Regulations & Safety
Jeju Air Flight 2216 Crash Caused by Pilot Error and Bird Strike
Jeju Air Flight 2216 crashed due to pilot error shutting down the wrong engine after a bird strike, prompting new safety measures in South Korea.
The crash of Jeju Air Flight 2216 on December 29, 2024, has become one of the most scrutinized aviation disasters in South Korea’s history. The flight, en route from Bangkok to Muan International Airport, ended in tragedy after a dual engine failure and a series of missteps during emergency procedures. The South Korea-led investigation has revealed that the pilots shut down the less-damaged engine following a bird strike, a decision that critically contributed to the loss of all thrust and the eventual crash.
This article examines the background of the incident, the investigation’s findings, industry reactions, and the broader implications for aviation safety. We aim to present a balanced, evidence-based overview grounded in verified data and expert analysis.
Jeju Air Flight 2216 was a scheduled passenger flight operated by a Boeing 737-800. On December 29, 2024, while approaching Muan International Airport, the aircraft encountered a bird strike involving migratory Baikal teal ducks. Both engines ingested birds, but only the right engine sustained critical damage. The aircraft lost thrust and failed to deploy its landing gear, ultimately skidding off the runway and catching fire upon impact with a concrete barrier.
Of the 181 people on board, 179 lost their lives. The only survivors were two flight attendants who managed to escape the wreckage. This made the crash one of the deadliest in South Korea’s aviation history. Investigators quickly focused on the sequence of events following the bird strike, particularly the pilots’ decision-making under pressure.
Initial findings highlighted long-standing concerns about Muan Airport’s vulnerability to bird strikes. Environmental assessments dating back over a decade had flagged the airport’s proximity to wetlands and migratory paths as a high-risk factor. In fact, a bird-strike prevention committee convened just ten days before the crash, acknowledging the lack of personnel and ineffective deterrent systems. Despite this, no significant changes were implemented before the incident.
Flight data and cockpit voice recordings revealed that after the bird strike, the flight crew mistakenly shut down the left engine, which remained operational, instead of the right engine, which was critically damaged. The captain issued the command to shut down engine number two (the right engine), but the fuel cutoff switch for engine number one (the left engine) was activated instead. The fire extinguisher was also discharged on the left engine, effectively eliminating all available thrust.
This error severely compromised the aircraft’s ability to maintain altitude and speed. Compounding the problem, the landing gear was never deployed. The aircraft attempted a belly landing at high speed, which led to the runway overrun and collision with a concrete barrier. The lack of thrust and gear deployment created a scenario from which recovery was virtually impossible.
The Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board (ARAIB) confirmed these findings in its interim report released in July 2025. The report emphasized that the left engine was fully functional prior to being shut down and that the right engine had failed due to the bird strike. The investigation also noted that the landing gear lever was never activated during the emergency procedures. “Shutting down the wrong engine reflects breakdowns in cockpit coordination and procedural discipline during cascading emergencies.”, John Cox, former crash investigator
The interim report sparked significant backlash from victims’ families, pilot associations, and aviation experts. The Korea Civil Aviation Pilots Association criticized the investigation for focusing too heavily on pilot error while ignoring systemic issues, including airport safety and infrastructure. Families of the victims also expressed frustration over the ARAIB’s reluctance to release complete flight recorder data and accused the agency of downplaying the role of the concrete barrier in exacerbating fatalities.
Independent aviation analysts have pointed out that bird strikes alone typically do not result in complete loss of aircraft control. Alvin Lie, an aviation analyst, remarked that landing gear failures are not commonly associated with bird strikes and suggested that other factors, such as crew disorientation or procedural lapses, likely contributed to the crash. Matt Driskill, editor of Asian Aviation, noted that the high-speed belly landing indicated significant deviations from standard emergency protocols.
Experts have also highlighted deficiencies in crew resource management (CRM). The pilots did not follow standard checklists and made unconventional maneuvers after the bird strike, including a climb and a downwind landing attempt. These actions reduced the time available for corrective measures and increased the risk of a catastrophic outcome.
Bird strikes are a well-documented hazard in aviation, particularly during takeoff and landing. According to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), there were over 19,000 bird strikes in 2023, with a notable increase attributed to climate change and urban sprawl affecting bird migration patterns. Globally, bird strikes cause more than $1.2 billion in damages annually.
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) recommends wildlife hazard assessments and the use of radar and thermal imaging systems for real-time bird detection. However, only a minority of airports worldwide have implemented these technologies. Muan Airport, for instance, relied on periodic patrols and loudspeakers, methods considered outdated and insufficient by modern safety standards.
In the aftermath of the crash, South Korea mandated the installation of bird-detection radar at all domestic airports by March 2025. This move aligns with practices at major international hubs such as JFK and Denver, where integrated detection and deterrent systems are already in place. These systems combine radar, AI, and habitat management to reduce bird strike risks effectively.
The Jeju Air Flight 2216 crash was a tragic convergence of human error and systemic failures. While the immediate cause was the shutdown of the wrong engine, deeper issues such as inadequate bird strike prevention, insufficient training, and flawed airport infrastructure played significant roles. The incident underscores the importance of comprehensive safety protocols and the need for real-time hazard detection systems.
Going forward, the aviation industry must prioritize proactive risk management, especially in regions with known environmental hazards. Regulatory bodies should enforce ICAO standards more rigorously, and airlines must invest in CRM training that prepares crews for complex, high-stress scenarios. Transparency in investigations and infrastructure audits will also be key to restoring public trust and preventing future tragedies. What caused the crash of Jeju Air Flight 2216? How many people died in the crash? What safety measures are being implemented post-crash?
Jeju Air Flight 2216 Crash: Pilot Error in Engine Shutdown After Bird Strike
Background of the Jeju Air Crash
Bird Strike and Engine Shutdown Sequence
Expert Reactions and Industry Criticism
Global Context and Bird Strike Mitigation
Conclusion
FAQ
The crash was caused by a combination of a bird strike that damaged the right engine and a pilot error that led to the shutdown of the functional left engine, resulting in total thrust loss.
179 of the 181 people on board died. Only two flight attendants survived.
South Korea is mandating bird-detection radar at all domestic airports and revising pilot training protocols to include more intensive emergency response simulations.
Photo Credit: SCMP
Regulations & Safety
ICAO Updates Annex 13 to Address Conflicts in Aviation Accident Investigations
ICAO’s Amendment 20 to Annex 13 improves aircraft accident investigations by preventing conflicts of interest, enhancing transparency, and ensuring evidence access.
This article is based on an official press release from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
On March 27, 2026, the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) announced a landmark decision to update international aviation Standards, specifically targeting conflicts of interest in aircraft accident Investigations. The updates amend Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation) of the 1944 Chicago Convention, marking a significant shift in how global aviation authorities handle sensitive crash inquiries.
According to the official ICAO press release, the new framework introduces robust mechanisms for delegating investigations, ensuring unrestricted access to evidence, and improving transparency for the public and victims’ families. This regulatory move addresses critical vulnerabilities exposed in recent years, most notably the 2020 downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752, where the State responsible for investigating the accident was also implicated in causing it.
We note that this amendment represents a vital evolution in international aviation law. By closing historical loopholes, the global aviation community is taking concrete steps to prioritize Safety, transparency, and the rights of victims’ families over geopolitical maneuvering and domestic interference.
Under the traditional framework of Article 26 of the Chicago Convention and existing Annex 13 standards, the responsibility for investigating an aviation accident defaults to the country where the accident happened, known as the “State of Occurrence.” The sole objective of these investigations is accident prevention, rather than apportioning blame or legal liability.
However, this system has shown severe limitations in cases of “unlawful interference.” When a civilian aircraft is shot down by military forces, and the State of Occurrence is also the State whose military caused the crash, a severe conflict of interest arises. Historically, the rules did not obligate a conflicted State to delegate the investigation, allowing them to exploit loopholes to control the narrative.
The vulnerability of the old framework was tragically highlighted on January 8, 2020, when Iran’s military shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752, resulting in the deaths of all 176 people on board. Because the crash occurred in Iran, Iranian authorities led the safety investigation under Annex 13. Canada and other nations heavily criticized the investigation, citing a failure to protect evidence, premature site cleanup, and a final report that lacked transparency.
Following the tragedy, an International Coordination and Response Group comprising Canada, Sweden, Ukraine, and the UK spearheaded a multi-year diplomatic effort at ICAO to amend Annex 13. Their advocacy, alongside the families of the victims, served as the primary catalyst for the reforms announced this week. The newly approved Amendment 20 to Annex 13 introduces several critical measures to safeguard the independence and credibility of aviation safety findings. According to the ICAO announcement, the amendment provides new guidance to help States manage investigations where an actual or perceived conflict of interest could undermine public confidence.
To enhance credibility, the updated standards encourage States to delegate the investigation to another State or a regional accident investigation organization. Furthermore, States are now urged to invite ICAO and third-party States to observe the investigation process, ensuring an added layer of international oversight.
A crucial element of the amendment is the requirement for unrestricted access to evidence. The ICAO Council approved changes clarifying that accident investigation authorities must have unrestricted access to all evidential material without delay. This provision is explicitly designed to prevent local or judicial authorities from misinterpreting rules to restrict investigators’ access to crash sites or flight data.
The framework also emphasizes public transparency, urging investigating bodies to provide timely, verified factual information to the public. Additionally, it aligns Annex 13 with updated provisions in Annex 19 (Safety Management), reinforcing the role that accident investigation data plays in proactive, State-level safety management.
Amendment 20 to Annex 13 will officially become applicable on November 23, 2028. This delayed applicability provides the 193 ICAO Member States with over two years to transpose the revised international provisions into their own national laws, Regulations, and procedures.
ICAO has stated it will actively support the global rollout through updated guidance materials, revised manuals, and regional workshops. These initiatives will bring together accident investigators, judicial figures, and aviation security authorities to ensure a smooth transition to the new standards.
We view this amendment as a vital step toward restoring public trust in international aviation investigations. By addressing the “State of Occurrence” loophole, ICAO is ensuring that investigations into highly sensitive or geopolitical incidents remain focused purely on safety and prevention, rather than political cover-ups. The challenge moving forward will be enforcement, particularly in nations with authoritarian governments or active conflict zones.
Furthermore, the inclusion of specific guidance regarding communication with victims’ families reflects a growing, necessary trend within the industry. In February 2026, ICAO Council President Toshiyuki Onuma urged governments to accelerate comprehensive support systems for air crash victims. “The international community must build an air transport system more deeply rooted in care.”, ICAO Council President Toshiyuki Onuma
This amendment ties directly into ICAO’s Long-Term Strategic Plan for 2050, which aims to accelerate progress toward zero aviation fatalities worldwide by ensuring that every accident yields untainted, actionable safety data.
What is Annex 13? When do the new ICAO rules take effect? Why were these changes made?
Addressing the “State of Occurrence” Loophole
The Catalyst: Flight PS752
Key Provisions of Amendment 20
Unrestricted Access and Transparency
Implementation and Industry Implications
AirPro News analysis
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Annex 13 to the 1944 Chicago Convention outlines the international standards and recommended practices for aircraft accident and incident investigation, dictating how global aviation authorities respond to crashes.
Amendment 20 to Annex 13 will officially become applicable on November 23, 2028, giving Member States time to update their national laws.
The changes were driven by the need to prevent conflicts of interest in accident investigations. This was heavily influenced by the 2020 downing of Flight PS752, where the investigating State was also the State whose military caused the crash.
Photo Credit: ICAO
Regulations & Safety
EASA and EUROCONTROL Launch Plan to Address GNSS Interference in Aviation
EASA and EUROCONTROL publish a joint Action Plan to enhance European aviation safety against increasing GNSS signal interference near conflict zones.
This article is based on an official press release from EASA and EUROCONTROL, supplemented by industry research data.
On March 26, 2026, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and EUROCONTROL published a joint Action Plan aimed at fortifying the safety and resilience of European aviation against the escalating threat of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference. The comprehensive strategy outlines a coordinated, multi-year approach to combat GPS jamming and spoofing, which have become regular operational hurdles for commercial airlines.
GNSS provides aircraft with critical positioning, navigation, and timing data. According to the joint press release, interference with these signals has become a frequent occurrence, particularly near the edges of active conflict zones, posing a direct threat to aviation safety. The newly published Action Plan seeks to maintain near-term safety while limiting the impact on airspace capacity and establishing a robust framework for future Navigation infrastructure.
By detailing 22 specific action items categorized into short-, medium-, and long-term measures, the initiative clearly defines responsibilities and timelines for various aviation stakeholders. We are seeing a definitive regulatory pivot from treating GNSS interference as a temporary anomaly to addressing it as a permanent fixture of modern airspace that requires structural technological backups.
To understand the urgency of this joint Action Plan, it is necessary to look at the recent surge in signal disruption incidents. Industry data from the International Air Transport Association (IATA) indicates that global positioning system (GPS) signal loss events increased by 220% between 2021 and 2024. This spike in jamming and spoofing is heavily concentrated around the peripheries of active conflict zones, most notably in Eastern Europe, the Baltic region, and the Middle East.
The operational impact of these disruptions is substantial. While Commercial-Aircraft are currently authorized to use the GPS constellation for GNSS, losing this signal reduces safety margins by increasing pilot workload and disabling critical systems, such as terrain and collision avoidance. Furthermore, it frequently forces aircraft to fly longer, less efficient routes, resulting in widespread flight delays.
The catalyst for this coordinated response was a formal letter sent on June 6, 2025, by 13 EU Member States to the European Commission, demanding immediate action against Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) affecting aviation. This political pressure followed a major European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC) exercise in March 2025, which underscored the urgent need for standardized spoofing responses and technical backups.
The Action Plan structures its 22 items across three distinct timeframes. The short-term actions, slated for the next one to three years, focus on immediate threat containment and maintaining airspace capacity. According to the research report detailing the plan, these measures include developing standardized phraseology for communications between pilots and Air Traffic Control (ATC), as well as establishing harmonized criteria for issuing and canceling Notices to Air Missions (NOTAMs) regarding interference. A critical component of the short-term strategy is the pooling of data. EASA and EUROCONTROL are utilizing a shared “Data4Safety” workspace to consolidate interference data, harmonize detection algorithms, and generate co-branded maps and alerts. This unified, real-time map of European airspace interference represents a major advancement for pilot situational awareness, replacing the previously fragmented views held by individual Airlines and national authorities.
Looking ahead three to five years, the medium-term actions focus on coordination and technological development. EASA and EUROCONTROL plan to work closely with avionics manufacturers and standards bodies, such as EUROCAE, to develop more robust GNSS receivers. New standards, expected for open consultation in 2026 or 2027, will require receivers to automatically recover from RFI once an aircraft leaves an impacted area.
For the long-term (five years and beyond), the focus shifts to strategic resilience and the deployment of alternative technologies. The Action Plan assesses complementary infrastructure for scenarios where GNSS is entirely unavailable. Explored technologies include Low Earth Orbit Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (LEO PNT), the L-band Digital Aeronautics Communications System (LDACS), and terrestrial reference time distribution systems.
Leadership from both EASA and EUROCONTROL emphasized the necessity of moving beyond temporary fixes to establish a resilient, sector-wide defense against signal interference.
“While the potential threat to aviation safety from GNSS interference has so far been mitigated by short-term actions such as raising pilot awareness, it is clear that more needs to be done,” said Florian Guillermet, EASA Executive Director, in the official press release. “This Action Plan lays out and prioritises short, mid and longer-term actions and, importantly, also assigns roles to the various aviation actors.”
EUROCONTROL echoed this sentiment, tying the initiative to broader modernization goals.
“GNSS interference remains a significant and evolving challenge for European aviation, making today’s Action Plan an important step forward in our collective response,” stated Raúl Medina, Director-General of EUROCONTROL. “The Action Plan concretely supports our Member States and aviation partners as we work together to ensure the evolution and resilience of aviation’s critical infrastructure.”
We observe that the EASA and EUROCONTROL Action Plan represents a fundamental shift in aviation safety strategy: moving from containment to structural resilience. By integrating this plan with EUROCONTROL’s Trajectory 2030 strategy, endorsed by Member States in November 2025 and published in December 2025, European Regulations are acknowledging that GPS spoofing is no longer a localized military spillover, but a persistent civilian infrastructure vulnerability.
Furthermore, while this is a European initiative, the active integration of guidance from IATA and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) suggests a broader strategic goal. We anticipate that this European framework will serve as the foundational blueprint for global alignment on GNSS interference standards and reporting at the ICAO level in the coming years.
GNSS interference involves the disruption of Global Navigation Satellite System signals, commonly through jamming (blocking the signal) or spoofing (sending false signal data). This deprives aircraft of precise positioning, navigation, and timing information. The plan is a response to a 220% increase in GPS signal loss events between 2021 and 2024, driven by geopolitical conflicts. It was directly catalyzed by a June 2025 demand from 13 EU Member States for coordinated action against radio frequency interference.
Long-term solutions (5+ years) involve deploying complementary infrastructure that does not rely on traditional GNSS. This includes Low Earth Orbit Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (LEO PNT) and the L-band Digital Aeronautics Communications System (LDACS).
Sources:
The Escalating Threat of GNSS Interference
Geopolitical Drivers and Operational Impact
A Phased Approach to Airspace Resilience
Short-Term Containment and Data Sharing
Medium to Long-Term Technological Shifts
Industry Leadership Perspectives
AirPro News analysis
Frequently Asked Questions
What is GNSS interference?
Why was the Action Plan published now?
What are the long-term solutions proposed?
Photo Credit: Montage
Regulations & Safety
ICAO Adopts Stricter CO2 and Noise Standards for New Aircraft
ICAO’s new regulations mandate 10% stricter CO2 limits and tighter noise controls for subsonic and supersonic aircraft starting 2026.
This article is based on an official press release from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), with additional context summarized from industry reporting.
On March 27, 2026, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council formally adopted significantly stricter environmental standards for new Commercial-Aircraft. The updated regulations target both carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and noise levels, marking a major regulatory shift for aerospace Manufacturers worldwide.
According to the official ICAO press release, the new rules mandate a 10 percent increase in stringency for CO2 emissions and introduce harsher noise limits for both subsonic and next-generation supersonic aircraft. These measures are explicitly designed to force the integration of the latest fuel-efficiency and noise-reduction technologies into future aircraft designs.
This regulatory update directly supports the global aviation industry’s mandate to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Because commercial aircraft typically have operational lifespans of 20 to 30 years, standards implemented in the early 2030s are critical to ensuring that the mid-century global fleet operates as efficiently as possible.
The ICAO has established a phased timeline for the rollout of its new CO2 emissions standards. Starting in 2031, all new aircraft type designs must meet a certification standard that is 10 percent more stringent than the previous baseline, which had been in effect since 2017.
For aircraft types that are already in production, the timeline extends to 2035. According to industry research summarizing the ICAO framework, new Deliveries of these active programs will face a complex, tiered standard based on Maximum Take-Off Mass (MTOM):
In addition to emissions, the ICAO Council has raised the bar for acoustic performance. Beginning in 2029, new subsonic aircraft type designs will be subject to noise limits that are 6 decibels stricter for large aircraft and 2 decibels stricter for smaller models.
Crucially, the ICAO has also addressed the impending return of commercial supersonic flight. By 2029, next-generation supersonic jets will be legally required to comply with the exact same noise limits that apply to standard subsonic commercial aircraft during takeoff and landing.
“These more stringent ICAO standards have been developed to ensure the latest technologies are used in aircraft design to reduce aviation CO2 emissions and aircraft noise globally… The collaborative approach ensures that the revised rules are both technically robust and reflective of the realities faced by regulators and manufacturers in every region.”
The new standards are the culmination of a multi-year technical review process led by ICAO’s Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP). The groundwork for these Regulations was heavily debated during the CAEP/13 meetings, which commenced in February 2025. The ICAO’s decision follows mounting pressure from environmental researchers. In February 2025, the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) published a study indicating that previous ICAO standards lagged behind state-of-the-art technology by approximately a decade. The ICCT warned that fuel efficiency gains had stalled, necessitating stricter international mandates.
“The aviation industry’s commitment to net-zero emissions by 2050 requires continuous improvements in aircraft efficiency. Our findings suggest that without stronger standards, the industry risks falling short of its climate goals.”
Nikita Pavlenko, Aviation Program Director at the ICCT, echoed this sentiment in the organization’s research, noting that improvements in new aircraft are expected to contribute about one-sixth of all emission reductions under the industry’s net-zero target, making stronger standards crucial.
The 2031 and 2035 deadlines will require major commercial manufacturers, such as Boeing and Airbus, to update active type certification projects. Some modern designs are already positioned to meet these goals; industry reports note that Boeing expects its upcoming 777X to produce 20 percent fewer emissions than the models it replaces.
For the nascent supersonic sector, the 2029 noise regulations present a massive regulatory hurdle. Companies like Boom Supersonic, currently testing its XB-1 demonstrator for the future Overture jet, will now have to ensure their aircraft are as quiet as traditional subsonic jets in airport environments.
Conversely, the stricter noise limits could serve as a market catalyst for electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) air taxis and regional electric aircraft. Industry analysts suggest that if these vehicles prove significantly quieter than traditional helicopters, operators may rapidly adopt them to cap their overall noise footprints and comply with the new ICAO standards.
We note that the simultaneous mandate to reduce both emissions and noise presents a highly complex engineering challenge for aerospace manufacturers. Aerodynamic modifications designed to improve fuel efficiency and lower CO2 emissions can sometimes negatively impact acoustic performance, and vice versa. Balancing these competing technical requirements will likely require significant research and development investments over the next decade. Furthermore, the strict application of subsonic noise limits to supersonic aircraft effectively closes a regulatory loophole, forcing companies in that space to innovate heavily in engine noise suppression if they hope to operate at major international hubs.
According to official ICAO documentation, the new requirements have an effective date of August 3, 2026, and will apply globally starting January 1, 2027. The specific design and production deadlines phase in between 2029 and 2035.
Starting in 2029, any new supersonic aircraft designs must meet the same stringent noise limits required of traditional subsonic commercial jets during takeoff and landing. Sources:
Stricter CO2 Emissions Standards
Phased Implementation for New and In-Production Aircraft
Noise Reduction Mandates
Subsonic and Supersonic Requirements
Background and Environmental Pressure
The CAEP Process and ICCT Findings
Industry Impact and Emerging Technologies
Commercial Manufacturers and Supersonic Hurdles
AirPro News analysis
Frequently Asked Questions
When do the new ICAO standards take effect?
How do the new rules affect supersonic flights?
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Newsroom
FLYING Magazine
GreenAir News
Photo Credit: ICAO
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