Regulations & Safety
Airbus Issues Safety Warning on Non-Certified Cockpit Window Equipment
Airbus warns that non-certified mounts and sunshades on cockpit windows can cause overheating and damage, urging use of approved equipment.

This article is based on an official safety publication from Airbus.
In May 2026, Airbus issued a critical safety warning to aircraft operators and flight crews regarding the widespread use of non-certified equipment on cockpit windows. As the aviation industry has universally adopted Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) such as iPads, pilots frequently rely on aftermarket suction-cup mounts to secure their devices. Additionally, it has become common practice for crews to purchase non-certified sunshades online to block glare and heat during long flights.
However, according to the recent Airbus safety publication, attaching these unapproved accessories directly to the inner surfaces of cockpit windows poses a severe, hidden risk. Investigations have revealed that these everyday items can act as thermal barriers. When combined with latent faults in the window’s built-in heating system, this thermal barrier effect can lead to severe overheating, structural distortion, and even the cracking of window plies mid-flight.
The warning was triggered by a specific in-flight incident involving an Commercial-Aircraft, which highlighted how a seemingly harmless consumer accessory can interact with complex aircraft systems to create a serious emergency. We have reviewed the technical findings provided by Airbus to understand the mechanics of this failure and the recommended operational guidelines for flight crews.
The Catalyst: An A320 Mid-Air Window Failure
To illustrate the danger of unapproved window attachments, Airbus detailed a recent event involving an A320 family aircraft in cruise flight. According to the Manufacturers report, the flight crew had attached a commercially purchased sunshade directly to the right sliding cockpit window.
During the flight, the crew received an ANTI ICE R WINDOW alert on the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM). Shortly after this alert was triggered, the right sliding window became noticeably hot and visibly distorted. Recognizing the potential structural threat, the crew initiated a descent and diverted the aircraft to a nearby airport.
As the aircraft passed through 1,000 feet on final approach, the crew reported hearing a loud crack emanating from the window. Fortunately, the aircraft landed safely without further incident. A post-flight inspection revealed severe damage to the right sliding window, and the aftermarket sunshade itself displayed visible heat damage.
Technical Breakdown: How Thermal Barriers Cause Damage
Commercial aircraft cockpit windows are highly engineered, fail-safe structures. According to Airbus, they typically consist of two structural plies, each capable of sustaining twice the maximum differential pressure of the aircraft, and a protective outer ply. While most Airbus aircraft utilize glass for side windows, the A320 family can feature side windows made of either glass or stretched acrylic. Furthermore, these windows are equipped with heating films regulated by active temperature sensors to provide essential anti-ice and anti-fog capabilities.
The “Shrink-Back” Effect in Acrylic Windows
When the damaged A320 window was sent to the manufacturer for a detailed investigation, engineers identified a two-part failure chain that led to the cracking. First, there was a latent system fault: the heating film adjacent to the window’s active temperature sensor was inoperative. This caused the system to incorrectly estimate the window’s overall temperature, prompting it to continuously heat the functional areas of the glass.
Second, the aftermarket sunshade created a thermal barrier. Normally, the inner side of the window is cooled naturally via the convection of cabin air. The sunshade trapped the heat against the acrylic. The combination of the faulty heating system and the thermal barrier caused the inner ply’s temperature to exceed the acrylic material’s glass transition temperature.
This resulted in “thermal relaxation” or a “shrink-back” effect, causing the inner ply to severely distort and crack.
Despite the severe damage to the inner ply, Airbus noted that the outer ply remained completely undamaged. This proved that the window’s fail-safe structural integrity was maintained, allowing the aircraft to land safely.
Risks to Glass Windows and Flight Controls
While glass windows do not suffer from the specific “shrink-back” effect seen in stretched acrylic, Airbus warns that thermal barriers still pose significant risks. Localized overheating can lead to bubbling of the window’s interlayer, which damages the heating system and impairs pilot visibility.
Beyond thermal damage, the physical presence of non-certified mounts introduces mechanical risks. Suction cups are prone to losing their grip due to aircraft vibrations or rapid temperature fluctuations. A falling tablet or heavy mount could obstruct flight controls, posing a critical danger during sensitive flight phases such as takeoff and landing. Furthermore, bulky mounts or shades can block access to emergency equipment, interfere with the deployment of oxygen masks, or impede the opening of sliding windows during an emergency evacuation.
Official Airbus Recommendations for Flight Crews
To mitigate these risks, Airbus and aviation safety experts have outlined strict operational guidelines for flight crews and operators. The primary directive is to universally avoid attaching any equipment, whether suction cups or sunshades, directly to the inner surface of cockpit windows.
Airbus also clarified a common misconception regarding solar radiation: pilots do not need aftermarket shades for UV protection. Both glass and acrylic cockpit windows are already manufactured to block the most dangerous Ultra-Violet (UV) radiation. Instead of aftermarket shades, crews are instructed to rely on the aircraft’s factory-installed sun visors and roller blinds. These built-in solutions are specifically designed to reduce glare while allowing sufficient natural cooling of the window surface.
For the use of Electronic Flight Bags, operators are urged to utilize certified cockpit mounts. Airbus offers EASA and FAA-approved mounts that attach directly to the window frame, rather than the glass. These certified solutions ensure they do not act as thermal barriers and are rigorously crash-tested to guarantee they will not interfere with emergency operations. Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) alternatives from third-party manufacturers are also available and approved by aviation authorities.
AirPro News analysis
This safety warning highlights a growing friction point in modern aviation: the rapid adoption of consumer technology versus the strict, slow-moving Certification processes required for aircraft safety. The iPad has revolutionized flight deck operations, replacing heavy paper manuals with lightweight, easily updated digital interfaces. However, the accessories used to support these consumer devices are often purchased outside of regulated aviation supply chains.
The A320 incident serves as a stark reminder that commercial aircraft are complex ecosystems where a seemingly isolated addition, like a plastic sunshade, can trigger a cascading failure in thermal management systems. At the same time, the incident is a testament to the resilience of modern aerospace engineering. Even when an operational error and a latent mechanical fault combined to melt and crack the inner window ply, the fail-safe design of the outer ply held firm, preventing a catastrophic depressurization event.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Why do pilots use aftermarket sunshades in the cockpit?
Pilots often purchase aftermarket sunshades to block intense glare and heat during long flights, especially when flying directly into the sun. Some also mistakenly believe they need them for UV protection, though modern cockpit windows already block harmful UV rays.
Are cockpit windows safe if the inner ply cracks?
Yes. Commercial aircraft windows are designed with fail-safe redundancy. They typically feature two structural plies and an outer protective ply. If the inner ply fails, the remaining structural ply is engineered to sustain the aircraft’s maximum differential pressure, allowing for a safe landing.
What is the approved way to mount an iPad or EFB in the cockpit?
Aviation authorities and manufacturers like Airbus recommend using certified mounts that attach directly to the aircraft’s window frame or structural panels, rather than using suction cups on the glass. These approved mounts are crash-tested and designed not to interfere with thermal regulation or emergency equipment.
Sources: Airbus Safety First
Photo Credit: Airbus Safety First
Regulations & Safety
FAA Proposes Directive for Bombardier CL-600 Flap Control Safety
FAA proposes updating Bombardier CL-600 flight manuals after flap control failure causes uncommanded extension, enhancing pilot emergency procedures.

This article is based on an official notice from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has officially proposed a new Airworthiness Directive (AD) affecting all Bombardier, Inc. CL-600 series airplanes. Published in the Federal Register on May 26, 2026, under document number 2026-10382, the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) addresses a critical safety vulnerability involving the aircraft’s flap control system.
According to the FAA notice, the proposed rule was prompted by a concerning in-flight incident where an aircraft experienced an uncommanded and unarrested movement of its flaps. If left unaddressed, aviation regulators warn that this mechanical anomaly could lead to a complete loss of control of the airplane.
At AirPro News, we are closely monitoring this regulatory action. The FAA is currently seeking public comments on the proposal, which mandates specific updates to the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) to ensure flight crews are equipped with the proper emergency procedures to handle this specific failure.
Understanding the In-Flight Incident
The FAA’s proposed directive stems from a specific mid-air event involving a Bombardier Model CL-600-2B16 airplane. During the flight, the crew experienced an uncommanded flap extension from 0 to 45 degrees. This sudden movement was accompanied by a “FLAPS FAIL” caution message in the cockpit. Fortunately, the flight crew managed to stabilize the aircraft and return safely to their departure airport.
To understand the severity of this incident, it is helpful to understand the function of aircraft flaps. Flaps are aerodynamic devices located on the trailing edge of the wings. They are primarily deployed during takeoff and landing to increase lift and drag, allowing the aircraft to fly safely at slower speeds. An unexpected deployment to 45 degrees during standard flight operations drastically alters the aerodynamic profile of the aircraft, creating a severe safety hazard.
The Role of the Retract Relay
According to the FAA’s investigation detailed in the NPRM, the Bombardier CL-600’s flap control system is engineered with built-in safeguards. Specifically, the system is designed to automatically halt flap movement at 3 degrees if an anomaly is detected.
However, investigators identified a specific component failure that bypassed this safeguard.
“A failed ‘retract relay’ prevented the system from arresting the uncommanded movement, allowing the flaps to extend fully to 45 degrees,” the FAA research report noted.
Because the retract relay failed, the system could not arrest the uncommanded movement, resulting in the full 45-degree extension. The FAA explicitly identified this as an unsafe condition that requires immediate regulatory intervention to prevent future occurrences from resulting in a loss of aircraft control.
FAA’s Proposed Regulatory Action
To mitigate the safety risks associated with a retract relay failure, the FAA is taking a procedural approach rather than a mechanical one. According to the published docket (FAA-2026-4642), the agency is not currently proposing physical mechanical alterations or parts replacements for the affected aircraft.
Instead, the proposed AD requires owners and operators of the affected Bombardier models to revise their existing Aircraft Flight Manuals (AFM). These revisions will provide flight crews with standardized, specific procedures to execute in the event of an uncommanded, unarrested flap movement. By updating the AFM, the FAA aims to ensure that pilots know exactly how to stabilize the aircraft and execute a safe landing if the hardware fails.
Affected Aircraft Models
The FAA notice specifies that the proposed rule applies to all Bombardier, Inc. CL-600 series airplanes. This includes the following specific variants:
- Model CL-600-1A11 (600)
- Model CL-600-2A12 (601)
- Model CL-600-2B16 (601-3A, 601-3R, and 604 Variants)
Industry and Financial Impact
Because the FAA’s proposed directive relies on a manual update rather than heavy maintenance or physical parts replacement, the financial burden on aircraft operators is expected to be minimal. The primary costs will involve the administrative time required to physically update the flight manuals and the operational time needed to brief flight crews on the new emergency procedures.
Public Comment Period and Next Steps
As with all Notices of Proposed Rulemaking, the FAA has opened a public comment period before the directive becomes a final, enforceable rule. The agency is inviting written data, views, or arguments from aviation industry experts, aircraft operators, and the general public.
Comments must be submitted to Docket No. FAA-2026-4642 by July 10, 2026, which is exactly 45 days from the NPRM’s publication date. For technical clarification, the FAA has designated Aviation Safety Engineer Christopher Spencer at the FAA’s Westbury, NY office as the official contact for this directive.
AirPro News analysis
The FAA’s decision to mandate an Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) revision rather than an immediate hardware redesign highlights a common regulatory strategy in aviation safety: relying on Crew Resource Management (CRM) and standardized emergency procedures to mitigate single-point hardware failures. While a failed retract relay presents a severe aerodynamic threat, the FAA’s assessment suggests that a properly trained crew with the right procedural checklist can safely manage the anomaly. This approach allows regulators to address the unsafe condition swiftly without grounding the entire CL-600 fleet or imposing crippling supply chain demands for new mechanical relays. However, we expect operators to closely monitor their fleets for any recurring relay issues, which could prompt the FAA to escalate this directive to require physical hardware inspections in the future.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the deadline to submit public comments on this FAA proposal?
The public comment period closes on July 10, 2026.
Will this proposed rule ground the Bombardier CL-600 fleet?
No. The proposed Airworthiness Directive does not require grounding the aircraft. It mandates an update to the Aircraft Flight Manuals to provide crews with emergency procedures.
What exactly caused the flaps to deploy mid-flight?
According to the FAA, a failed “retract relay” prevented the aircraft’s safety systems from stopping an uncommanded flap movement, allowing the flaps to extend fully to 45 degrees.
Photo Credit: Bombardier
Regulations & Safety
FAA Proposes $165,000 Fine Against Alaska Airlines for Intoxicated Passengers
FAA proposes a $165,000 fine against Alaska Airlines for allegedly allowing intoxicated passengers on 11 flights between 2024 and 2025.

This article is based on an official press release from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has announced a proposed civil penalty of $165,000 against Alaska Airlines, citing allegations that the carrier repeatedly allowed passengers who appeared to be intoxicated to board its aircraft.
According to the official press release issued by the FAA on May 26, 2026, the alleged regulatory violations occurred across 11 separate flights over a one-year period, spanning from February 2024 to February 2025.
This enforcement action highlights the agency’s ongoing commitment to strict adherence to federal aviation safety protocols regarding passenger behavior and alcohol consumption, emphasizing the critical role airlines play in screening passengers before they reach the cabin.
Details of the Alleged Violations
The core of the FAA’s allegation centers on the airline’s failure to prevent impaired individuals from accessing the aircraft. Under federal aviation regulations, specifically 14 CFR § 121.575 governing alcoholic beverages, airlines are strictly prohibited from allowing any person to board an aircraft if that individual appears to be intoxicated.
The FAA has historically noted in its safety briefings that impaired passenger behavior introduces unpredictable risks to the flight environment. These risks can range from a passenger being non-responsive during an emergency to becoming physically disruptive, thereby creating unsafe conditions for both the flight crew and fellow travelers.
Regulatory Requirements and Next Steps
Beyond the strict prohibition on boarding, 14 CFR § 121.575 also mandates that airlines report any onboard disturbances caused by an intoxicated-appearing passenger to the FAA within five days of the incident. The agency relies on these reports to track safety trends and enforce compliance across the national airspace system.
Following the issuance of the enforcement letter, Alaska Airlines has a standard 30-day window to formally respond to the agency. During this period, the Seattle-based carrier may choose to pay the $165,000 penalty, dispute the FAA’s findings, or attempt to negotiate a settlement.
Broader Industry Context and Enforcement Trends
The proposed fine against Alaska Airlines is not an isolated incident but rather part of a wider regulatory crackdown by the FAA on alcohol and drug-related compliance across the commercial aviation sector.
In January 2026, the FAA issued an Information for Operators (InFO 26002) bulletin that specifically addressed the safety risks associated with carrying impaired passengers. While initially directed at charter and general aviation operators, the agency used the bulletin to underscore a universal safety principle regarding intoxication.
As noted in the FAA’s January guidance, “past aviation accidents have shown that carrying intoxicated or impaired passengers can be a contributing factor” to unsafe flight conditions.
Recent Actions Against Major Carriers
The agency has recently levied substantial fines against other major U.S. carriers for related infractions, demonstrating a zero-tolerance approach to substance-related regulations. In April 2026, the FAA proposed civil penalties of $304,000 against Southwest Airlines and $255,000 against American Airlines. According to the agency, those fines were related to alleged failures in conducting required follow-up drug and alcohol testing for employees in safety-sensitive roles, including pilots and flight attendants.
AirPro News analysis
At AirPro News, we observe that while a $165,000 fine represents a relatively minor financial penalty for a major corporation like Alaska Air Group, the reputational implications are far more significant. This enforcement action places a direct, public spotlight on the airline’s passenger safety management practices and internal training protocols.
Furthermore, this situation underscores the immense operational pressure placed on frontline aviation workers. Gate agents and flight crews are tasked with the difficult job of assessing a passenger’s level of intoxication during the highly time-sensitive and often chaotic boarding process. They must constantly balance the operational push for on-time departures with strict regulatory compliance. The string of recent FAA actions, from employee testing fines in April to this passenger screening fine in May, sends a clear message to the industry that the FAA expects safety and regulatory adherence to supersede operational speed.
Frequently Asked Questions
What regulation did Alaska Airlines allegedly violate?
The FAA alleges the airline violated 14 CFR § 121.575, which prohibits airlines from allowing any person to board an aircraft if they appear to be intoxicated.
How many flights were involved in the FAA’s allegations?
According to the FAA, the alleged violations occurred on 11 separate flights between February 2024 and February 2025.
What happens next for the airline?
Alaska Airlines has 30 days from the receipt of the FAA’s enforcement letter to respond. The airline can pay the fine, dispute the allegations, or negotiate with the agency.
Sources
Photo Credit: Alaska Airlines
Regulations & Safety
NTSB Urges FAA to Update Runway Condition Assessment Matrix for Heavy Rain
NTSB recommends FAA revise runway condition assessments and expand rainfall reporting after 11 runway overruns linked to heavy rain from 2008 to 2022.

This article is based on an official press release from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
On May 26, 2026, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a press release urging the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to overhaul how runway conditions are assessed during heavy rainfall. The safety board warns that the current framework leaves flight crews vulnerable to runway overruns by failing to capture the true impact of severe weather on aircraft braking performance.
Stemming from investigations into 11 runway overrun accidents and incidents that occurred on wet runways between 2008 and 2022, the NTSB has issued three new safety recommendations. These directives focus on updating the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM) and expanding aviation weather reporting standards to better equip pilots with accurate data.
According to the NTSB, the current system fails to adequately account for the progressive loss of wheel braking friction as rainfall intensity increases. This creates a critical blind spot for pilots and dispatchers when calculating safe landing distances during intense storms.
The Limitations of Current Weather Reporting and RCAM
The RCAM is a standardized framework utilized by airport operators and flight crews to evaluate and report runway surface conditions. As noted in the NTSB release, it plays a vital role in calculating required landing distances, particularly on wet or contaminated runways.
However, the NTSB’s Aviation Investigation Report 26-04 (AIR-26-04), titled “Accounting for the Progressive Decrease in Runway Friction Associated with Increasing Rainfall Intensity,” highlights a significant flaw. The current matrix does not factor in the progressive decrease in runway friction that correlates with heavier rainfall.
Expanding Rainfall Descriptors
Currently, aviation weather reports cap the “heavy rain” threshold at 0.3 inches per hour. The NTSB points out that this limitation prevents flight crews from accurately assessing runway slipperiness when rainfall exceeds this rate.
To address this, the NTSB recommends that the FAA add new rainfall intensity descriptors to aviation weather reports. This would allow pilots to identify rainfall rates that surpass the 0.3 inches per hour mark, enabling more accurate landing distance calculations and better aeronautical decision-making.
Case Study: Miami Air International Flight 293
The NTSB’s recommendations are heavily informed by historical data, notably the crash of Miami Air International Flight 293. On May 3, 2019, a Boeing 737-81Q carrying 142 passengers and crew overran ungrooved runway 10 at Jacksonville Naval Air Station in Florida, coming to rest in the shallow waters of the St. Johns River.
While there were no serious injuries, the aircraft sustained substantial damage. The NTSB investigation determined that the probable cause was directly linked to the runway conditions and the intensity of the precipitation.
Extreme Conditions and Pilot Decision-Making
Crucially, the NTSB found that rainfall intensities during the Miami Air incident were two to eight times higher than the FAA’s heavy rain threshold of 0.3 inches per hour.
“an extreme loss of braking friction due to heavy rain and the water depth on the ungrooved runway, which resulted in viscous hydroplaning”
In its official report, the NTSB attributed the above cause to the Jacksonville overrun. The safety board noted that under such extreme conditions, braking effectiveness is reduced so severely that pilots should not even attempt to land.
NTSB’s Three Core Recommendations
Based on these findings, the NTSB has formally issued three safety recommendations to the FAA to mitigate future risks and improve operational safety.
First, the FAA must revise the RCAM to account for the progressive decrease in the wheel braking friction coefficient associated with increasing rainfall intensity. The NTSB advises that progressively higher rainfall intensities should correspond to progressively lower runway condition codes.
Second, as previously noted, the FAA should expand rainfall intensity descriptors in aviation weather reports to capture data beyond the current 0.3 inches per hour maximum.
Third, the NTSB emphasizes the need to improve flight crew awareness. By providing a broader range of descriptors, pilots will be better equipped to associate heavy rainfall with lower runway condition codes, preventing the dangerous underestimation of required landing distances.
AirPro News analysis
We view these recommendations as a necessary and overdue evolution in aviation safety protocols. If the FAA adopts these changes, it will fundamentally alter how pilots and dispatchers calculate landing performance during severe weather events, likely leading to an increase in weather-related diversions but a significant decrease in runway excursions.
The NTSB’s findings underscore that pilots are currently forced to make critical landing decisions based on incomplete weather data. Providing accurate descriptors for extreme rain will empower flight crews to confidently divert flights rather than risk a catastrophic runway overrun. Furthermore, the specific mention of an “ungrooved runway” in the Miami Air case highlights the ongoing need for airports to evaluate their infrastructure. The interaction between pavement types (grooved versus ungrooved) and heavy rainfall remains a critical variable in RCAM calculations that airport operators must prioritize.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
What is the RCAM?
The Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM) is a standardized framework used by airport operators and flight crews to assess and report runway surface conditions. It is essential for calculating safe landing distances.
Why is the NTSB recommending changes to the RCAM?
The NTSB found that the current RCAM and weather reporting standards do not adequately account for the progressive loss of braking friction during rainfall that exceeds 0.3 inches per hour, leading pilots to underestimate required landing distances.
How many accidents prompted this NTSB report?
The NTSB based its recommendations on data gathered from investigations into 11 runway overrun accidents and incidents that occurred on wet runways between 2008 and 2022.
Sources
Photo Credit: NTSB
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