The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has released its preliminary report detailing a significant bird strike event involving an Alaska Airlines cargo flight operated on behalf of Amazon Air. The incident, which occurred on January 28, 2026, resulted in substantial damage to an Airbus A330-300 freighter and the presence of smoke in the cockpit, prompting an emergency return to Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG).

According to the NTSB’s findings, the flight crew successfully managed a high-workload emergency immediately after takeoff. Despite the severity of the engine damage and the hazardous environment within the flight deck, both crew members survived without injury. The investigation has formally classified the event as an “accident,” a designation reserved for occurrences involving serious injury or substantial structural damage to the aircraft.

The release of this preliminary report sheds light on the specific sequence of events that turned a routine cargo run into a major safety investigation. It also clarifies the complex operational structure behind the flight, which carried an Alaska Airlines flight number but utilized an aircraft and livery associated with Amazon Air and the recently acquired Hawaiian Airlines fleet.

Sequence of Events: From Takeoff to Emergency Landing

On the afternoon of January 28, 2026, Alaska Airlines flight 2616 (AS2616) departed CVG at approximately 3:05 PM EST, bound for Houston George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH). The aircraft, an Airbus A330-300 freighter registered as N5827K, was occupied by two crew members: a Captain and a First Officer.

The NTSB report indicates that the flight proceeded normally through its initial takeoff roll from Runway 27. However, the situation deteriorated rapidly during the initial climb. At an altitude of approximately 3,000 feet, the aircraft encountered a flock of birds. The preliminary data confirms that multiple birds were ingested into the No. 1 (left) engine.

Immediate Impact and Cockpit Environment

The ingestion caused an immediate loss of thrust and severe vibrations in the left engine. The crew received fire indications for the engine, complicating the emergency. More critically, the report notes that smoke began to fill the flight deck shortly after the strike. This development forced the pilots to don supplemental oxygen masks while managing the aircraft’s energy and trajectory.

Declaring a “Mayday,” the crew coordinated with Air Traffic Control (ATC) for an immediate return. ATC vectored the heavy freighter for a visual approach to Runway 36R. The NTSB highlighted the effective coordination between the pilots and controllers, which facilitated a swift return. The aircraft touched down safely at approximately 3:13 PM EST, just 8 to 10 minutes after departure.

Damage Assessment and Evacuation Decisions

Upon landing, the crew made a critical safety decision regarding evacuation. Rather than deploying emergency slides, which could have placed them in proximity to the engine fire or hot brakes, the pilots brought the aircraft to a stop on the runway. They requested a ladder from the airport’s Crash Fire Rescue (CFR) services and evacuated via the right-side door, deliberately avoiding the hazards on the left side of the aircraft.

The NTSB’s post-accident inspection revealed why the event was classified as an accident rather than a standard incident. The No. 1 engine and its surrounding structure sustained “substantial damage.” While modern turbofan engines are designed to contain broken fan blades, the severity of this strike caused damage significant enough to warrant the higher classification.

“The NTSB rated the occurrence as an ‘accident’ rather than an ‘incident,’ a classification reserved for events involving substantial aircraft damage or serious injury.”

The aircraft, N5827K, remains grounded at CVG as technical teams assess the full extent of the structural compromise and the NTSB continues its investigation. Future phases of the inquiry will likely utilize DNA analysis of the organic remains (“snarge”) to identify the bird species and further evaluate the performance of the engine’s containment systems.

Operational Context: The Alaska-Hawaiian-Amazon Connection

To the casual observer, the flight details might appear contradictory: an Alaska Airlines flight number, an Amazon Air paint scheme, and an Airbus A330 aircraft, a type not historically flown by Alaska Airlines. This complexity is a result of the recent merger between Alaska Air Group and Hawaiian Airlines.

Hawaiian Airlines has operated a fleet of Airbus A330-300 freighters for Amazon since 2019. Following Alaska Airlines’ acquisition of Hawaiian, these operations have been brought under the single Alaska Air Group umbrella. Consequently, while the metal and the mission belong to the legacy Hawaiian/Amazon contract, the flight operated under an “AS” code. This incident highlights the operational integration currently underway between the two carriers.

AirPro News Analysis

Crew Resource Management (CRM) Under Pressure

The successful outcome of flight AS2616 serves as a textbook example of effective Crew Resource Management (CRM). Bird strikes are common, but strikes resulting in engine fires and cockpit smoke are rare and highly dangerous. The presence of smoke introduces a physiological threat and obscures vision, significantly increasing the stress load.

We believe the crew’s decision to forego a slide evacuation in favor of a ladder egress is particularly noteworthy. In the heat of the moment, the “standard” reaction might be to blow the slides and get out immediately. However, the pilots assessed the specific threat, fire on the left side, and chose a controlled exit on the right side with ground support. This disciplined decision-making likely prevented secondary injuries during the evacuation phase.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why was this classified as an accident?
The NTSB defines an “accident” as an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft where a person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. In this case, the damage to the engine and airframe met the threshold for “substantial damage.”

Was anyone injured?
No. Both crew members evacuated safely without injury.

What happens next in the investigation?
The NTSB will continue to analyze flight data recorders, cockpit voice recorders, and the physical debris. A final report, which includes the probable cause and any safety recommendations, typically takes 12 to 18 months to complete.

Sources

• NTSB Preliminary Report (DCA26WA/202360)
• FAA

This article is based on an official press release from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

FAA Reports 14% Decline in Laser Strikes for 2025, Though Risks Remain High

For the second consecutive year, the number of reported laser strikes against aircraft in the United States has decreased, signaling potential progress in the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) ongoing battle against aviation safety threats. According to data released by the agency on February 25, 2026, pilots reported 10,994 laser strike incidents in 2025.

This figure represents a 14% decrease from the 12,840 incidents recorded in 2024. While the downward trend is encouraging, following a record high of 13,304 incidents in 2023, aviation safety officials emphasize that the volume of strikes remains dangerously high. The FAA and industry stakeholders continue to warn that pointing a laser at an aircraft poses a severe threat to pilots, passengers, and people on the ground.

2025 Statistics: A Downward Trend

The latest data provides a snapshot of the current safety landscape regarding laser interference. The 10,994 incidents reported in 2025 mark a significant reduction compared to the surge seen earlier in the decade. However, the numbers are still nearly triple the volume reported in 2010, when the FAA first began detailed tracking of these events.

According to the FAA’s report, the historical trend for the last five years is as follows:

• 2025: 10,994 (14% decrease)
• 2024: 12,840 (3% decrease)
• 2023: 13,304 (All-time record high)
• 2022: 9,457
• 2021: 9,723

State-by-State Breakdown

Geographically, the distribution of laser strikes remains concentrated in states with high air traffic volume and dense populations. California continues to lead the nation in reported incidents. The FAA identified the top three states for laser strikes in 2025 as:

1. California: 1,309 incidents
2. Texas: 1,100 incidents
3. Florida: 654 incidents

Other states with significant activity included Illinois (620), Arizona (574), and Washington (484). These regional “hot spots” remain a primary focus for federal and local law enforcement efforts.

Enforcement and Outreach Strategies

The FAA attributes the recent decline in incidents to a combination of aggressive enforcement and successful public outreach. A key component of this strategy is the agency’s Law Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP). Through this initiative, agents identify high-risk areas and collaborate directly with local police and community leaders to mitigate threats.

In states such as Texas and Georgia, the integration of technology has proven effective. Police helicopters equipped with advanced tracking systems have been able to locate perpetrators in real-time, leading to immediate arrests. Furthermore, the agency credits the aviation community for its role in identifying these hazards.

“Laser strikes are decreasing, thanks to a strong pilot reporting culture that is providing the data we need for community engagement and work with local law enforcement.”

— Ben Supko, FAA Associate Administrator for Security and Intelligence

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The Persistent Danger and Legal Consequences

Despite the statistical improvement, the physical danger to flight crews remains acute. High-powered lasers can cause flash blindness, glare, and temporary vision loss. These effects are particularly critical during takeoff and landing phases when pilots are maneuvering at low altitudes and require maximum visual acuity.

The FAA notes that approximately 90% of all laser strikes occur at night, amplifying the visual disruption in a dark cockpit. Additionally, the majority of incidents involve green lasers, which appear much brighter to the human eye than red lasers. Since 2010, pilots have reported 337 eye injuries resulting from these strikes.

Federal Penalties

Pointing a laser at an aircraft is a federal crime. The FAA enforces strict civil penalties for violations, with fines of up to $11,000 per incident. Repeat offenders face cumulative penalties of up to $30,800. Beyond civil fines, violators face criminal prosecution, which can result in up to five years in federal prison and fines of up to $250,000.

AirPro News Analysis

While a 14% drop is statistically significant, the baseline remains worryingly high. The shift from over 13,000 incidents in 2023 to just under 11,000 in 2025 suggests that public awareness campaigns and high-profile prosecutions are beginning to have a deterrent effect. However, with nearly 30 incidents still occurring on average every single day in the United States, the threat to aviation safety is far from neutralized. The persistence of California, Texas, and Florida as top offenders suggests that targeted, state-specific interventions may be required to drive numbers down further.

Sources

Sources: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

NTSB Final Report: “Plan Continuation Bias” Led to Envoy Airlines Wrong Runway Landing at O’Hare

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has published its final report regarding a serious incident involving an Envoy Airlines passenger jet at Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD). The investigation concludes that a combination of pilot error, technical mismanagement, and air traffic control (ATC) deficiencies led an Embraer 170 to land on the wrong runway on September 25, 2024.

According to the report, released on February 25, 2026, Envoy Airlines flight 3936 (ENY3936) landed safely on Runway 10L despite being cleared for and assigned to Runway 10C. While no injuries or damage occurred to the aircraft (registration N772MR), the NTSB highlights the event as a significant example of “wrong-surface landing” risks, a top safety priority for federal regulators.

The investigation identifies “plan continuation bias” and “expectation bias” as primary psychological factors that caused the flight crew to continue an unstable approach despite lacking critical instrument guidance.

Sequence of Events: Changing Plans and Cognitive Load

The NTSB investigation details a complex arrival phase where the flight crew faced a rapid series of runway assignment changes. These changes likely contributed to a high cognitive workload and “expectation bias” as the crew prepared for landing.

According to the final report, the crew prepared for four different runways in succession due to shifting weather conditions and airport operations:

• Initial Plan: Runway 27R
• First Update: Runway 9L
• Second Update: Runway 10R
• Final Assignment: Runway 10C

The NTSB noted that this sequence of changes forced the crew to repeatedly reprogram the Flight Management System (FMS) and briefing protocols, setting the stage for the errors that followed.

Technical Mismanagement in the Cockpit

Once cleared for a visual approach to Runway 10C, the crew attempted to back up their visual flight path with an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to ensure precision. However, the aircraft’s systems failed to “autotune” the correct ILS frequency for Runway 10C.

In an effort to correct the automation failure manually, the captain tuned the navigation radios himself. The investigation revealed a critical error in this process:

“The flight crew’s decision to continue the approach without the correct ILS frequency in the FMS [Flight Management System].”

The report states that the captain manually tuned 108.4 MHz, which was an incorrect frequency, instead of the required 108.95 MHz for Runway 10C. Furthermore, the second radio was tuned to 113.0 MHz, a VOR frequency that provided no vertical or lateral guidance for the landing. Deprived of valid instrument data to verify their alignment, the crew relied entirely on visual cues and inadvertently lined up with Runway 10L, which runs parallel to their assigned runway.

Air Traffic Control Deficiencies

While the primary error originated in the cockpit, the NTSB assigned significant weight to the failure of Air Traffic Control to intervene. The approach controller observed that Envoy flight 3936 was aligned with Runway 10L rather than the assigned 10C.

Under Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) directives, controllers are required to notify pilots immediately if they observe an aircraft aligning with a wrong surface. However, in this instance, the controller did not issue a safety alert or order a go-around. Instead, the approach controller coordinated with the tower controller responsible for Runway 10L to ensure the strip was clear, effectively allowing the error to proceed to a landing.

The NTSB described this decision as “deficient,” noting that it bypassed critical Safety layers designed to prevent collisions.

“Air traffic control’s failure to notify the flight crew that they were lined up with the incorrect runway contrary to FAA directives.”

Probable Cause and Safety Findings

The Board’s final report formally identifies the probable cause of the incident as the crew’s failure to identify the correct runway, driven by psychological biases.

“The flight crew’s misidentification of the intended landing runway, which resulted in an approach to and landing on the wrong runway due to their planned continuation bias.”

The report emphasizes “plan continuation bias”, a phenomenon where pilots continue with an original plan (landing) despite emerging cues that suggest the plan is no longer safe or valid (such as the failure to receive positive ILS guidance). The NTSB also reiterated that wrong-surface landings remain a “top 5” safety focus for the FAA, noting that while this specific incident ended without damage, similar errors have historically led to near-misses and catastrophic collisions.

AirPro News Analysis

This incident serves as a textbook example of how “Swiss Cheese” failure models manifest in modern Aviation. While the pilots made the initial errors, mis-tuning a radio and visually misidentifying a runway, the safety net that is supposed to catch these errors also failed. The ATC decision to silently accommodate the wrong runway landing rather than correct it suggests a potential normalization of deviance in busy terminal environments.

Furthermore, the “expectation bias” noted by the NTSB highlights the vulnerability of human performance during high-workload phases of flight. When runway assignments change four times in a short window, the mental model of the arrival becomes fragmented. For operators, this underscores the importance of “stopping the line”, or initiating a go-around, when automation (like the ILS autotune) behaves unexpectedly, rather than attempting manual workarounds at low altitudes.

Sources

Sources: NTSB Final Report (ID 195210)