Regulations & Safety
Jeju Air Flight 2216 Crash Caused by Pilot Error and Bird Strike
Jeju Air Flight 2216 crashed due to pilot error shutting down the wrong engine after a bird strike, prompting new safety measures in South Korea.
Jeju Air Flight 2216 Crash: Pilot Error in Engine Shutdown After Bird Strike
The crash of Jeju Air Flight 2216 on December 29, 2024, has become one of the most scrutinized aviation disasters in South Korea’s history. The flight, en route from Bangkok to Muan International Airport, ended in tragedy after a dual engine failure and a series of missteps during emergency procedures. The South Korea-led investigation has revealed that the pilots shut down the less-damaged engine following a bird strike, a decision that critically contributed to the loss of all thrust and the eventual crash.
This article examines the background of the incident, the investigation’s findings, industry reactions, and the broader implications for aviation safety. We aim to present a balanced, evidence-based overview grounded in verified data and expert analysis.
Background of the Jeju Air Crash
Jeju Air Flight 2216 was a scheduled passenger flight operated by a Boeing 737-800. On December 29, 2024, while approaching Muan International Airport, the aircraft encountered a bird strike involving migratory Baikal teal ducks. Both engines ingested birds, but only the right engine sustained critical damage. The aircraft lost thrust and failed to deploy its landing gear, ultimately skidding off the runway and catching fire upon impact with a concrete barrier.
Of the 181 people on board, 179 lost their lives. The only survivors were two flight attendants who managed to escape the wreckage. This made the crash one of the deadliest in South Korea’s aviation history. Investigators quickly focused on the sequence of events following the bird strike, particularly the pilots’ decision-making under pressure.
Initial findings highlighted long-standing concerns about Muan Airport’s vulnerability to bird strikes. Environmental assessments dating back over a decade had flagged the airport’s proximity to wetlands and migratory paths as a high-risk factor. In fact, a bird-strike prevention committee convened just ten days before the crash, acknowledging the lack of personnel and ineffective deterrent systems. Despite this, no significant changes were implemented before the incident.
Bird Strike and Engine Shutdown Sequence
Flight data and cockpit voice recordings revealed that after the bird strike, the flight crew mistakenly shut down the left engine, which remained operational, instead of the right engine, which was critically damaged. The captain issued the command to shut down engine number two (the right engine), but the fuel cutoff switch for engine number one (the left engine) was activated instead. The fire extinguisher was also discharged on the left engine, effectively eliminating all available thrust.
This error severely compromised the aircraft’s ability to maintain altitude and speed. Compounding the problem, the landing gear was never deployed. The aircraft attempted a belly landing at high speed, which led to the runway overrun and collision with a concrete barrier. The lack of thrust and gear deployment created a scenario from which recovery was virtually impossible.
The Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board (ARAIB) confirmed these findings in its interim report released in July 2025. The report emphasized that the left engine was fully functional prior to being shut down and that the right engine had failed due to the bird strike. The investigation also noted that the landing gear lever was never activated during the emergency procedures.
“Shutting down the wrong engine reflects breakdowns in cockpit coordination and procedural discipline during cascading emergencies.”, John Cox, former crash investigator
Expert Reactions and Industry Criticism
The interim report sparked significant backlash from victims’ families, pilot associations, and aviation experts. The Korea Civil Aviation Pilots Association criticized the investigation for focusing too heavily on pilot error while ignoring systemic issues, including airport safety and infrastructure. Families of the victims also expressed frustration over the ARAIB’s reluctance to release complete flight recorder data and accused the agency of downplaying the role of the concrete barrier in exacerbating fatalities.
Independent aviation analysts have pointed out that bird strikes alone typically do not result in complete loss of aircraft control. Alvin Lie, an aviation analyst, remarked that landing gear failures are not commonly associated with bird strikes and suggested that other factors, such as crew disorientation or procedural lapses, likely contributed to the crash. Matt Driskill, editor of Asian Aviation, noted that the high-speed belly landing indicated significant deviations from standard emergency protocols.
Experts have also highlighted deficiencies in crew resource management (CRM). The pilots did not follow standard checklists and made unconventional maneuvers after the bird strike, including a climb and a downwind landing attempt. These actions reduced the time available for corrective measures and increased the risk of a catastrophic outcome.
Global Context and Bird Strike Mitigation
Bird strikes are a well-documented hazard in aviation, particularly during takeoff and landing. According to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), there were over 19,000 bird strikes in 2023, with a notable increase attributed to climate change and urban sprawl affecting bird migration patterns. Globally, bird strikes cause more than $1.2 billion in damages annually.
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) recommends wildlife hazard assessments and the use of radar and thermal imaging systems for real-time bird detection. However, only a minority of airports worldwide have implemented these technologies. Muan Airport, for instance, relied on periodic patrols and loudspeakers, methods considered outdated and insufficient by modern safety standards.
In the aftermath of the crash, South Korea mandated the installation of bird-detection radar at all domestic airports by March 2025. This move aligns with practices at major international hubs such as JFK and Denver, where integrated detection and deterrent systems are already in place. These systems combine radar, AI, and habitat management to reduce bird strike risks effectively.
Conclusion
The Jeju Air Flight 2216 crash was a tragic convergence of human error and systemic failures. While the immediate cause was the shutdown of the wrong engine, deeper issues such as inadequate bird strike prevention, insufficient training, and flawed airport infrastructure played significant roles. The incident underscores the importance of comprehensive safety protocols and the need for real-time hazard detection systems.
Going forward, the aviation industry must prioritize proactive risk management, especially in regions with known environmental hazards. Regulatory bodies should enforce ICAO standards more rigorously, and airlines must invest in CRM training that prepares crews for complex, high-stress scenarios. Transparency in investigations and infrastructure audits will also be key to restoring public trust and preventing future tragedies.
FAQ
What caused the crash of Jeju Air Flight 2216?
The crash was caused by a combination of a bird strike that damaged the right engine and a pilot error that led to the shutdown of the functional left engine, resulting in total thrust loss.
How many people died in the crash?
179 of the 181 people on board died. Only two flight attendants survived.
What safety measures are being implemented post-crash?
South Korea is mandating bird-detection radar at all domestic airports and revising pilot training protocols to include more intensive emergency response simulations.
Photo Credit: SCMP
Regulations & Safety
NTSB: Thermal Plugs Caused AA Flight 3023 Tire Failure
NTSB determines melted thermal relief plugs caused tire failure on American Airlines 737-8 at Denver, triggering emergency evacuation.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has determined that melted thermal relief plugs caused the left main landing gear tires to fail on an American Airlines Boeing 737-8 during a July 2025 takeoff roll at Denver International Airport (DEN), prompting a high-speed rejected takeoff and emergency evacuation.
The final aviation investigation report, published on August 26, 2026, officially closes the inquiry into American Airlines Flight 3023. The document details the mechanical sequence that led to the tire failure while highlighting significant passenger noncompliance during the subsequent evacuation, as travelers ignored crew commands and retrieved carry-on baggage.
Mechanical sequence and rejected takeoff
The incident occurred on July 26, 2025, involving a Boeing 737-8, registration N306SW, equipped with CFM International LEAP-1B28 engines. According to the NTSB, the flight experienced an approximate 25-minute delay while awaiting departure at runway 34L.
During the subsequent takeoff roll, as the aircraft reached an indicated airspeed between 90 and 100 knots, the captain reported hearing a loud pop accompanied by a noticeable bump. The flight crew initiated a rejected takeoff at speeds above 80 knots.
The NTSB determined the probable cause of the incident was the melting of thermal relief plugs in the left main landing gear. This melting released tire pressure and caused the tires and wheels to fail during the takeoff roll. The agency noted that this failure resulted in abnormal airplane handling characteristics, which prompted the flight crew to reject the takeoff. Debris from the fractured wheels caused minor damage to the aircraft, including a three-inch dent on the lower skin of the left wing.
Emergency evacuation and passenger behavior
Following the rejected takeoff, the flight crew initially instructed the cabin to remain seated. Between 30 and 45 seconds later, after identifying smoke and fire originating from the left main landing gear, the crew ordered an emergency evacuation.
The aircraft carried 175 occupants, comprising 169 passengers and six crew members. The NTSB final report confirms that zero injuries occurred during the event. This official casualty figure supersedes preliminary media reports from July 2025 that had indicated minor injuries and hospital evaluations.
The investigation report draws specific attention to passenger behavior during the emergency egress. The NTSB stated that the cabin crew described the evacuation as rapid but hindered by significant passenger confusion and noncompliance. Despite flight attendants repeatedly commanding passengers to leave their belongings behind, multiple individuals retrieved their carry-on baggage. The NTSB concluded that this noncompliance directly slowed the flow of egress from the aircraft.
AirPro News analysis
The NTSB findings regarding American Airlines Flight 3023 add to a well-documented and growing safety concern within the commercial aviation sector. Passenger retrieval of carry-on baggage during emergency evacuations is a recurring issue that compromises the 90-second evacuation standard mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
When passengers stop to open overhead bins and carry luggage down escape slides, they not only slow the egress rate for those behind them but also introduce the risk of puncturing the evacuation slides or injuring fellow passengers. We continue to see official accident reports cite passenger noncompliance as a negative factor in evacuation efficiency. This recurring behavioral pattern has prompted safety advocates and lawmakers to question whether current FAA evacuation certification tests, which rely on compliant participants, accurately reflect real-world human behavior during an emergency.
Sources: National Transportation Safety Board
Photo Credit: National Transportation Safety Board
Regulations & Safety
Marine One Loss of Separation at DCA: NTSB Preliminary Report
NTSB cites radio line-of-sight failure after Marine One and Envoy Air E-170 came within 0.82 NM at Reagan National.
This is a developing story. Information may change as official details are released.
This is original reporting and analysis by AirPro News.
A loss of separation occurred on August 4, 2026, between a Sikorsky VH-3D operating as Marine One and an Envoy Air Embraer E-170 departing Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). The incident took place approximately two miles north of the airport at 14:34 EDT and prompted an immediate Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) relocation of radio equipment after investigators identified a communication failure.
According to a preliminary report released on August 27, 2026, by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), air traffic controllers at DCA did not receive a required three-minute pre-departure warning from the helicopter. The event triggered a review of strict Safety protocols implemented following a fatal midair collision in the same airspace in January 2025.
Incident timeline and separation data
The loss of separation occurred when Marine One departed The Ellipse simultaneously with Envoy Air flight 3742 departing runway 1 at DCA. Preliminary FAA estimates indicate the aircraft came within 0.82 nautical miles (NM) laterally and 700 feet vertically. The NTSB is currently analyzing surveillance data to establish the exact closest point of approach.
President Donald Trump was on board the Sikorsky VH-3D at the time of the incident. In a statement provided to CBS News, White House spokesman Kush Desai confirmed the President was never in danger.
Marine One flights are piloted by the finest aviators in the world, and the White House maintains the utmost confidence in these patriots and other security officials who are responsible for ensuring the President’s safety.
No injuries were reported among the occupants of either aircraft, and both flights continued to their respective destinations without further incident.
Communication failure and FAA response
The NTSB preliminary report points to inadequate radio line-of-sight coverage between The Ellipse and the DCA tower as the primary factor in the missed pre-departure warning. A DCA tower controller reported that the transmission attempt from the helicopter was “broken and unreadable,” according to CBS News.
Following the August 4 incident, FAA technicians evaluated the infrastructure and confirmed the line-of-sight deficiency. To resolve the issue, the agency relocated the helicopter-control radio equipment to the top of the DCA control tower. Subsequent communication checks were successful.
CBS News also reported that recent construction at the White House may have contributed to the radio line-of-sight degradation, though the NTSB has not yet issued a final determination on the cause.
Regulatory context and prior airspace changes
The airspace surrounding DCA operates under highly specific procedural rules designed to deconflict fixed-wing airline traffic from frequent VIP helicopter movements. These procedures were significantly tightened following a fatal midair collision on January 29, 2025, involving an airliner and an Army Black Hawk helicopter near the airport.
Following the 2025 accident, regulators instituted a requirement for a ground stop at DCA anytime a Helicopters passes on a conflicting route. The failure of the three-minute warning on August 4 prevented controllers from initiating this required ground stop for the Envoy Air departure.
Air traffic controllers and Marine One pilots had previously met on July 28, 2026, exactly one week prior to the incident, to discuss ongoing communication challenges in the sector.
AirPro News analysis
The August 4 loss of separation highlights the fragility of procedural deconfliction in the Washington, D.C. airspace. While the FAA characterized the event as a momentary loss of separation, the failure of a critical communication link reveals a single point of failure in the safety protocols established after the 2025 collision. We note that the rapid relocation of the radio equipment by the FAA demonstrates an acknowledgment of the infrastructure gap. As the NTSB continues its Investigation, we will monitor the docket for potential systemic recommendations regarding how VIP helicopter movements integrate with high-volume Commercial-Aircraft traffic at DCA, particularly concerning redundant communication systems.
Sources: National Transportation Safety Board
Photo Credit: National Transportation Safety Board
Regulations & Safety
FAA Moves to Fire Two LaGuardia Controllers After Fatal Collision
FAA initiates termination proceedings against two LaGuardia controllers for early shift departures on the night of the March 22, 2026 runway collision.
This is a developing story. Information may change as official details are released.
This article summarizes reporting by Reuters by David Shepardson and Doyinsola Oladipo.
The FAA has initiated termination proceedings against two air traffic controllers accused of leaving their shifts early on the night of a fatal runway collision at LaGuardia Airport (LGA) in March 2026. The agency is classifying the unauthorized early departures as timecard fraud amid a broader national crackdown on the practice.
The disciplinary action follows the March 22, 2026, accident in which Air Canada Express Flight 8646, operated by Jazz Aviation LP, collided with an aircraft rescue firefighting (ARFF) vehicle while landing on Runway 4. According to Reuters, the two controllers allegedly departed the facility approximately one hour before their scheduled shifts ended, a practice colloquially known as an “early shove.”
Disciplinary actions and union response
The FAA stated its commitment to holding employees accountable, emphasizing that it will not compromise the safety or efficiency of the national airspace system. U.S. Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy condemned the practice, stating that while most controllers complete their full shifts, the department will not tolerate fraud from individuals who unfairly burden their colleagues and impact the airspace.
The National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) confirmed it is actively discussing the allegations with FAA leadership. The union indicated that these internal discussions are the appropriate forum for addressing the matter. Reuters reports that the FAA is currently conducting a nationwide enforcement effort targeting employees who leave on break at the end of their shifts and fail to return.
The March 22 collision and investigation
The NTSB continues to investigate the March 22 collision under investigation ID DCA26MA161. The official cause of the accident remains undetermined. The aircraft involved was an MHI RJ Aviation CRJ-900, and the ground equipment was an Oshkosh Striker 1500 ARFF vehicle.
Official NTSB figures confirm that 76 people were on board the aircraft, including 72 passengers, two flight attendants, and two pilots. The captain and first officer sustained fatal injuries. Thirty-nine individuals were transported to local hospitals, with six reported to have serious injuries.
It remains unverified whether the controllers’ early departure directly influenced the events leading to the collision. Speaking in March 2026, NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy noted that operating with two controllers in the tower cab during a midnight shift is common practice across the national airspace system, suggesting the facility may have been operating at standard staffing levels at the time of the accident.
Regulatory response to surface safety
Following the LaGuardia accident, the FAA accelerated initiatives to improve surface visibility at airports. On May 13, 2026, the agency announced a $16.5 million investment to equip all airport vehicles with transponders.
These vehicle movement area transponders (VMATs) are designed to provide ATC with better situational awareness of ground equipment operating on runways and taxiways.
AirPro News analysis
We note that the FAA’s decision to pursue termination for timecard fraud rather than operational errors highlights a strict administrative approach to facility management. By focusing on the unauthorized absence, the agency addresses the “early shove” culture directly without preempting the NTSB’s ongoing safety investigation into the collision’s root causes. The distinction between administrative violations and operational fault will likely remain a focal point as NATCA engages with FAA leadership.
Photo Credit: Mike Segar – Reuters
-
MRO & Manufacturing7 days agoBoeing SPEEA Engineers Reject Contract, Authorize Strike
-
Business Aviation7 days agoFTAI Aviation Closes $2B Warehouse Financing for 2026 SPV
-
Defense & Military5 days agoBoeing Wins $131B IDIQ Contract for F-15 Eagle Crest Program
-
Defense & Military5 days agoSikorsky Names First EU Black Hawk Parts Distribution Center
-
Space & Satellites5 days agoSpaceX Commits $100B to Starbase Louisiana Spaceport