Regulations & Safety
NTSB Urges FAA Action on Bombardier Learjet Landing Gear Flaw
After a fatal 2025 crash, NTSB calls for FAA to mandate inspections and fix maintenance for Bombardier Learjet landing gear safety.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued an urgent safety recommendation to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) concerning a critical flaw in the landing gear assembly of certain Bombardier Learjet models. This decisive action follows a comprehensive investigation into a fatal runway excursion in Scottsdale, Arizona, which highlighted a latent but severe safety risk. An urgent recommendation from the NTSB signifies a critical threat to life or property that requires immediate attention, compelling recipients to respond within 30 days. The gravity of the situation is underscored by the sheer number of aircraft involved, a total of 1,883 airplanes across 10 specific Learjet models currently in service.
The catalyst for this recommendation was a tragic accident on February 10, 2025, where a Learjet 35A experienced a catastrophic failure during its landing sequence. The aircraft’s left main landing gear separated upon touchdown, causing the jet to veer off the runway and collide with a parked aircraft. The incident resulted in the death of the captain and serious injuries to three other individuals. However, the NTSB’s investigation revealed that this was not an isolated event. A pattern of similar failures dating back decades pointed to a systemic issue with the landing gear’s design or, more specifically, its maintenance procedures. This history of incidents, combined with the fatal outcome in Scottsdale, has created a clear and present need for regulatory intervention to prevent future occurrences.
At the heart of the issue is a subtle but dangerous flaw in how the main landing gear is secured to the airframe. The investigation pinpointed a specific component, the aft trunnion pin and its retaining bolt, as the point of failure. The NTSB’s findings indicate that the current maintenance procedures allow for a critical misassembly that is nearly impossible to detect through standard pre-flight or even routine maintenance checks. This hidden vulnerability means that hundreds of aircraft could potentially be operating with insecurely attached landing gear, posing a significant and unacceptable risk to crew, passengers, and individuals on the ground.
The events of February 10, 2025, at Scottsdale Airport serve as a stark illustration of the potential consequences of this mechanical vulnerability. During the landing rollout, the Learjet 35A’s left main landing gear detached from the aircraft. This structural failure caused the jet to enter a “left-wing-low attitude” and veer uncontrollably off the runway. The excursion ended when the Learjet struck a parked Gulfstream G200 jet, resulting in significant damage to both aircraft. The separated landing gear was later found on an adjacent taxiway.
The human cost of this mechanical failure was severe. The captain of the Learjet was killed in the accident. The first officer and a passenger aboard the Learjet, as well as an occupant of the parked Gulfstream, all sustained serious injuries. Such outcomes transform a technical investigation into a pressing human safety issue, driving the urgency behind the NTSB’s recommendations. The investigation focused immediately on the separated landing gear, seeking to understand the precise cause of the detachment during what should have been a routine landing.
The NTSB’s investigation zeroed in on the aft landing gear trunnion pin and its retaining bolt. This assembly is a critical connection point that secures the entire landing gear structure to the aircraft’s wing. The board discovered that it is possible for a mechanic to inadvertently install the retaining bolt without it properly passing through the trunnion pin. In this state, the bolt appears to be correctly installed and secured, but it is not actually locking the pin in place. This leaves the landing gear insecurely attached to the airframe, held on by little more than friction and positioning.
This misassembly is particularly dangerous because it is not readily detectable. A visual inspection during a pre-flight walk-around would not reveal the improperly seated bolt. Furthermore, even during subsequent maintenance, the error can be easily missed without a specific verification step. This creates a latent failure condition that can persist through numerous flight cycles, waiting for the stresses of a landing to trigger a catastrophic separation. The NTSB’s findings highlight a critical gap in the maintenance process that has allowed this risk to go unaddressed.
In the absence of a required verification step, a mechanic could inadvertently install the retaining bolt without it passing through the trunnion pin, leaving the gear insecurely attached to the airframe. The misassembly is not readily detectable during routine maintenance or preflight inspections.
While the Scottsdale accident was the immediate trigger, the NTSB’s investigation quickly uncovered a disturbing history of similar incidents. This pattern demonstrates that the vulnerability in the Learjet’s landing gear assembly is a long-standing issue, not a new phenomenon. By looking into past events, the board identified at least three prior occurrences where a Learjet’s main landing gear disconnected from the airframe due to the same failure of the retaining bolt and trunnion pin assembly. These historical cases span several years and different aircraft models within the Learjet family. On October 4, 1995, a Learjet 25B experienced a left main landing gear collapse in Oklahoma City. A few years later, on February 4, 2001, another Learjet 25B suffered a gear separation after touchdown in Fort Pierce, Florida. A third documented incident occurred on March 28, 2008, when a Learjet VU-35A operated by the Brazilian Air Force had its left main landing gear collapse in Recife, Brazil. This documented history proves that the potential for misassembly has existed for decades, making the need for a permanent solution all the more critical.
In response to its findings, the NTSB has issued two specific recommendations. The first and most urgent is for the FAA to mandate compliance with service bulletins issued by Bombardier. Following the Scottsdale accident, Bombardier released a service bulletin requesting a one-time inspection of the landing gear on all affected models. However, the response has been alarmingly low; according to Bombardier, only 12 percent of the 1,883 airplanes have been inspected. By calling for an FAA mandate, likely in the form of an Airworthiness Directive (AD), the NTSB is seeking to make these inspections compulsory, ensuring the entire fleet is checked.
The second recommendation targets the root cause of the problem: the maintenance procedure itself. The NTSB has asked the FAA to require Bombardier to revise its procedures to include a specific post-maintenance visual check. This new step would require mechanics to visually verify the correct position of the aft trunnion pin and retaining bolt after installation, eliminating the ambiguity that allows for the current misassembly. This procedural fix is designed to prevent the error from occurring in the first place, providing a long-term solution to the safety vulnerability.
The NTSB’s urgent recommendations regarding the Bombardier Learjet fleet represent a critical step in the aviation safety cycle. The investigation into the tragic Scottsdale accident successfully identified not only a mechanical point of failure but also a procedural gap that allowed a hidden danger to persist across more than 1,800 aircraft. By uncovering a history of similar incidents, the board has demonstrated a systemic risk that requires a robust and mandatory solution. The focus now shifts to the FAA and Bombardier to implement these changes swiftly.
This case serves as a powerful reminder that aviation safety is an ongoing process of learning and adaptation. The subtle, hard-to-detect nature of the landing gear flaw underscores the importance of designing maintenance procedures that are not only effective but also include clear verification steps to prevent human error. The implementation of a mandatory inspection and a revised maintenance protocol will be crucial in ensuring that this specific type of accident does not happen again, protecting flight crews, passengers, and the public from a known and preventable risk.
Question: What is the specific problem with the Learjet landing gear? Question: How many aircraft are affected by this recommendation? Question: Why is the NTSB’s recommendation considered “urgent”?
NTSB Calls for Urgent Action on Learjet Landing Gear After Fatal Accident
Anatomy of a Failure: The Scottsdale Incident and a Hidden Flaw
The Technical Flaw: A Bolt That Deceives
A Pattern of Failures and a Call for Mandatory Action
The NTSB’s Two-Pronged Recommendation
Conclusion: From Investigation to Prevention
FAQ
Answer: The NTSB found that the retaining bolt for the aft trunnion pin on the main landing gear can be installed incorrectly without being obvious. This leaves the gear insecurely attached to the airframe, creating a risk of it separating during landing.
Answer: The recommendation affects 1,883 airplanes currently in service across 10 different Private-Jets models.
Answer: The NTSB issues urgent recommendations to address immediate and critical safety issues that pose a threat to lives or property. Given the fatal accident in Scottsdale and the large number of potentially affected aircraft, the agency determined that immediate action was necessary.Sources
Photo Credit: NTSB
Regulations & Safety
NTSB Finds No Mechanical Failure in Bangor Challenger 600 Crash
NTSB preliminary report on the Bangor Bombardier Challenger 600 crash cites severe winter weather and deicing as key factors, no mechanical faults found.
This article is based on an official preliminary report from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has released its preliminary report regarding the fatal crash of a Bombardier CL-600-2B16 airplane that occurred on January 25, 2026, at Bangor International Airport (KBGR) in Maine. The accident resulted in the deaths of all six individuals on board, including two crew members and four passengers.
According to the NTSB’s findings, investigators have found no evidence of flight control malfunctions or mechanical failures that would have precluded normal operation. Instead, the investigation is increasingly focusing on environmental factors, specifically the severe winter weather conditions and the deicing procedures conducted minutes before the aircraft attempted to take off.
The aircraft, registered as N10KJ and operated by KTKJ Challenger LLC, was en route to Châlons Vatry Airport in France after a refueling stop in Bangor. The flight originated from William P. Hobby Airport in Houston, Texas.
Data recovered from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) provides a detailed timeline of the aircraft’s final movements. The NTSB report indicates that the jet arrived at the runway threshold during a severe winter storm characterized by falling snow and freezing temperatures.
The preliminary report states that the aircraft underwent deicing treatment with both Type I and Type IV fluids at approximately 7:20 PM local time. Following the application of the fluid, the plane remained stationary for about five minutes before beginning its taxi to the runway.
Investigators noted that the CVR captured a critical conversation between the flight crew regarding “holdover times.” Holdover time refers to the estimated length of time deicing fluid remains effective in preventing the accumulation of ice or snow on critical aircraft surfaces. This discussion suggests the crew was aware of the deteriorating conditions and the time sensitivity of their departure.
The aircraft reached Runway 33 at 7:40 PM and received clearance for takeoff. According to FDR data, engine power was increased for takeoff at 7:43:57 PM. The aircraft lifted off the runway approximately 30 seconds later. However, the flight was brief. Moments after becoming airborne, the aircraft veered off the right side of the runway. It scraped the ground, flipped over, and came to rest inverted in a grassy safety area. The debris field stretched approximately 1,270 feet long and 150 feet wide, with the wreckage sustaining significant damage from a prolonged post-crash fire.
The NTSB’s on-site examination and data analysis have ruled out several potential causes, narrowing the scope of the ongoing investigation.
A key finding in the preliminary report is the status of the engines. The NTSB states:
Data from the Flight Data Recorder indicates that both engines were producing takeoff power and continued to gain power until the recording stopped.
Furthermore, investigators found no evidence of anomalies with the flight controls prior to the impact. The wings remained attached to the fuselage despite the severity of the crash, and the landing gear was found in the extended position.
At the time of the accident, visibility was reported as approximately three-quarters of a mile due to snow. The presence of freezing precipitation is a critical factor in the investigation, particularly regarding the effectiveness of the deicing fluid used.
While the NTSB report focuses on technical details, local authorities and media have identified the six victims of the tragedy. According to reporting by the Bangor Daily News and other local outlets, the victims include Shawna Collins, Nick Mastrascusa, Tara Arnold, Jacob Hosmer, Shelby Kuyawa, and Jorden Reidel. The aircraft was linked to the Houston-based law firm Arnold & Itkin.
The Bombardier Challenger 600 series has a documented history regarding wing contamination. Aviation safety databases note that this aircraft type has a “hard wing” design that can be sensitive to even small amounts of ice or frost, which can disrupt airflow and lead to a stall during takeoff.
Previous incidents, such as the 2004 crash in Montrose, Colorado, and the 2002 crash in Birmingham, England, involved similar circumstances where wing contamination was cited as a contributing factor. The NTSB’s final report, expected in 12 to 24 months, will likely determine if the severe weather in Bangor exceeded the capabilities of the deicing fluid or if the holdover time was exceeded. The focus on “holdover times” in the cockpit voice recorder transcript is a significant detail. In severe winter operations, the window between deicing and takeoff is often measured in minutes. If the intensity of the snowfall increases, the effective time of the anti-icing fluid decreases rapidly. The fact that the engines were producing power and no mechanical faults were found strongly suggests that aerodynamic performance was compromised, a hallmark of icing accidents. This investigation will likely serve as a critical reminder of the strict limitations of deicing fluids in active precipitation.
Sources: NTSB Preliminary Report, Bangor Daily News, FAA Registry
NTSB Preliminary Report: No Mechanical Failure Found in Bangor Challenger 600 Crash
Sequence of Events
Deicing and Taxi
Takeoff and Impact
Investigation Findings
Engine and Systems Performance
Weather Conditions
Victims and Context
Aircraft History and Icing Sensitivity
AirPro News Analysis
Sources
Photo Credit: NTSB
Regulations & Safety
United Airlines Plane Collides with Deicing Truck at Denver Airport
United Airlines Flight 605 collided with a deicing truck at Denver International Airport amid a snowstorm, injuring the truck driver and delaying flights.
This article summarizes reporting by 9News, Richard Cote, CBS News and social platform X.
A United Airlines aircraft collided with a deicing truck Friday morning at Denver International Airport (DIA), resulting in injuries to the truck’s driver and forcing passengers to deplane on the tarmac. The incident occurred amidst a severe March snowstorm that has disrupted travel across the region.
United Airlines Flight 605, a Boeing 737-800 scheduled to depart for Nashville, struck the vehicle while exiting the deicing pad. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the collision took place in a section of the airfield not controlled by air traffic towers.
The Incident occurred at approximately 8:26 a.m. local time as the aircraft was preparing for departure. According to reporting by 9News, the flight had been scheduled to leave Denver at 7:59 a.m. but was delayed due to winter weather conditions. The FAA confirmed that the aircraft was moving out of the deicing area when it struck the truck.
United Airlines confirmed the accident in a statement, noting that the aircraft “made contact with ground equipment” during the operation. Following the collision, the 122 passengers and six crew members on board were evacuated from the aircraft via stairs and transported by bus back to the terminal. No injuries were reported among those on the plane.
While the passengers and crew remained unharmed, the operator of the deicing truck sustained injuries. According to a United Airlines spokesperson cited by the Denver Gazette, the driver, an employee of a contractor used by the airport, was taken to a hospital. The extent of the driver’s injuries has not been publicly disclosed.
The collision occurred during a significant winter storm affecting Colorado’s Front Range. The adverse weather conditions had already severely impacted operations at Denver International Airports before the ground accident took place.
According to flight tracking data, more than 600 flights were delayed and scores were canceled at the airport by Friday morning. United Airlines and Southwest Airlines were among the carriers most heavily affected by the snow and ice. The FAA stated it would investigate the collision, specifically noting that the crash happened in a non-movement area where pilots and ground vehicles are responsible for maintaining visual clearance. United Airlines stated they were working to rebook customers on alternative flights to Nashville. In a statement regarding the safety of the operation, the airline said:
“United flight 605 made contact with the equipment… [We are] cooperating with airport officials and federal investigators.”
Ground collisions in deicing areas are relatively rare but can occur during periods of low visibility and high congestion, such as winter storms. In these “non-movement” areas, air traffic control does not provide separation instructions, placing the burden of safety on pilots and ground vehicle operators. The Investigation will likely focus on communication protocols and visibility factors present during the heavy snowfall.
Was anyone injured in the accident? What caused the collision? What happened to the passengers?
Collision on the Deicing Pad
Driver Hospitalized
Weather Context and Operational Impact
AirPro News Analysis
Frequently Asked Questions
Yes, the driver of the deicing truck was injured and transported to a hospital. No passengers or crew members on the aircraft were hurt.
The specific cause is under investigation by the FAA. The collision occurred while the aircraft was exiting a deicing pad during heavy snow.
Passengers were deplaned using stairs on the tarmac and bused back to the terminal to be rebooked on other flights.
Sources
Photo Credit: CBS News
Regulations & Safety
Skyryse Launches Universal Emergency Autoland for Helicopters and Planes
Skyryse unveils Universal Emergency Autoland for fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, enhancing safety with automated landings starting 2026.
This article is based on an official press release from Skyryse.
In a significant development for general aviation safety, Skyryse has announced the introduction of a “Universal Emergency Autoland” feature for its SkyOSâ„¢ operating system. According to the company’s official announcement, this technology represents the world’s first emergency landing system designed to be aircraft-agnostic, capable of safely landing both fixed-wing airplanes and helicopters in the event of pilot incapacitation.
The new capability is designed to address a critical gap in current aviation safety technology. While automated landing systems like Garmin Autoland have existed for several years, they have been restricted to specific fixed-wing airframes. Skyryse states that their new system leverages the SkyOS platform to bring similar “panic button” safety to the vertical lift market, including helicopters which require complex stabilization and control inputs to land safely.
Skyryse has confirmed that the Universal Emergency Autoland feature will be a core component of SkyOS. The system is currently undergoing “for-credit” testing with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), with the first production aircraft, the Skyryse One, expected to begin shipping in 2026.
The core promise of the Skyryse system is simplicity for the passenger during a crisis. According to the company, the system can be activated in two ways: manually, via a single tap on a touchscreen by a passenger, or automatically, if the system detects pilot unresponsiveness or erratic flight behavior.
Once engaged, Skyryse describes a fully automated sequence of events designed to bring the aircraft and its occupants to safety:
Mark Groden, CEO of Skyryse, emphasized the user-centric design of the feature in the company’s announcement:
“If you have an incapacitated pilot, you’re probably going to be pretty stressed… It would be so much easier to have, basically, a shortcut button for the passenger to press, and then they can focus on other things.”
The distinction between fixed-wing and rotary-wing automation is substantial. Landing a helicopter requires active management of stability across all axes, a task that has historically made retrofitting autopilots difficult. Skyryse claims to solve this through a triply-redundant fly-by-wire system that replaces traditional mechanical linkages.
According to technical details released by Skyryse, the system utilizes “advanced sensor fusion,” combining data from radar, lidar, and cameras. This suite allows the aircraft to perceive its environment in real-time, ensuring that it does not attempt to land on obstacles, even if GPS data is slightly inaccurate. While Skyryse has previously demonstrated fully automated autorotations (unpowered landings), this new feature is specifically designed for powered emergency landings where the engine is operational but the pilot is unable to fly. The announcement positions Skyryse as a competitor to established players like Garmin, whose Autoland system is the current industry standard for turboprops and light jets. However, Garmin’s solution does not support helicopters. Other manufacturers, such as Leonardo, are developing similar capabilities for specific models like the AW169, but Skyryse aims to offer a universal retrofit solution applicable to a wide variety of airframes, starting with the Robinson R66-based Skyryse One.
The introduction of a universal autoland system for helicopters marks a potential paradigm shift in general aviation safety. Historically, high-end automation has been the domain of expensive business jets. By designing SkyOS as an “operating system” rather than a bespoke avionics suite, Skyryse is attempting to democratize safety features.
If successful, this technology could significantly reduce accident rates in the helicopter sector, which statistically faces higher risks than fixed-wing aviation. The ability to retrofit this technology onto older airframes could also revitalize the legacy fleet, offering owners a safety upgrade that was previously impossible without purchasing a brand-new aircraft. However, the success of this rollout hinges on the FAA certification process, which is notoriously rigorous for fly-by-wire systems in general aviation.
Skyryse has outlined a clear roadmap for the deployment of this technology. The company is currently pursuing a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for SkyOS. The first aircraft to feature the Universal Emergency Autoland will be the Skyryse One, a modernized version of the Robinson R66 helicopter.
According to the press release, the Skyryse One is expected to ship in 2026. The Universal Emergency Autoland capability is slated to be available at launch or shortly thereafter as a standard feature of the SkyOS platform.
The system is designed to be aircraft-agnostic, meaning it can be installed on both helicopters and fixed-wing airplanes. The first certified aircraft will be the Skyryse One (a modified Robinson R66).
Garmin Autoland is currently certified only for specific fixed-wing aircraft (like the Piper M600 and Cirrus Vision Jet). Skyryse’s solution is the first to support vertical-lift aircraft (helicopters) in addition to airplanes.
Skyryse expects the first production aircraft featuring this technology to begin shipping in 2026, pending FAA certification. Sources: Skyryse Press Release
Skyryse Unveils Universal Emergency Autoland for Helicopters and Fixed-Wing Aircraft
How Universal Emergency Autoland Works
Bridging the Helicopter Safety Gap
Technical Implementation
Comparison to Existing Solutions
AirPro News Analysis
Timeline and Availability
Frequently Asked Questions
What aircraft will support Skyryse Universal Emergency Autoland?
How is this different from Garmin Autoland?
When will this technology be available?
Photo Credit: Skyryse
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