Defense & Military
F35 Crash at Eielson AFB Due to Frozen Hydraulic Fluid Causes $196 Million Loss
An F-35A crash at Eielson AFB caused by frozen hydraulic fluid highlights maintenance and reliability issues in extreme cold climates.

Frozen Landing Gear Malfunction Leads to $196.5 Million F-35 Lightning II Loss at Eielson Air Force Base
On January 28, 2025, a U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II crashed at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska, marking a significant event in military aviation due to a combination of technical, procedural, and environmental failures. This incident resulted in the loss of an aircraft valued at $196.5 million and has since prompted a comprehensive investigation into the vulnerabilities of advanced fighter jets operating in extreme cold climates. The mishap not only highlighted the challenges posed by Arctic conditions but also exposed broader issues with maintenance protocols and the reliability of the F-35 fleet.
The crash, which was captured on video and widely reported, involved a cascade of failures beginning with water-contaminated hydraulic fluid freezing in the aircraft’s landing gear system. This led the flight control system to misinterpret the aircraft’s status, ultimately resulting in an uncontrollable situation. While the pilot safely ejected and survived with minor injuries, the event has sparked discussions about the readiness of the F-35 program for operations in harsh environments, as well as the importance of rigorous maintenance and decision-making processes.
Incident Overview and Timeline
The day of the accident began with routine air-to-air combat training for four F-35s from the 355th Fighter Squadron. The temperature in Fairbanks, Alaska, was close to zero degrees Fahrenheit, a critical factor in the subsequent mechanical failure. The aircraft involved was piloted by an experienced aviator with over 2,200 hours of flight experience, including substantial time on both the A-10 and F-35 platforms.
The mission’s first sign of trouble emerged after an extended period on the ground, during which the aircraft’s hydraulic fluid, already contaminated with water, had time to freeze within the nose landing gear system. After takeoff, the pilot noticed the nose gear would not retract. Attempts to extend the gear revealed it was stuck at an unsafe angle, making a normal landing impossible and eliminating the option of using Eielson’s arresting barrier system.
The pilot, accompanied by his wingman, entered a holding pattern while ground crews and Manufacturers and Lockheed Martin engineers joined a 50-minute conference call to troubleshoot the issue. The consensus was to attempt touch-and-go landings to realign the nose wheel. The first attempt failed; the second, conducted at higher speed, resulted in ice buildup spreading to both main landing gear struts. This triggered a catastrophic flight control failure, as sensors incorrectly indicated the aircraft was on the ground, causing the jet to enter an uncontrollable mode and forcing the pilot to eject.
Technical Analysis: Flight Control System and Sensor Failures
The F-35 employs advanced automated flight control systems with multiple modes, including those for takeoff, landing, and ground operations. These modes rely on the Weight on Wheels (WoW) sensors, mechanical switches that detect the compression of landing gear struts to determine whether the aircraft is airborne or on the ground.
In this incident, the freezing of water-contaminated hydraulic fluid prevented the landing gear from fully extending, causing the WoW sensors to falsely register that the aircraft was grounded. As a result, the flight control system switched to “on ground” mode while the aircraft was still airborne at over 250 miles per hour and 372 feet above the runway. This mode, intended for taxiing and ground handling, rendered the jet uncontrollable in flight.
Lockheed Martin had previously identified risks associated with WoW sensor malfunctions, especially in cold weather. Maintenance bulletins had warned that unresolved WoW faults could lead to erratic flying qualities and controllability issues. However, these warnings were not fully integrated into the emergency decision-making process during the incident.
“Not acting on a WoW switch fault could result in WoW switches faulting on a future flight which can cause erratic flying qualities making it difficult for the pilot to maintain control of the aircraft.”
— Lockheed Martin newsletter, April 2024
Maintenance and Procedural Breakdown
The investigation found that the root cause of the failure was water-contaminated hydraulic fluid, estimated at around 30 percent, well above acceptable levels. This contamination likely occurred due to improper storage and handling of hydraulic fluid barrels, which had been exposed to humid conditions during deployments and were inadequately tracked and supervised.
The 355th Fighter Generation Squadron lacked a dedicated hazardous materials manager, and critical documentation was missing or incomplete. Maintenance personnel used a hand cart instead of a nitrogen servicing cart and failed to flush lines properly, further increasing the risk of contamination. Both the barrel and servicing cart used for the mishap aircraft tested at more than double the acceptable particulate limits.
Alarmingly, a nearly identical hydraulic system problem occurred on another F-35 at Eielson just nine days later. In that case, the pilot landed safely, but the recurrence underscored systemic issues in maintenance discipline and procedural compliance.
Historical Context and Fleet Reliability
The Eielson crash is the 15th recorded F-35 incident since the aircraft’s introduction. The F-35 program, initiated in 1995, has delivered nearly 1,100 aircraft globally but has faced a series of setbacks ranging from engine fires to system malfunctions and pilot disorientation events.
According to the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the F-35 fleet’s availability rate stands at 51 percent, significantly below the target of 65 percent. This rate has declined since 2021, reflecting ongoing reliability and maintenance challenges. The F-35A variant achieves only 10.5 mean flight hours between critical failures, compared to the required 20 hours, and repair times for mission-critical failures routinely exceed operational requirements.
The Government Accountability Office has highlighted persistent supply chain issues and maintenance delays, with up to 27 percent of the fleet grounded due to supply problems and an additional 15 percent down for maintenance as of September 2023. These challenges have prompted congressional scrutiny and ongoing efforts to improve mission capability rates.
“The operational suitability of the F-35 fleet remains below service expectations and requirements.”
— Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, 2023 Annual Report
Financial Impact and Cost Analysis
The loss of the F-35A at Eielson represents a direct financial hit of $196.5 million, making it one of the most expensive single-aircraft losses in Air Force history. This figure covers only the replacement cost of the jet and does not account for investigation, cleanup, or operational disruption expenses.
The F-35 program is the most expensive weapons system in U.S. history, with a projected lifetime cost exceeding $1.7 trillion. Each aircraft loss reduces the return on this massive investment and impacts fleet readiness, training, and support infrastructure.
The incident also necessitated a fleet-wide review of hydraulic fluid handling and maintenance practices, adding indirect costs related to corrective actions and operational delays. The recurrence of similar problems in other aircraft suggests that the financial impact of maintenance failures could be far-reaching.
Broader Implications for Arctic Operations
The Eielson crash underscores the unique challenges of operating advanced Military-Aircraft in Arctic environments. Extreme cold can compromise systems that function reliably in milder climates, as evidenced by the F-35’s hydraulic and sensor failures in Alaska. Previous incidents at Eielson have also involved cold-induced battery heating problems and false alarm triggers.
As geopolitical competition intensifies in the Arctic, reliable air power is crucial for U.S. strategy. Eielson AFB is a key hub for projecting force in the region, and any vulnerability in its F-35 fleet could have strategic consequences. The incident has prompted a reassessment of maintenance procedures, storage protocols, and cold-weather adaptations for F-35 operations.
Allied nations operating F-35s in similar climates, such as Norway, are likely to review their own practices in light of the Eielson findings. Norway, for instance, has equipped its F-35s with drag chutes for icy runways, a modification not present on U.S. models. The lessons from Eielson may drive further modifications and procedural changes across the global F-35 community.
Lessons Learned and Decision-Making Analysis
The 50-minute conference call between the pilot, ground crew, and Lockheed Martin engineers was both a testament to real-time technical collaboration and a case study in decision-making under pressure. While the team made a good-faith effort to resolve the emergency, the chosen course of repeated touch-and-go attempts failed to account for the risks of cascading sensor failures.
Lockheed Martin’s prior guidance on WoW sensor risks was available to the engineering team but was not fully integrated into the crisis response. The investigation concluded that a planned full-stop landing or controlled ejection might have prevented the loss, had the broader risks been considered.
The incident highlights the need for comprehensive emergency procedures that address the complex interactions between mechanical, environmental, and software systems in highly automated aircraft like the F-35. The recurrence of similar hydraulic problems shortly after the crash suggests that systemic improvements in maintenance discipline and decision-making protocols are urgently needed.
Conclusion
The Eielson F-35 crash was the result of a preventable chain of failures, from maintenance lapses and environmental challenges to system design vulnerabilities. The event exposed critical weaknesses in both the aircraft’s technical systems and the organizational processes meant to safeguard them. While the pilot survived, the loss of a $196.5 million asset and the subsequent revelations about fleet-wide maintenance discipline have prompted a reevaluation of F-35 readiness for Arctic operations.
Moving forward, the Air Force and its partners must implement lessons learned from this incident, including improved maintenance protocols, enhanced training, and revised emergency procedures tailored to the realities of extreme environments. As the F-35 continues to serve as a cornerstone of U.S. and allied air power, ensuring its reliability under all operational conditions is both a matter of financial responsibility and national security.
FAQ
What caused the F-35 crash at Eielson Air Force Base?
The crash was caused by water-contaminated hydraulic fluid freezing in the landing gear system, which led to sensor failures and the flight control system incorrectly switching to ground mode while airborne.
How much did the incident cost?
The direct loss was $196.5 million for the destroyed aircraft, not including investigation, cleanup, or operational disruption costs.
Are there broader issues with F-35 reliability?
Yes. The F-35 fleet has experienced recurring reliability and maintenance challenges, with only 51% of aircraft available for operations compared to a 65% target.
What changes are being considered after the crash?
The Air Force is reviewing maintenance protocols, storage procedures, and emergency decision-making processes, especially for operations in extreme cold climates.
Have similar incidents occurred elsewhere?
Yes. Another F-35 at Eielson experienced similar hydraulic issues just nine days later, though it landed safely. Other cold weather-related failures have also been reported in Alaska.
Sources
Defense & Military
Rostec Delivers New Su-57 Batch With Modernized Onboard Systems
UAC delivered a new batch of Su-57 fighters with modernized onboard systems to Russia’s Aerospace Forces. Rostec did not say how many.

United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), part of the Rostec State Corporation, has delivered a new batch of Su-57 fifth-generation multirole fighters to the Russian Aerospace Forces, Rostec said on November 19, 2026. The announcement does not say how many aircraft were in the batch, which plant built them or which base received them.
In its press release, Rostec said the aircraft went through a full cycle of factory tests before handover. Pilots of the Russian Ministry of Defense then tested them in various operating modes and flew them to their home airfield. According to Rostec, the delivered jets are equipped with modernized onboard systems and a weapons complex.
A Su-57 pilot of the Russian Aerospace Forces, who is not named in the release, said Aerospace Forces crews had completed acceptance of the aircraft. The pilot said the new technical configuration will widen the range of tasks the type is used for, and that capabilities built into the aviation weapons complex allow the use of new types of aviation weapons. The release does not describe the new configuration or name the weapons.
Rostec called the Su-57 “our main aircraft in the operational-tactical aviation lineup” and said it can carry stealth cruise missiles among other weapons. The corporation said demand for the type means its aviation plants are not reducing production rates, and that new batches are already in production. The release describes the Su-57 as designed to engage air, ground and naval targets at any time of day, including in difficult weather and under jamming.
Where the Su-57 program stands
The November announcement follows the pattern of an earlier Su-57 handover in 2026. Aviation Week reported on February 9, 2026, that the Russian air force had received a large batch of Su-57 fighters, citing a Rostec statement issued that day, and that the Rostec release gave no details on the number of fighters, the system updates or the new weapons.
UAC is also widening the Su-57 family. It has begun flight tests of the Su-57D, a two-seat multirole version, with Sukhoi Design Bureau Chief Pilot Sergei Bogdan flying the two-seat prototype on its maiden flight. Rostec has said the two-seat aircraft can be used for pilot training and for organizing and managing combat operations of a joint group of manned and unmanned aircraft. UAC CEO Vadim Badekha said he expects the two-seat version to contribute significantly to the type’s success in international markets.
For readers tracking Russian fighter output, the figures that matter most remain undisclosed in the November 19 release: the number of aircraft handed over, the total delivered so far in 2026 and the content of the new technical configuration. Rostec’s only production statement is that its plants are not reducing production rates and that further batches are being built.
Defense & Military
F-35 Simulators at NAS Lemoore Connect With Six Live Navy Jets
Lockheed Martin linked four F-35 simulators at NAS Lemoore with six F/A-18s in flight, using Navy NCTE and Link-Inject-to-Live systems.

Four F-35 full mission simulators at Naval Air Station (NAS) Lemoore, California, have connected in real time with six F/A-18 aircraft in flight, bringing live and simulated forces together for mission rehearsal. Lockheed Martin announced the demonstration on November 17, 2026, and called it a joint training first.
The link ran over two U.S. Navy systems: the Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE) and Link-Inject-to-Live (LITL) ground station systems, according to the release. Both were built to mix live, virtual and constructive forces, but Navy material published in 2023 described LITL as a tool for the F/A-18 and EA-18G fleets, with connections to other platforms’ simulators still being tested at the time.
What the demonstration linked
Linking airborne F/A-18s with ground-based F-35 simulators expands training capabilities and supports more realistic mission rehearsal, Lockheed Martin said. Pilots could train against virtual adversaries alongside both the live jets and the simulated aircraft.
The company said combining simulators and live aircraft gives a fuller training experience, from repeatable mission scenarios in the simulator to the physical demands of high-G flight in the aircraft.
“When we connect live aircraft, high-fidelity simulators and virtual adversaries, we can build more realistic scenarios,” said Ken Garrett, vice president of F-35 Training and Logistics at Lockheed Martin. He added that the approach tests decision-making under pressure and better prepares pilots for critical moments.
Lockheed Martin’s release did not say which squadrons took part, how long the event lasted or on what date it took place.
The Navy systems behind the link
LITL is a live, virtual and constructive (LVC) training system fielded by the Naval Aviation Training Systems and Ranges program office (PMA-205) and the F/A-18 and EA-18G program office (PMA-265). In a NAVAIR release dated May 8, 2023, the Navy said LITL injects high-fidelity simulated air-to-air and surface-to-air targets into F/A-18E/F and EA-18G weapon systems and was projected to save millions of dollars a year.
The system was fielded aboard aircraft carriers so squadrons could continue weapons and tactics training at sea. NAVAIR said it is not limited by weather, spares squadrons from using live aircraft as adversaries and was used for hundreds of events and thousands of sorties in 2022, up from 2021. Because it is portable, it also reduces the cost of travelling to detachment sites for red air adversary support, cutting fuel and maintenance costs.
“In naval aviation, we train like we fight, and Link Inject-to-Live makes training more realistic and easier,” said Cmdr. Sarah Abbott, PMA-265’s F/A-18E/F deputy program manager, in the 2023 release.
At the time, Chuck Terry, team lead of PMA-205’s Aviation Training LVC and Strategy Department, said connections to other platform simulators were being tested to enable integrated training. “The future use cases for LITL are really exciting,” he said.
The NCTE is the Navy environment on which such live and synthetic entities are connected. A U.S. Navy article from October 3, 2022, described the Tactical Combat Training System Increment II (TCTS II) connecting live aircraft to the NCTE, where they received constructive radar warning receiver threats. In June 2022, the ANTX22 exercise combined link inject-to-live with fleet simulators at Strike Fighter Wing Atlantic, constructive threats from the Naval Aviation Distributed Training Center and two live aircraft.
The Lemoore base
NAS Lemoore is the Navy’s designated West Coast strike fighter hub and master jet base, according to a U.S. Pacific Fleet article from January 26, 2017. The first four Pacific-based F-35C Lightning II fighters arrived there on January 25, 2017, joining the reactivated Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 125, the Rough Raiders.
The base’s commanding officer at the time, Capt. David James, said Lemoore offered “basically unencroached airspace” for training. The same article said more F-35C squadrons were expected at the base in the years that followed.
The November 17 demonstration put F-35 simulators and airborne F/A-18s on one training network at that base. Lockheed Martin directed readers to its F-35 Lightning II training page for more information and did not announce follow-on events.
Defense & Military
Boeing B-1 Load Adaptable Modular Pylon Clears Critical Design Review
Boeing’s LAM pylon for the B-1 bomber cleared critical design review, moving the external carriage design into build and test.

Boeing’s Load Adaptable Modular (LAM) pylon for the B-1 bomber has completed critical design review (CDR), clearing the external carriage design to move into the build-and-test phases. At the end of the review, the U.S. Air Force B-1 program office accepts the design and establishes the system product baseline, a formal reference point for future work, Boeing said on November 17, 2026.
The pylon could double the B-1’s payload capacity and lets the bomber carry external payloads, including future advanced munitions such as hypersonic weapons, according to Boeing. The company said the added flexibility could keep the B-1 relevant through 2040 and beyond as the U.S. Air Force modernizes its bomber fleet.
What critical design review means for the program
Boeing described the CDR as a key checkpoint showing that the system design is complete, technically sound and ready for the work ahead. The company said the milestone confirms the design is mature enough for the next development phase, in which hardware and software are prepared for manufacturing, integration and test.
For the B-1 external carriage effort, Boeing and the U.S. Air Force have agreed that the design can move into the build-and-test phases. “We are starting a new chapter in this journey,” said Lynsay Brannock, Boeing B-1 program manager. “This is the moment when we shift from designing the solution to preparing to produce and test it.”
Brannock said the team’s work shows what is possible when engineers focus on a practical solution that supports the warfighter. “This milestone helps move the B-1 closer to a new capability that is both relevant and innovative,” she said.
Dan Ruder, Boeing’s Bombers Advanced Programs manager, said, “The LAM pylon gives commanders more options.” He said the pylon supports future advanced weapons and additional payload types, helping the aircraft adapt to changing mission needs.
How the pylon uses the B-1’s existing hard points
The LAM pylon mounts on the B-1 using six existing hard points originally intended for the Air-Launched Cruise Missile. In a May 26, 2026, feature, Boeing said those hard points have largely gone unused since the aircraft’s nuclear role was removed under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Repurposing them lets the bomber carry payloads externally.
The concept came from Boeing’s B-1 team in Oklahoma City, led by engineer Tristin Lam, after whom the pylon is named. Boeing said the team developed the concept under the company’s independent research and development, that Boeing owns the intellectual property, and that the program started before the U.S. Air Force requested it. “This is what makes this company special,” Ruder said, adding that anyone in the company can create something for the warfighter that helps create sustained work for Boeing and its suppliers.
From preliminary design to build and test
The CDR follows the pylon’s preliminary design review in May (PDR), which engineers at Boeing’s Oklahoma City site completed before the company reported it on May 26, 2026. Boeing said then that the PDR included leaders from Air Force Materiel Command and key industry suppliers, and that the work would move toward CDR, aircraft modification, and ground and flight testing to field the capability rapidly.
The May feature also showed a B-1B Lancer assigned to the 419th Flight Test Squadron taking off from Edwards Air Force Base, California, to conduct flight tests on the LAM pylon. Jayson Ridge, Boeing’s executive director for Bombers Modifications & Upgrades, said at the time: “This increased customer investment reflects the Air Force’s need to preserve proven capabilities.” Ridge said the Air Force is funding upgrades such as the LAM pylon because practical, cost-effective improvements provide flexibility, speed and range now, and time for a transition to future platforms.
Earlier Air Force work on external carriage
The Air Force has examined external carriage on the B-1B before. In an expanded carriage demonstration at Edwards Air Force Base, the 412th Test Wing, Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) and industry partners showed external carriage on six of the bomber’s eight hard points, according to an article published by AFGSC. The demonstration used a notional hypersonic missile mock-up on a Conventional Rotary Launcher, and the bomber carried an inert Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile on a pylon attached to one of the original hard points.
“Currently we can carry 24 weapons internally, now it can be increased to potentially 40,” Lt. Col. Dominic Ross, B-1B program element monitor at AFGSC, said in that article, adding that the number depends on the type of pylon. Ross said the expanded capabilities are conventional only, which keeps the aircraft compliant with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START.
The same demonstration covered a long bay option, which Ross said would increase the intermediate bay capacity from 180 inches to 269 inches by moving the bulkhead. Col. Richard Barksdale, commander of the 28th Operations Group at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, said in the article that the added capacity would make the bomber more efficient, with fewer aircraft and aircrews at risk for the same number of targets.
-
Space & Satellites6 days agoSpaceX Catches Starship From Orbit as Flight 15 Booster Is Lost
-
Commercial Aviation6 days agoLufthansa A350-1000 Brings Starlink Wi-Fi to Long-Haul on December 3
-
Business Aviation7 days agoLos Angeles Approves Two Sky Harbour Hangar Campus Leases at VNY
-
Company Performance4 days agoS&P Upgrades Aviation Capital Group to BBB After ITOCHU Deal Closes
-
Aircraft Orders & Deliveries5 days agoPhilippine Airlines Signs Contracts for 15 Boeing 787-10 Dreamliners
