Regulations & Safety
SAS A320neo Wrong Taxiway Takeoff Incident at Brussels Airport
A SAS Airbus A320neo nearly took off from a taxiway at Brussels Airport, aborted at 127 knots with no injuries. Preliminary AAIU report details contributing factors.
This article is based on an official preliminary report from the Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU).
SAS A320neo Narrowly Avoids Disaster in High-Speed Taxiway Takeoff Incident at Brussels Airport
On March 6, 2026, the Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) released a preliminary report detailing a severe aviation incident that occurred at Brussels Airport (BRU). According to the official AAIU documentation, on the evening of February 5, 2026, a Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) Airbus A320neo mistakenly attempted to take off from a parallel taxiway instead of its assigned runway. The aircraft reached a high speed before the flight crew realized the error and executed an emergency rejected takeoff (RTO).
The AAIU has officially classified the event as a “Serious Incident” under ICAO Annex 13 due to the high probability of an accident. The aircraft, operating as Flight SK2590 to Copenhagen with 165 passengers and crew on board, narrowly avoided a catastrophic collision with temporary fences and nearby aviation fuel storage tanks. Fortunately, no injuries were reported, and passengers were safely transported back to the terminal.
We have reviewed the preliminary findings, which highlight a complex “Swiss cheese” alignment of environmental, technical, and human factors. The report emphasizes that multiple overlapping issues contributed to the crew’s loss of situational awareness, rather than a single point of failure.
The Sequence of Events: A High-Speed Near-Miss
Misalignment and Acceleration
According to the AAIU timeline, the incident unfolded between 21:00 and 21:04 local time. The flight crew was cleared to take off from Runway 07R via an intersection designated as C6, rather than utilizing the full length of the runway. Operating in total darkness, the crew mistook taxiway “Outer 10” for intersection C6 and subsequently aligned the Airbus A320neo with Taxiway E1, which runs parallel to the active runway.
The preliminary report states that the crew initiated the takeoff roll down the taxiway, accelerating rapidly. The aircraft reached an Indicated Airspeed (IAS) of 127 knots (approximately 146 mph). The AAIU notes that the critical “V1” speed, the velocity beyond which a takeoff can no longer be safely aborted, was calculated at 132 knots for this specific flight, placing the aircraft just 5 knots away from the point of no return.
The Critical Abort and Evasive Action
As the aircraft accelerated down Taxiway E1, the First Officer noticed that the forward visual perspective appeared unusually narrow and that the Captain was not responding to standard operating procedure callouts. Realizing the aircraft was not on the runway, the First Officer intervened.
“Stop, stop, stop, stop.”
, First Officer, SAS Flight SK2590, as recorded in the AAIU preliminary report.
At 21:04:09, the Captain immediately aborted the takeoff by applying full reverse thrust and maximum braking. The AAIU report details that at the moment the abort was initiated, the aircraft had only about 520 meters (1,705 feet) of taxiway remaining before it would have collided with temporary fences. While still moving at roughly 40 knots, the First Officer instructed a right turn to avoid the approaching barriers. The aircraft came to a complete halt in just 14 seconds, stopping near the intersection of taxiways V1 and C1, mere meters from the runway guard lights and the airport’s fuel storage farm.
Contributing Factors Identified by Investigators
Environmental and Infrastructure Challenges
The AAIU preliminary report does not assign blame but rather identifies several contributing factors. Environmental conditions played a significant role; the incident occurred after civil twilight in total darkness. Furthermore, the runway and taxiway surfaces were wet, which the AAIU notes caused glare and made painted ground markings highly difficult to read.
Infrastructure and procedural elements also compounded the risk. The specific intersection is officially designated as a “hot spot”, an area with a known history or high risk of runway incursions. The AAIU report highlights that the illumination for a crucial intersection sign was inoperable at the time. Additionally, the red stop bar lights at the taxiway/runway intersection extinguished before the crew arrived at the holding point, depriving the pilots of a critical visual reference.
Equipment and Air Traffic Control Context
According to the investigation, the SAS Airbus A320neo was not equipped with optional safety software such as the Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS), Airbus Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS), or Take-Off Surveillance 2 (TOS2). While aviation regulators do not currently mandate these systems, their absence is noted in the report as they are designed to provide auditory and visual alerts if a takeoff is attempted from a taxiway.
From an Air Traffic Control (ATC) perspective, the AAIU notes that the control tower supervisor had combined the ground and air frequencies. A single air traffic controller was managing both frequencies and dividing their attention among seven different aircraft. Following the report’s release, Belgium’s ATC agency, Skeyes, publicly stated that this staffing arrangement strictly adhered to existing safety guidelines for that time of night and emphasized their full cooperation with the investigation under a “Just Culture” framework.
AirPro News analysis
We note that this incident serves as a textbook example of the critical importance of modern Crew Resource Management (CRM). Historically, steep cockpit hierarchies often prevented junior First Officers from correcting senior Captains, sometimes with fatal results. In this instance, the First Officer’s immediate, assertive command directly prevented a disaster, demonstrating that modern CRM training is functioning exactly as intended.
Furthermore, the absence of systems like RAAS or TOS2 on the incident aircraft highlights an ongoing industry debate. While airlines are legally compliant without these systems, wrong-surface events remain a persistent threat in commercial aviation. As the AAIU continues its investigation, we anticipate that the final report may include safety recommendations urging broader adoption of these technological safety nets, especially for operations at complex airports during low-visibility conditions.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Were there any injuries on SAS Flight SK2590?
No. According to the AAIU report, all 165 passengers and crew members were unharmed and safely transported back to the terminal via bus. The aircraft sustained only minor tire and landing gear damage due to high-speed braking.
How fast was the aircraft traveling before the abort?
The AAIU confirmed the aircraft reached 127 knots Indicated Airspeed (IAS) on the taxiway. The V1 speed (the speed at which takeoff must continue) was 132 knots.
When will the final investigation report be released?
The current AAIU report is strictly preliminary. A final report, which will include binding safety recommendations, is expected to be published in approximately one year, likely in early 2027.
Sources:
Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) Preliminary Report: AAIU-2026-02-05-01
Photo Credit: Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit
Regulations & Safety
Turkish Airlines 777-300ER Wing Strike at Antalya Airport
A Turkish Airlines Boeing 777-300ER struck a radar antenna pole taxiing at Antalya Airport, prompting evacuation and a formal investigation.
This is a developing story. Information may change as official details are released.
This article summarizes reporting by Hürriyet.
A Turkish Airlines (TK) Boeing 777-300ER sustained damage and prompted a passenger evacuation after its right wing struck a ground radar antenna pole while taxiing at Antalya Airport (AYT) on June 11, 2026.
The incident, which occurred at approximately 20:00 local time following Flight TK2430 from Istanbul, resulted in minor injuries among the passengers. According to official statements reported by Hürriyet, the widebody aircraft was maneuvering toward its parking position on Apron-1 when the collision occurred, leading to an immediate evacuation on the tarmac.
Conflicting passenger and injury reports
Following the evacuation, official sources provided conflicting figures regarding the number of passengers on board and the extent of injuries. In a public statement, Turkish Airlines Senior Vice President of Communications Yahya Üstün confirmed the evacuation, stating that 267 passengers were safely removed from the aircraft. The airline reported that one passenger sustained minor injuries and was in good health.
Conversely, the Turkey Ministry of Transport released a separate statement indicating a higher passenger count. The ministry reported that the aircraft was carrying 284 adult passengers and four infants. Furthermore, the government authority stated that three passengers suffered minor injuries during the event. Both entities confirmed that the aircraft, registered as TC-LKD, was towed to a parking area after the necessary safety checks and passenger removal were completed.
Investigation into the ground collision
A technical investigation into the ground collision has been initiated by the Turkey Ministry of Transport and the General Directorate of State Airports Authority (DHMI). The official cause of the incident remains under investigation.
While the airline noted the aircraft was approaching its parking position, preliminary remarks from the Ministry of Transport suggested the Boeing 777-300ER made contact with the radar pole after entering an incorrect taxiway line. Final determinations regarding the aircraft routing, ground control instructions, and the sequence of events will be established by the investigating authorities.
AirPro News analysis
Ground collisions involving widebody aircraft like the Boeing 777-300ER often highlight the tight tolerances required when maneuvering large airframes around airport infrastructure. While we await the official investigation findings, safety reviews following such events typically examine airport taxiway markings, lighting, and the clarity of ground control communications. The discrepancy in passenger manifests between the operator and the regulator is a notable detail, though initial reporting conflicts frequently occur in the immediate aftermath of an evacuation before final reconciliations are completed.
Sources: X.com
Photo Credit: X
Regulations & Safety
NTSB Final Report: Southwest Flight 4273 Turbulence Encounter
NTSB cites ATC communication delays and sector overload in Southwest Airlines turbulence event over Gulf of Mexico.
This is original reporting and analysis by AirPro News.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has released its final report on a severe turbulence encounter involving a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737-700, detailing how rapidly developing convective weather and air traffic control communication delays factored into an event that seriously injured two people.
The April 3, 2024, incident aboard Southwest Airlines Flight 4273 over the Gulf of Mexico highlights the operational risks when severe weather systems intersect with technical limitations at air traffic control facilities. According to the NTSB investigation, the aircraft was navigating complex weather en route from New Orleans to Orlando when the encounter occurred, resulting in serious injuries to one flight attendant and one passenger, alongside minor injuries to a second flight attendant.
Weather conditions and the turbulence encounter
Flight 4273, operated by a Boeing 737-700 (registration N567WN) with 140 passengers and five crew members on board, was traveling from Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport (MSY) to Orlando International Airport (MCO).
At 11:55 UTC, a Convective Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) advisory was issued for the region, warning of cloud tops exceeding 45,000 feet.
At approximately 08:20 Eastern Daylight Time, the aircraft encountered severe turbulence over the Gulf of Mexico. The NTSB confirmed the aircraft itself sustained no damage during the event and the flight crew was able to continue the flight.
Air traffic control workload and technical limitations
The NTSB report outlines compounding factors at the Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center (JAX ARTCC) that affected the flight routing through the weather system.
During the incident, the specific JAX ARTCC sector was managing a traffic volume that exceeded its target capacity of 20 aircraft.
This high workload was exacerbated by a technical limitation involving the facility communication infrastructure. The primary VHF antenna at JAX ARTCC had been rendered inoperative following a fire in October 2023. As a result, controllers were utilizing a temporary satellite relay connection to communicate with aircraft in the sector.
The NTSB determined this satellite relay introduced a 600-millisecond round-trip transmission delay, complicating timely communication between controllers and flight crews navigating the dynamic weather environment.
AirPro News analysis
We note that the findings in this final report underscore a critical vulnerability in the National Airspace System. When primary communication infrastructure fails, the fallback systems must be robust enough to handle high-stress, time-critical scenarios like severe convective weather deviation. A 600-millisecond delay might seem negligible in routine operations, but in a saturated sector where controllers are issuing rapid heading changes to keep aircraft clear of building storm cells, that latency degrades situational awareness and increases the risk of weather encounters. The NTSB documentation of this technical shortfall will likely prompt further scrutiny of contingency communication systems at major en route centers.
Photo Credit: NTSB
Regulations & Safety
Sinkhole Closes Primary Runway at Tri-Cities Airport
A 20-ft-wide, 17-ft-deep sinkhole forced closure of Runway 5/23 at TRI on June 9, 2026, disrupting airline operations.
This is a developing story. Information may change as official details are released.
This article summarizes reporting by WSMV by Li Cohen, Kingsport Times News, and official statements from the Tri-Cities Airport Authority.
A massive sinkhole measuring 20 feet wide and 17 feet deep forced the immediate closure of the primary commercial runway at Tri-Cities Airports (TRI) in East Tennessee on June 9, 2026, disrupting airline operations. The subsurface void was discovered beneath Runway 5/23, prompting airport officials to halt traffic on the strip while engineering teams assess the structural integrity of the pavement.
Airport personnel initially identified a surface condition requiring evaluation on the runway on Tuesday. Subsequent investigation by the Tri-Cities Airport Authority revealed the extensive 20-by-20-by-17-foot void, leading to an extended closure through at least June 10, 2026, according to official airport updates.
Operational impact and airline response
Runway 5/23 serves as the primary long runway for commercial flights at the Blountville facility. Its sudden closure has shifted the burden of operational decisions to individual air carriers, who must evaluate their ability to operate at the airport under current conditions.
Tri-Cities Airport Authority President and CEO Gene Cossey stated that airlines will determine whether to delay or cancel their scheduled flights. According to reporting by Kingsport Times News, Cossey advised passengers to check directly with their respective airlines for status updates before traveling to the terminal.
While the primary commercial strip is out of service, the airport’s secondary runway, Runway 9/27, remains open for operations. However, the shift in runway availability has required dispatchers and flight crews to recalculate performance data to ensure safe operations on the alternate surface.
Infrastructure repairs and geological context
Repair efforts commenced immediately on the evening of June 9. The airport authority emphasized that safety remains the primary concern during the restoration process and that the runway will remain closed until repairs meet regulatory standards.
“The airport will work to fix this problem as quickly as possible, but we always ensure the safety of the traveling public is our primary concern, and we will ensure that the repairs are made as quickly as we can while also ensuring complete safety,” Cossey said, as reported by Kingsport Times News.
Sinkholes are a documented geological hazard in East Tennessee. The region is characterized by karst topography, which consists of highly soluble carbonate rocks that can dissolve and create underground voids over time.
Similar infrastructure challenges have affected other major aviation facilities recently. On May 20, 2026, a sinkhole discovered near Runway 4/22 at New York’s LaGuardia Airport (LGA) forced a runway closure and caused widespread flight disruptions, according to reporting by WBIR.
AirPro News analysis
We note that runway closures due to sudden geological subsidence present unique challenges for airport operators, particularly at regional facilities with limited runway redundancy. While TRI’s Runway 9/27 remains active, its dimensions and weight-bearing capacity may restrict certain commercial operations or require payload penalties compared to the primary Runway 5/23. The rapid identification of the 17-foot-deep void highlights the critical importance of routine daily runway inspections in preventing potential aircraft incidents during takeoff or landing rolls. The timeline for reopening Runway 5/23 will likely depend on the stability of the surrounding soil and the extent of the required fill and repaving work.
Sources: Tri-Cities Airport, WSMV, Kingsport Times News, WBIR
Photo Credit: Kingsport Times News
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