NASA Unveils GlennICE: A Digital Leap for Aviation Safety

NASA has officially introduced GlennICE, a next-generation software code designed to revolutionize how the aviation industry predicts and prevents ice accumulation on aircraft. Developed at the Glenn Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio, this new tool addresses the limitations of decades-old legacy systems, offering high-fidelity 3D simulations critical for the safety of emerging aircraft designs, including eVTOL vehicles and sustainable commercial jets.

According to an announcement from the agency on December 4, 2025, GlennICE, short for the Glenn Icing Computational Environment, enables engineers to “flight test” designs digitally with extreme precision. By simulating how ice forms on complex surfaces like rotating propeller blades, engine interiors, and truss-braced wings, the software aims to reduce the reliance on expensive and time-consuming physical wind tunnel testing.

From 2D Legacy to 3D Precision

For over 20 years, the aviation industry relied primarily on LEWICE, a 2D coding standard also developed by NASA. While LEWICE proved effective for traditional “tube-and-wing” aircraft, it struggles to model the intricate geometries of modern Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) vehicles. NASA officials state that GlennICE was built specifically to bridge this gap.

Christopher Porter, the lead developer for GlennICE at NASA, emphasized the necessity of this evolution in the agency’s press release:

“The legacy codes are well formulated to handle simulations of traditional tube-and-wing shaped aircraft. But now, we have new vehicles with new designs that present icing research challenges. This requires a more advanced tool, and that’s where GlennICE comes in.”

Advanced Physics and Droplet Tracking

The core advancement in GlennICE is its use of Lagrangian droplet tracking. Unlike previous methods that utilized simple 2D strips, GlennICE simulates the trajectories of individual water droplets as they approach an aircraft. According to NASA technical reports, the software can track millions of droplets to calculate exactly which ones impact the surface and which are swept away by airflow.

Validation data indicates the software has demonstrated the ability to simulate over 134 million trajectories to ensure safety-critical accuracy. This capability allows it to model various hazardous icing conditions, including:

• Rime Ice: Rough, opaque ice that forms instantly upon impact.
• Glaze Ice: Clear, heavy ice that can run back along the wing before freezing, altering aerodynamics significantly.
• Supercooled Large Droplets (SLD): Freezing rain or drizzle, which poses a severe threat to flight control surfaces.
• Ice Crystals: High-altitude particles that can melt and refreeze inside turbine engines.

Industry Adoption and Strategic Partnerships

The transition to GlennICE is already underway across the aerospace sector. NASA reports that “dozens of industry partners” are currently utilizing the tool to certify next-generation aircraft. Key collaborations highlighted in recent reports include:

• Boeing: Engineers are using GlennICE to predict ice formation on the Transonic Truss-Braced Wing (TTBW) concept, known as the X-66A. The software helps model ice buildup on the aircraft’s unique support struts, a task difficult to achieve with legacy 2D tools.
• Wisk Aero: As a subsidiary of Boeing focused on autonomous air taxis, Wisk utilizes the software to simulate icing on complex rotors and lifting surfaces, a critical step for AAM certification.
• Honeywell Aerospace: The company employs GlennICE to research “ice crystal icing” inside engines, a phenomenon linked to power loss events in commercial aviation.

AirPro News Analysis

The release of GlennICE represents a pivotal moment for the Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) sector. As manufacturers of eVTOLs and delivery drones push toward commercial certification, they face stringent safety requirements regarding flight into known icing (FIKI) conditions. Physical testing for every potential icing scenario is financially prohibitive and logistically difficult given the limited availability of specialized facilities like the NASA Icing Research Tunnel.

By providing a validated “digital twin” capability, NASA is effectively lowering the barrier to entry for sustainable aviation startups. If regulators accept GlennICE data as a partial substitute for physical testing, similar to how CFD is used in aerodynamics, it could significantly accelerate the timeline for bringing autonomous air taxis to market.

Validating the Digital Twin

To ensure the software’s predictions match reality, NASA validated GlennICE using data from the Icing Research Tunnel (IRT), the world’s oldest and largest refrigerated wind tunnel. This process ensures that the digital simulations align with physical physics, allowing engineers to trust the software for scenarios that are difficult to replicate physically.

Porter noted the importance of this capability in the official release:

“Some environments we need to test in are impractical with wind tunnels because of the tunnel size required and complex physics involved. But with GlennICE, we can do these tests digitally.”

Version 5.1.0 of the software, released in early 2025, introduced standardized verification frameworks, further solidifying its role as the new industry standard for icing research.

Sources

• NASA: NASA Software Raises Bar for Aircraft Icing Research
• NASA Technical Reports Server: GlennICE Verification and Validation v5.1.0

This article summarizes reporting by NPR and The Associated Press.

Deep-Sea Search for MH370 to Resume December 30 Under “No Find, No Fee” Deal

The search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 (MH370), one of aviation’s most enduring mysteries, is set to resume later this month. According to reporting by NPR and The Associated Press, the Malaysian government has confirmed that the marine robotics firm Ocean Infinity will restart operations on December 30, 2025. The mission operates under a strict performance-based contract, with a financial reward contingent entirely on success.

This renewed effort marks a significant development in the decade-long quest to locate the Boeing 777, which vanished on March 8, 2014, with 239 people on board. As reported by the Associated Press, the government has stipulated a payment of $70 million to Ocean Infinity, but only if the wreckage is located within a 55-day timeframe.

Operational Details and Financial Stakes

The upcoming mission is technically a resumption of an effort that began earlier in 2025 but was suspended in April due to hazardous winter conditions in the southern hemisphere. The structure of the agreement places the financial risk squarely on the contractor.

Under the “no find, no fee” terms outlined in reports, Ocean Infinity will bear the upfront costs of fuel, personnel, and equipment. The Malaysian Ministry of Transport has indicated that the $70 million reward is payable only upon positive identification of the debris field. This model incentivizes efficiency and the use of cutting-edge technology to cover ground quickly.

According to operational details surfacing in recent reports, the search window is limited to 55 days of intermittent searching. This duration accounts for the transit time required to reach the remote search zone and potential pauses necessitated by the volatile weather patterns characteristic of the southern Indian Ocean.

Technology and Target Zone

The search strategy relies heavily on advanced autonomous systems. The primary vessel for this mission is identified as the Armada 78 06, a 78-meter robotic vessel from Ocean Infinity’s fleet. Unlike previous searches that relied on towed sonar arrays connected to crewed ships by miles of cable, the Armada fleet utilizes UAVs.

These UAVs are capable of scanning the seabed with higher resolution and greater speed. They can operate simultaneously, covering vast swathes of the ocean floor while the surface vessel monitors data acquisition. The target area for this phase covers approximately 15,000 square kilometers (roughly 5,800 square miles) in the southern Indian Ocean.

Experts and independent researchers, including the “UGIB” group (Ulich, Godfrey, Iannello, and Banks), have advocated for this specific zone. Based on refined analyses of satellite “handshake” data and debris drift modeling, the search will focus on the vicinity of the “Seventh Arc,” specifically between latitudes 33°S and 36°S near the Broken Ridge underwater plateau.

AirPro News Analysis: The Shift to Autonomous Search

The deployment of the Armada 78 06 represents a pivotal shift in deep-sea salvage and search operations. Previous efforts, such as the Australia-led search from 2014 to 2017, were hampered by the logistical difficulties of towing equipment at extreme depths. The tethered approach limited maneuverability and required slow towing speeds to prevent cable breakage.

By utilizing untethered AUVs, Ocean Infinity can decouple the sensors from the surface conditions to a significant degree. This allows the sensors to hug the rugged terrain of the Indian Ocean floor more closely, potentially revealing wreckage that might have been obscured in the “shadows” of underwater mountains during previous lower-resolution scans. If successful, this mission could validate the economic viability of autonomous fleets for high-stakes oceanography.

Stakeholder Reactions and Historical Context

The disappearance of MH370 remains a painful open wound for the families of the 227 passengers and 12 crew members. Family associations, particularly Voice370, have consistently lobbied for the search to continue, arguing that finding the hull is essential for global safety.

Prominent family members have publicly stated that preventing future recurrences requires a definitive understanding of what happened to the aircraft. The Malaysian Ministry of Transport has echoed this sentiment, stating that the resumption of the search underscores their commitment to providing closure.

This is not the first time Ocean Infinity has attempted to solve the mystery. In 2018, the company conducted a similar “no find, no fee” search covering over 112,000 square kilometers. While that mission ended without success, the technology has evolved significantly in the intervening years. The Chinese government, representing the majority of the passengers, continues to monitor these developments closely.

Sources

Sources: NPR / The Associated Press

ATSB Report: Data Entry Error Triggered “Cascading” Safety Risks on Qantas 737 Flight

A seemingly minor data-entry mistake by ground staff initiated a complex chain of errors that resulted in a Qantas Boeing 737-800 taking off from Canberra significantly heavier than its flight crew believed. According to a final report released by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) regarding the December 1, 2024 incident, the Commercial-Aircraft departed with incorrect performance calculations, creating a genuine Safety risk that was only mitigated by the pilots’ conservative decision-making.

The incident highlights the fragility of automated safety systems when human operators are under pressure. As reported by ABC News and detailed in the ATSB findings, the error caused the flight management computer to calculate takeoff speeds that were too slow for the aircraft’s actual weight, increasing the potential for a tailstrike or runway overrun.

The Trigger: A Case of Mistaken Identity

The sequence of events began when a Qantas staff member in Canberra, reportedly working under high pressure due to weather-related diversions, accessed the flight planning system. According to the ATSB report, the employee inadvertently entered the aircraft code for a Boeing 717, a smaller 125-seat jet, instead of the correct Boeing 737-800, which seats 164 passengers.

While the staff member realized the mistake and corrected the aircraft type code back to a 737, they failed to notice a critical automated consequence of the initial error. When the system briefly thought the flight was a smaller Boeing 717, it automatically “offloaded” 51 passengers (11 Business Class and 40 Economy) to align with the smaller jet’s capacity. When the code was corrected, the system did not automatically re-add these passengers.

Weight and Performance Discrepancies

Because the 51 passengers were missing from the digital manifest, the final loadsheet issued to the pilots was inaccurate. The ATSB investigation revealed the following discrepancies:

• Weight Error: The aircraft was approximately 4,291 kg (4.3 tonnes) heavier than the loadsheet indicated.
• Speed Calculation: The flight management computer calculated takeoff speeds 3–4 knots lower than required for the actual weight.

Communication Breakdowns and Missed Opportunities

The ATSB described the incident as a failure of the safety system to catch the initial slip, citing “cascading” errors that bypassed multiple layers of defense. Although the initial input was a human error, the subsequent failure to rectify it involved broken chains of communication.

According to the investigation, a Load Control Manager eventually noticed the discrepancy in the system and attempted to contact the pilots via mobile phone, but the call went unanswered. The issue was then escalated to Movement Control, who attempted to radio the crew. However, the pilots had deselected the radio to focus on pre-flight data entry, a standard procedure designed to minimize distractions in the cockpit.

In a final attempt to reach the crew, Movement Control radioed the Gate Agent to pass the urgent message. This action breached standard procedure, which requires direct liaison with the flight crew for critical load errors. Consequently, the message never reached the pilots before the aircraft began its takeoff roll.

Safety Outcome and Pilot Actions

Despite the incorrect data, the flight departed safely. The ATSB credited the pilots’ conservative approach to performance planning for preventing a more serious outcome. Rather than utilizing a shorter intersection departure or applying a “headwind credit”, which allows for higher weights or lower speeds based on wind conditions, the crew elected to use the full length of the runway.

Dr. Stuart Godley, Director of Transport Safety at the ATSB, noted the importance of these decisions in the official report:

“Fortunately, the flight crew elected to use the full length of the runway… which added an increased safety margin.”

The crew only discovered the error after the aircraft was airborne.

AirPro News Analysis: The Danger of Automation Bias

This incident serves as a textbook example of “automation surprise” or bias. When the ground staff member corrected the aircraft type from 717 back to 737, they likely assumed the computer would “undo” all associated changes, including the removal of passengers. This psychological reliance on system logic can be dangerous when software is designed to be conservative (offloading passengers to prevent overbooking) but not restorative.

Furthermore, the “high workload” environment cited in the report underscores a persistent industry challenge. When staff are saturated with tasks, in this case, managing weather diversions, their ability to cross-check automated outputs diminishes. The failure here was not just individual, but systemic, as the software provided no clear warning that the passenger count had been drastically altered following the code correction.

Qantas Response and Procedural Changes

Qantas has acknowledged the findings and accepted the ATSB’s conclusions. In response to the incident, the Airlines has implemented new safety protocols to prevent recurrence. According to the report, airport staff are now required to conduct a manual headcount whenever passenger numbers in the system do not match expected figures, ensuring physical verification before a flight is closed.

Dr. Godley emphasized the broader lesson for the Aviation industry:

“The occurrence demonstrated how a small error can cascade when unusual situations are not proactively identified, addressed, or escalated by those involved in a safety system.”

Frequently Asked Questions

Was the flight ever in immediate danger of crashing?
While the risk was elevated due to incorrect speeds, the ATSB noted that the pilots’ decision to use the full runway length provided a sufficient safety buffer. Had they used a shorter intersection or less conservative settings, the risk of a tailstrike or runway overrun would have been significantly higher.

How common are data-entry errors in aviation?
Data-entry errors are a known hazard. Similar incidents have occurred in the past, including a 2014 Qantas flight where children were assigned adult weights, and a 2009 Emirates incident in Melbourne where an incorrect weight entry led to a severe tailstrike.

What happened to the staff member involved?
The report focuses on systemic improvements rather than individual punishment. It highlights that the staff member was working under high pressure due to weather disruptions, which is a known human factor in safety incidents.

Sources

• ABC News
• Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)