Regulations & Safety
SAS A320neo Wrong Taxiway Takeoff Incident at Brussels Airport
A SAS Airbus A320neo nearly took off from a taxiway at Brussels Airport, aborted at 127 knots with no injuries. Preliminary AAIU report details contributing factors.
This article is based on an official preliminary report from the Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU).
SAS A320neo Narrowly Avoids Disaster in High-Speed Taxiway Takeoff Incident at Brussels Airport
On March 6, 2026, the Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) released a preliminary report detailing a severe aviation incident that occurred at Brussels Airport (BRU). According to the official AAIU documentation, on the evening of February 5, 2026, a Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) Airbus A320neo mistakenly attempted to take off from a parallel taxiway instead of its assigned runway. The aircraft reached a high speed before the flight crew realized the error and executed an emergency rejected takeoff (RTO).
The AAIU has officially classified the event as a “Serious Incident” under ICAO Annex 13 due to the high probability of an accident. The aircraft, operating as Flight SK2590 to Copenhagen with 165 passengers and crew on board, narrowly avoided a catastrophic collision with temporary fences and nearby aviation fuel storage tanks. Fortunately, no injuries were reported, and passengers were safely transported back to the terminal.
We have reviewed the preliminary findings, which highlight a complex “Swiss cheese” alignment of environmental, technical, and human factors. The report emphasizes that multiple overlapping issues contributed to the crew’s loss of situational awareness, rather than a single point of failure.
The Sequence of Events: A High-Speed Near-Miss
Misalignment and Acceleration
According to the AAIU timeline, the incident unfolded between 21:00 and 21:04 local time. The flight crew was cleared to take off from Runway 07R via an intersection designated as C6, rather than utilizing the full length of the runway. Operating in total darkness, the crew mistook taxiway “Outer 10” for intersection C6 and subsequently aligned the Airbus A320neo with Taxiway E1, which runs parallel to the active runway.
The preliminary report states that the crew initiated the takeoff roll down the taxiway, accelerating rapidly. The aircraft reached an Indicated Airspeed (IAS) of 127 knots (approximately 146 mph). The AAIU notes that the critical “V1” speed, the velocity beyond which a takeoff can no longer be safely aborted, was calculated at 132 knots for this specific flight, placing the aircraft just 5 knots away from the point of no return.
The Critical Abort and Evasive Action
As the aircraft accelerated down Taxiway E1, the First Officer noticed that the forward visual perspective appeared unusually narrow and that the Captain was not responding to standard operating procedure callouts. Realizing the aircraft was not on the runway, the First Officer intervened.
“Stop, stop, stop, stop.”
, First Officer, SAS Flight SK2590, as recorded in the AAIU preliminary report.
At 21:04:09, the Captain immediately aborted the takeoff by applying full reverse thrust and maximum braking. The AAIU report details that at the moment the abort was initiated, the aircraft had only about 520 meters (1,705 feet) of taxiway remaining before it would have collided with temporary fences. While still moving at roughly 40 knots, the First Officer instructed a right turn to avoid the approaching barriers. The aircraft came to a complete halt in just 14 seconds, stopping near the intersection of taxiways V1 and C1, mere meters from the runway guard lights and the airport’s fuel storage farm.
Contributing Factors Identified by Investigators
Environmental and Infrastructure Challenges
The AAIU preliminary report does not assign blame but rather identifies several contributing factors. Environmental conditions played a significant role; the incident occurred after civil twilight in total darkness. Furthermore, the runway and taxiway surfaces were wet, which the AAIU notes caused glare and made painted ground markings highly difficult to read.
Infrastructure and procedural elements also compounded the risk. The specific intersection is officially designated as a “hot spot”, an area with a known history or high risk of runway incursions. The AAIU report highlights that the illumination for a crucial intersection sign was inoperable at the time. Additionally, the red stop bar lights at the taxiway/runway intersection extinguished before the crew arrived at the holding point, depriving the pilots of a critical visual reference.
Equipment and Air Traffic Control Context
According to the investigation, the SAS Airbus A320neo was not equipped with optional safety software such as the Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS), Airbus Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS), or Take-Off Surveillance 2 (TOS2). While aviation regulators do not currently mandate these systems, their absence is noted in the report as they are designed to provide auditory and visual alerts if a takeoff is attempted from a taxiway.
From an Air Traffic Control (ATC) perspective, the AAIU notes that the control tower supervisor had combined the ground and air frequencies. A single air traffic controller was managing both frequencies and dividing their attention among seven different aircraft. Following the report’s release, Belgium’s ATC agency, Skeyes, publicly stated that this staffing arrangement strictly adhered to existing safety guidelines for that time of night and emphasized their full cooperation with the investigation under a “Just Culture” framework.
AirPro News analysis
We note that this incident serves as a textbook example of the critical importance of modern Crew Resource Management (CRM). Historically, steep cockpit hierarchies often prevented junior First Officers from correcting senior Captains, sometimes with fatal results. In this instance, the First Officer’s immediate, assertive command directly prevented a disaster, demonstrating that modern CRM training is functioning exactly as intended.
Furthermore, the absence of systems like RAAS or TOS2 on the incident aircraft highlights an ongoing industry debate. While airlines are legally compliant without these systems, wrong-surface events remain a persistent threat in commercial aviation. As the AAIU continues its investigation, we anticipate that the final report may include safety recommendations urging broader adoption of these technological safety nets, especially for operations at complex airports during low-visibility conditions.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Were there any injuries on SAS Flight SK2590?
No. According to the AAIU report, all 165 passengers and crew members were unharmed and safely transported back to the terminal via bus. The aircraft sustained only minor tire and landing gear damage due to high-speed braking.
How fast was the aircraft traveling before the abort?
The AAIU confirmed the aircraft reached 127 knots Indicated Airspeed (IAS) on the taxiway. The V1 speed (the speed at which takeoff must continue) was 132 knots.
When will the final investigation report be released?
The current AAIU report is strictly preliminary. A final report, which will include binding safety recommendations, is expected to be published in approximately one year, likely in early 2027.
Sources:
Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) Preliminary Report: AAIU-2026-02-05-01
Photo Credit: Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit
Regulations & Safety
NTSB: Thermal Plugs Caused AA Flight 3023 Tire Failure
NTSB determines melted thermal relief plugs caused tire failure on American Airlines 737-8 at Denver, triggering emergency evacuation.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has determined that melted thermal relief plugs caused the left main landing gear tires to fail on an American Airlines Boeing 737-8 during a July 2025 takeoff roll at Denver International Airport (DEN), prompting a high-speed rejected takeoff and emergency evacuation.
The final aviation investigation report, published on August 26, 2026, officially closes the inquiry into American Airlines Flight 3023. The document details the mechanical sequence that led to the tire failure while highlighting significant passenger noncompliance during the subsequent evacuation, as travelers ignored crew commands and retrieved carry-on baggage.
Mechanical sequence and rejected takeoff
The incident occurred on July 26, 2025, involving a Boeing 737-8, registration N306SW, equipped with CFM International LEAP-1B28 engines. According to the NTSB, the flight experienced an approximate 25-minute delay while awaiting departure at runway 34L.
During the subsequent takeoff roll, as the aircraft reached an indicated airspeed between 90 and 100 knots, the captain reported hearing a loud pop accompanied by a noticeable bump. The flight crew initiated a rejected takeoff at speeds above 80 knots.
The NTSB determined the probable cause of the incident was the melting of thermal relief plugs in the left main landing gear. This melting released tire pressure and caused the tires and wheels to fail during the takeoff roll. The agency noted that this failure resulted in abnormal airplane handling characteristics, which prompted the flight crew to reject the takeoff. Debris from the fractured wheels caused minor damage to the aircraft, including a three-inch dent on the lower skin of the left wing.
Emergency evacuation and passenger behavior
Following the rejected takeoff, the flight crew initially instructed the cabin to remain seated. Between 30 and 45 seconds later, after identifying smoke and fire originating from the left main landing gear, the crew ordered an emergency evacuation.
The aircraft carried 175 occupants, comprising 169 passengers and six crew members. The NTSB final report confirms that zero injuries occurred during the event. This official casualty figure supersedes preliminary media reports from July 2025 that had indicated minor injuries and hospital evaluations.
The investigation report draws specific attention to passenger behavior during the emergency egress. The NTSB stated that the cabin crew described the evacuation as rapid but hindered by significant passenger confusion and noncompliance. Despite flight attendants repeatedly commanding passengers to leave their belongings behind, multiple individuals retrieved their carry-on baggage. The NTSB concluded that this noncompliance directly slowed the flow of egress from the aircraft.
AirPro News analysis
The NTSB findings regarding American Airlines Flight 3023 add to a well-documented and growing safety concern within the commercial aviation sector. Passenger retrieval of carry-on baggage during emergency evacuations is a recurring issue that compromises the 90-second evacuation standard mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
When passengers stop to open overhead bins and carry luggage down escape slides, they not only slow the egress rate for those behind them but also introduce the risk of puncturing the evacuation slides or injuring fellow passengers. We continue to see official accident reports cite passenger noncompliance as a negative factor in evacuation efficiency. This recurring behavioral pattern has prompted safety advocates and lawmakers to question whether current FAA evacuation certification tests, which rely on compliant participants, accurately reflect real-world human behavior during an emergency.
Sources: National Transportation Safety Board
Photo Credit: National Transportation Safety Board
Regulations & Safety
Marine One Loss of Separation at DCA: NTSB Preliminary Report
NTSB cites radio line-of-sight failure after Marine One and Envoy Air E-170 came within 0.82 NM at Reagan National.
This is a developing story. Information may change as official details are released.
This is original reporting and analysis by AirPro News.
A loss of separation occurred on August 4, 2026, between a Sikorsky VH-3D operating as Marine One and an Envoy Air Embraer E-170 departing Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). The incident took place approximately two miles north of the airport at 14:34 EDT and prompted an immediate Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) relocation of radio equipment after investigators identified a communication failure.
According to a preliminary report released on August 27, 2026, by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), air traffic controllers at DCA did not receive a required three-minute pre-departure warning from the helicopter. The event triggered a review of strict Safety protocols implemented following a fatal midair collision in the same airspace in January 2025.
Incident timeline and separation data
The loss of separation occurred when Marine One departed The Ellipse simultaneously with Envoy Air flight 3742 departing runway 1 at DCA. Preliminary FAA estimates indicate the aircraft came within 0.82 nautical miles (NM) laterally and 700 feet vertically. The NTSB is currently analyzing surveillance data to establish the exact closest point of approach.
President Donald Trump was on board the Sikorsky VH-3D at the time of the incident. In a statement provided to CBS News, White House spokesman Kush Desai confirmed the President was never in danger.
Marine One flights are piloted by the finest aviators in the world, and the White House maintains the utmost confidence in these patriots and other security officials who are responsible for ensuring the President’s safety.
No injuries were reported among the occupants of either aircraft, and both flights continued to their respective destinations without further incident.
Communication failure and FAA response
The NTSB preliminary report points to inadequate radio line-of-sight coverage between The Ellipse and the DCA tower as the primary factor in the missed pre-departure warning. A DCA tower controller reported that the transmission attempt from the helicopter was “broken and unreadable,” according to CBS News.
Following the August 4 incident, FAA technicians evaluated the infrastructure and confirmed the line-of-sight deficiency. To resolve the issue, the agency relocated the helicopter-control radio equipment to the top of the DCA control tower. Subsequent communication checks were successful.
CBS News also reported that recent construction at the White House may have contributed to the radio line-of-sight degradation, though the NTSB has not yet issued a final determination on the cause.
Regulatory context and prior airspace changes
The airspace surrounding DCA operates under highly specific procedural rules designed to deconflict fixed-wing airline traffic from frequent VIP helicopter movements. These procedures were significantly tightened following a fatal midair collision on January 29, 2025, involving an airliner and an Army Black Hawk helicopter near the airport.
Following the 2025 accident, regulators instituted a requirement for a ground stop at DCA anytime a Helicopters passes on a conflicting route. The failure of the three-minute warning on August 4 prevented controllers from initiating this required ground stop for the Envoy Air departure.
Air traffic controllers and Marine One pilots had previously met on July 28, 2026, exactly one week prior to the incident, to discuss ongoing communication challenges in the sector.
AirPro News analysis
The August 4 loss of separation highlights the fragility of procedural deconfliction in the Washington, D.C. airspace. While the FAA characterized the event as a momentary loss of separation, the failure of a critical communication link reveals a single point of failure in the safety protocols established after the 2025 collision. We note that the rapid relocation of the radio equipment by the FAA demonstrates an acknowledgment of the infrastructure gap. As the NTSB continues its Investigation, we will monitor the docket for potential systemic recommendations regarding how VIP helicopter movements integrate with high-volume Commercial-Aircraft traffic at DCA, particularly concerning redundant communication systems.
Sources: National Transportation Safety Board
Photo Credit: National Transportation Safety Board
Regulations & Safety
FAA Moves to Fire Two LaGuardia Controllers After Fatal Collision
FAA initiates termination proceedings against two LaGuardia controllers for early shift departures on the night of the March 22, 2026 runway collision.
This is a developing story. Information may change as official details are released.
This article summarizes reporting by Reuters by David Shepardson and Doyinsola Oladipo.
The FAA has initiated termination proceedings against two air traffic controllers accused of leaving their shifts early on the night of a fatal runway collision at LaGuardia Airport (LGA) in March 2026. The agency is classifying the unauthorized early departures as timecard fraud amid a broader national crackdown on the practice.
The disciplinary action follows the March 22, 2026, accident in which Air Canada Express Flight 8646, operated by Jazz Aviation LP, collided with an aircraft rescue firefighting (ARFF) vehicle while landing on Runway 4. According to Reuters, the two controllers allegedly departed the facility approximately one hour before their scheduled shifts ended, a practice colloquially known as an “early shove.”
Disciplinary actions and union response
The FAA stated its commitment to holding employees accountable, emphasizing that it will not compromise the safety or efficiency of the national airspace system. U.S. Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy condemned the practice, stating that while most controllers complete their full shifts, the department will not tolerate fraud from individuals who unfairly burden their colleagues and impact the airspace.
The National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) confirmed it is actively discussing the allegations with FAA leadership. The union indicated that these internal discussions are the appropriate forum for addressing the matter. Reuters reports that the FAA is currently conducting a nationwide enforcement effort targeting employees who leave on break at the end of their shifts and fail to return.
The March 22 collision and investigation
The NTSB continues to investigate the March 22 collision under investigation ID DCA26MA161. The official cause of the accident remains undetermined. The aircraft involved was an MHI RJ Aviation CRJ-900, and the ground equipment was an Oshkosh Striker 1500 ARFF vehicle.
Official NTSB figures confirm that 76 people were on board the aircraft, including 72 passengers, two flight attendants, and two pilots. The captain and first officer sustained fatal injuries. Thirty-nine individuals were transported to local hospitals, with six reported to have serious injuries.
It remains unverified whether the controllers’ early departure directly influenced the events leading to the collision. Speaking in March 2026, NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy noted that operating with two controllers in the tower cab during a midnight shift is common practice across the national airspace system, suggesting the facility may have been operating at standard staffing levels at the time of the accident.
Regulatory response to surface safety
Following the LaGuardia accident, the FAA accelerated initiatives to improve surface visibility at airports. On May 13, 2026, the agency announced a $16.5 million investment to equip all airport vehicles with transponders.
These vehicle movement area transponders (VMATs) are designed to provide ATC with better situational awareness of ground equipment operating on runways and taxiways.
AirPro News analysis
We note that the FAA’s decision to pursue termination for timecard fraud rather than operational errors highlights a strict administrative approach to facility management. By focusing on the unauthorized absence, the agency addresses the “early shove” culture directly without preempting the NTSB’s ongoing safety investigation into the collision’s root causes. The distinction between administrative violations and operational fault will likely remain a focal point as NATCA engages with FAA leadership.
Photo Credit: Mike Segar – Reuters
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