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SAS A320neo Wrong Taxiway Takeoff Incident at Brussels Airport

A SAS Airbus A320neo nearly took off from a taxiway at Brussels Airport, aborted at 127 knots with no injuries. Preliminary AAIU report details contributing factors.

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This article is based on an official preliminary report from the Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU).

SAS A320neo Narrowly Avoids Disaster in High-Speed Taxiway Takeoff Incident at Brussels Airport

On March 6, 2026, the Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) released a preliminary report detailing a severe aviation incident that occurred at Brussels Airport (BRU). According to the official AAIU documentation, on the evening of February 5, 2026, a Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) Airbus A320neo mistakenly attempted to take off from a parallel taxiway instead of its assigned runway. The aircraft reached a high speed before the flight crew realized the error and executed an emergency rejected takeoff (RTO).

The AAIU has officially classified the event as a “Serious Incident” under ICAO Annex 13 due to the high probability of an accident. The aircraft, operating as Flight SK2590 to Copenhagen with 165 passengers and crew on board, narrowly avoided a catastrophic collision with temporary fences and nearby aviation fuel storage tanks. Fortunately, no injuries were reported, and passengers were safely transported back to the terminal.

We have reviewed the preliminary findings, which highlight a complex “Swiss cheese” alignment of environmental, technical, and human factors. The report emphasizes that multiple overlapping issues contributed to the crew’s loss of situational awareness, rather than a single point of failure.

The Sequence of Events: A High-Speed Near-Miss

Misalignment and Acceleration

According to the AAIU timeline, the incident unfolded between 21:00 and 21:04 local time. The flight crew was cleared to take off from Runway 07R via an intersection designated as C6, rather than utilizing the full length of the runway. Operating in total darkness, the crew mistook taxiway “Outer 10” for intersection C6 and subsequently aligned the Airbus A320neo with Taxiway E1, which runs parallel to the active runway.

The preliminary report states that the crew initiated the takeoff roll down the taxiway, accelerating rapidly. The aircraft reached an Indicated Airspeed (IAS) of 127 knots (approximately 146 mph). The AAIU notes that the critical “V1” speed, the velocity beyond which a takeoff can no longer be safely aborted, was calculated at 132 knots for this specific flight, placing the aircraft just 5 knots away from the point of no return.

The Critical Abort and Evasive Action

As the aircraft accelerated down Taxiway E1, the First Officer noticed that the forward visual perspective appeared unusually narrow and that the Captain was not responding to standard operating procedure callouts. Realizing the aircraft was not on the runway, the First Officer intervened.

“Stop, stop, stop, stop.”

, First Officer, SAS Flight SK2590, as recorded in the AAIU preliminary report.

At 21:04:09, the Captain immediately aborted the takeoff by applying full reverse thrust and maximum braking. The AAIU report details that at the moment the abort was initiated, the aircraft had only about 520 meters (1,705 feet) of taxiway remaining before it would have collided with temporary fences. While still moving at roughly 40 knots, the First Officer instructed a right turn to avoid the approaching barriers. The aircraft came to a complete halt in just 14 seconds, stopping near the intersection of taxiways V1 and C1, mere meters from the runway guard lights and the airport’s fuel storage farm.

Contributing Factors Identified by Investigators

Environmental and Infrastructure Challenges

The AAIU preliminary report does not assign blame but rather identifies several contributing factors. Environmental conditions played a significant role; the incident occurred after civil twilight in total darkness. Furthermore, the runway and taxiway surfaces were wet, which the AAIU notes caused glare and made painted ground markings highly difficult to read.

Infrastructure and procedural elements also compounded the risk. The specific intersection is officially designated as a “hot spot”, an area with a known history or high risk of runway incursions. The AAIU report highlights that the illumination for a crucial intersection sign was inoperable at the time. Additionally, the red stop bar lights at the taxiway/runway intersection extinguished before the crew arrived at the holding point, depriving the pilots of a critical visual reference.

Equipment and Air Traffic Control Context

According to the investigation, the SAS Airbus A320neo was not equipped with optional safety software such as the Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS), Airbus Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS), or Take-Off Surveillance 2 (TOS2). While aviation regulators do not currently mandate these systems, their absence is noted in the report as they are designed to provide auditory and visual alerts if a takeoff is attempted from a taxiway.

From an Air Traffic Control (ATC) perspective, the AAIU notes that the control tower supervisor had combined the ground and air frequencies. A single air traffic controller was managing both frequencies and dividing their attention among seven different aircraft. Following the report’s release, Belgium’s ATC agency, Skeyes, publicly stated that this staffing arrangement strictly adhered to existing safety guidelines for that time of night and emphasized their full cooperation with the investigation under a “Just Culture” framework.

AirPro News analysis

We note that this incident serves as a textbook example of the critical importance of modern Crew Resource Management (CRM). Historically, steep cockpit hierarchies often prevented junior First Officers from correcting senior Captains, sometimes with fatal results. In this instance, the First Officer’s immediate, assertive command directly prevented a disaster, demonstrating that modern CRM training is functioning exactly as intended.

Furthermore, the absence of systems like RAAS or TOS2 on the incident aircraft highlights an ongoing industry debate. While airlines are legally compliant without these systems, wrong-surface events remain a persistent threat in commercial aviation. As the AAIU continues its investigation, we anticipate that the final report may include safety recommendations urging broader adoption of these technological safety nets, especially for operations at complex airports during low-visibility conditions.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Were there any injuries on SAS Flight SK2590?
No. According to the AAIU report, all 165 passengers and crew members were unharmed and safely transported back to the terminal via bus. The aircraft sustained only minor tire and landing gear damage due to high-speed braking.

How fast was the aircraft traveling before the abort?
The AAIU confirmed the aircraft reached 127 knots Indicated Airspeed (IAS) on the taxiway. The V1 speed (the speed at which takeoff must continue) was 132 knots.

When will the final investigation report be released?
The current AAIU report is strictly preliminary. A final report, which will include binding safety recommendations, is expected to be published in approximately one year, likely in early 2027.


Sources:
Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) Preliminary Report: AAIU-2026-02-05-01

Photo Credit: Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit

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Regulations & Safety

Global Aerospace Issues Hangar Foam Suppression Safety Guidelines

Global Aerospace updates hangar fire suppression guidelines, citing 200+ accidental foam discharges and the shift to PFAS-free alternatives.

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Global Aerospace has issued updated safety and risk mitigation guidelines for aviation hangar fire suppression systems, highlighting the severe financial and environmental toll of accidental foam discharges. The aviation insurer published the comprehensive best practices on August 24, 2026, detailing the industry transition toward alternative fire protection technologies.

The guidance arrives alongside the introduction of the 2026 edition of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 409. This updated standard governs hangar fire protection and introduces critical changes to align requirements with modern aircraft design and growing environmental concerns regarding chemical suppressants.

The financial and human cost of accidental discharges

Fire suppression standards established in the mid-1970s heavily prioritized foam systems to combat large fuel-spill fires. However, Global Aerospace reports that these systems frequently cause more damage than the fires they are designed to prevent. Over the last two decades, more than 200 unnecessary foam discharges have occurred in aviation facilities.

These accidental activations have resulted in tens of millions of dollars in total damages, with the average per-incident cost reaching hundreds of thousands of dollars. Beyond property damage to aircraft and hangar infrastructure, accidental discharges pose severe life-safety risks to personnel.

The insurer cited a fatal 2014 incident at Eglin Air Force Base as a primary example of these hazards. Following a broken sprinkler pipe, the hangar filled with approximately 17 feet of foam in minutes, resulting in the death of one contractor.

Shifting standards and environmental-impact liabilities

Aviation insurers are increasingly processing claims that extend beyond immediate property damage to include long-term health risks and environmental restoration. This liability shift is largely driven by the presence of perfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) in older aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF).

To mitigate these chemical risks, the aviation industry is actively transitioning toward fluorine-free foams and alternative fire suppression technologies. Global Aerospace highlighted the growing adoption of ignitable liquid drainage floor assemblies and optical flame detection systems, such as multi-spectrum infrared detectors. These alternatives eliminate hazardous chemicals and significantly reduce the likelihood of false alarms.

While the 2026 edition of NFPA 409 provides the framework for these modern systems, the updated standards must be adopted by local fire marshals before facilities can implement the changes.

Operational risk mitigation strategies

For facilities still operating legacy high-expansion foam (HEF) or AFFF systems, Global Aerospace recommends strict operational protocols to minimize the risk and impact of an accidental discharge. The insurer advises operators to protect all aircraft openings and secure sensitive electronics during maintenance operations.

In the event of a discharge, the guidelines stress the importance of keeping hangar doors closed to contain the foam and prevent environmental contamination outside the facility. Additionally, Global Aerospace recommends conducting all system testing and maintenance during off-hours to limit personnel exposure and operational disruption.

AirPro News analysis

The publication of these guidelines by a major aviation insurer underscores a broader industry reality: insurance providers are often the primary catalyst for operational safety upgrades. While regulatory bodies like the NFPA set the baseline standards, the financial pressure of uninsurable environmental liabilities tied to PFAS contamination is forcing hangar operators to modernize. We expect the transition to optical flame detection and drainage floor assemblies to accelerate rapidly as insurers begin pricing the risk of legacy foam systems out of the market.

Sources: Global Aerospace

Photo Credit: Global Aerospace

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Regulations & Safety

NTSB Preliminary Report: Ryanair 737-800 Engine Failure

NTSB confirms fan-blade-out on Ryanair 737-800 shattered cabin window, partially ejecting a passenger during climb from Thessaloniki.

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This is a developing story. Information may change as official details are released.

This is original reporting and analysis by AirPro News.

On August 13, 2026, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued its preliminary report on a July 10 uncontained engine failure aboard a Ryanair Boeing 737-800, confirming that a fan-blade-out event shattered a cabin window and caused a rapid decompression. The incident resulted in a 61-year-old male passenger being partially pulled through the shattered window before being secured by fellow passengers.

The event occurred during climb out from Thessaloniki International Airport (SKG) in Greece. The flight, operated by Ryanair subsidiary Malta Air, was bound for Memmingen, Germany (FMM). The NTSB is currently investigating potential similarities between this event and a fatal 2018 engine failure, while the agency has also publicly addressed premature speculation regarding the cause by Ryanair leadership.

Flight 1879 rapid decompression

According to the NTSB preliminary report, the Boeing 737-800 was climbing when the right-hand CFM56-7B engine experienced a fan-blade-out event. Debris from the engine struck the fuselage and shattered a window at row 11. The resulting rapid decompression pulled a passenger partially outside the aircraft. The passenger sustained neck and shoulder injuries as well as friction burns, but no fatalities occurred.

Reporting by The Air Current indicates the failure happened at an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet. Passengers described a sudden and violent disruption to the flight. A passenger told AP News that the cabin was quiet before a loud noise resembling a bursting tire occurred, adding that they knew immediately the aircraft had lost pressure due to the sudden loss of altitude.

Initial reports following the July 10 incident suggested the failure occurred in the airspace of the Republic of North Macedonia. However, flight path analysis confirmed the event took place in Greek airspace. The Hellenic Air and Rail Safety Investigation Authority officially delegated the investigation to the NTSB on July 16, 2026.

Maintenance history and preliminary findings

The NTSB preliminary report notes that bird remains were found inside the damaged engine. Flight crews had reported four suspected bird strikes to the aircraft’s number two engine in the 12 months preceding the accident. The report states that bird remains were found in two of those previous cases.

Maintenance records indicate that the fan blades on the failed right engine underwent ultrasonic inspections in November 2025 and May 2026. No damage was found during either inspection. The official cause of the July 10 failure remains under investigation by the NTSB, with participation from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Boeing, and CFM International, a joint venture between GE Aerospace and Safran.

Regulatory protocols and historical precedent

The investigation has generated friction between the NTSB and Ryanair regarding public communications. On August 7, 2026, NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy issued a letter to Ryanair CEO Michael O’Leary after he told investors the investigation was focused on foreign object damage rather than aircraft age or maintenance. Homendy stated that the NTSB had made no such determination and noted that O’Leary’s comments violated International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 13 protocols governing accident investigations.

The aviation industry is closely monitoring the investigation due to the aircraft and engine types involved. The Air Current reported that the event closely mirrors the April 2018 Southwest Airlines flight 1380 uncontained engine failure, which also involved a Boeing 737-700 and a CFM56-7B engine. That incident resulted in one passenger fatality after a shattered window caused partial ejection, leading the FAA to mandate engine inlet redesigns by July 2028.

The NTSB addressed the historical context directly in its preliminary report:

The investigative team is aware of previous … events with similar engine models that resulted in damage to engine inlets or cowlings and fuselage structures. Determination of any relevant similarities or details between this accident and previous events remains under investigation.

AirPro News analysis

We observe that the public rebuke of a major airline CEO by the NTSB is a rare and significant enforcement of ICAO Annex 13 communication protocols. Operators typically defer entirely to the investigating authority to avoid compromising the integrity of an active probe. The NTSB’s swift correction underscores the agency’s zero-tolerance policy for operator speculation, particularly when an event involves high-profile safety concerns like uncontained engine failures.

The CFM56-7B is one of the most widely used commercial aviation engines in the world. Any investigation involving a fan-blade-out event on this powerplant will naturally draw intense regulatory scrutiny, especially given the precedent set by the 2018 Southwest Airlines accident. While the discovery of bird remains introduces foreign object damage as a variable, we expect investigators will rigorously examine the efficacy of the ultrasonic inspections conducted in November 2025 and May 2026 to understand how the blade failure propagated.

Sources: National Transportation Safety Board

Photo Credit: NTSB

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Regulations & Safety

FAA Installs New Surface Radar at Newark Airport

The FAA unveiled a new SMR-4 radar at Newark Liberty as part of a $30 million infrastructure upgrade targeting runway safety.

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U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Bryan Bedford unveiled a new Surface Movement Radar-Systems Model 4 (SMR-4) at Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) on August 11, 2026, replacing a 30-year-old legacy system.

The installation is part of a broader $30 million infrastructure upgrade at the New Jersey hub designed to prevent runway incursions and reduce delays. According to the FAA press release, the SMR-4 allows air traffic controllers to track aircraft and ground vehicles across runways and taxiways in all weather and visibility conditions.

Newark’s infrastructure modernization

The $30 million funding allocation for EWR spans a three-year period and targets critical technological vulnerabilities. During the summer of 2025, the Airports experienced severe delays that prompted the FAA to deploy Software patches, expedite fiber deployment, and rebalance flight volumes. To date, 90% of the airport’s legacy copper wiring has been replaced with high-speed fiber.

“Since the start of this administration, we have been working towards building a modern system that will serve America’s skies for generations,” Duffy stated. “From replacing Newark’s ancient copper wire to investing $30 million into new infrastructure and bringing new radar online, we are delivering real safety and efficiency enhancements at one of our nation’s busiest airports.”

The FAA has set a target deadline of summer 2027 for EWR to install new electronic information displays, upgraded voice switches, and a new long-range radar system.

National surface awareness rollout

The EWR installation is one of five SMR-4 systems deployed nationwide to date. The agency has accelerated its broader technological overhaul over the past year, replacing 60% of all copper wires in its national network and converting 363 radio sites. The FAA also transitioned 19 air traffic control towers to electronic flight strips and installed 151 IP voice switches at control towers across the country.

Bedford emphasized the operational volume driving the upgrades. “Newark sees well-over a thousand flights per day, and the new Surface Movement Radar will help controllers keep those flights safe at this major U.S. hub,” Bedford said, describing the deployment as a step toward modernizing the national airspace.

The push for enhanced surface surveillance follows a fatal runway incursion at LaGuardia Airport (LGA) on March 22, 2026. In that event, Air Canada (AC) Express Flight 8646, operated by Jazz Aviation using a Bombardier CRJ900, collided with an airport firefighting vehicle on Runway 4. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) confirmed two pilot fatalities and 39 injuries. The NTSB is leading the ongoing Investigation, and no official cause has been determined.

In response to surface safety concerns, the FAA has installed 96 new Surface Awareness Initiative systems nationwide over the past year to provide controllers with better situational awareness.

AirPro News analysis

The FAA’s rapid deployment of 96 Surface Awareness Initiative systems and the ongoing SMR-4 rollout represent a tangible shift toward proactive technological intervention in ground operations. While the NTSB has not yet concluded its investigation into the March 2026 LaGuardia runway incursion, the agency’s aggressive timeline for replacing legacy copper wiring and installing surface tracking tools indicates that regulators are prioritizing immediate situational awareness upgrades for air traffic controllers. We view the $30 million targeted investment at EWR as a template the FAA is likely to replicate at other high-density hubs where legacy infrastructure limits operational capacity during low-visibility conditions.

Sources: Federal Aviation Administration

Photo Credit: Federal Aviation Administration

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