FAA Administrator Denies Agency is “Roadblock” to Boeing MAX 7 and 10 Certification

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Bryan Bedford has explicitly rejected the narrative that regulatory hurdles are the primary cause of delays for Boeing’s remaining 737 MAX variants. Speaking to reporters in Washington, D.C. on January 21, 2026, Bedford emphasized that the pace of certification for the MAX 7 and MAX 10 lies squarely with the manufacturer.

According to reporting by Reuters, the Administrator clarified that while the agency is heavily involved in the process, the timeline depends on Boeing completing the necessary engineering and safety documentation. The comments come as Boeing targets a 2026 certification window for both aircraft, following years of setbacks involving anti-icing systems and broader quality control reforms.

Clarifying the Regulatory Role

During the press briefing, Bedford addressed the ongoing delays that have kept the smallest and largest variants of the MAX family grounded. He pushed back against the idea that the FAA is holding up the process unnecessarily.

“I don’t think FAA is the roadblock on 7 and the -10 certification. We can only help get them there, but they have got to do the work, and they’re doing the work.”

, FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford, via Reuters

Reuters reports that Bedford noted the agency has “devoted significant resources” to the certification campaigns. However, under the stricter regulatory regime adopted following the 2024 door-plug incident and earlier crashes, the FAA has moved away from delegating authority. Instead, the agency now requires direct inspection and verification of systems, placing the onus on Boeing to demonstrate full compliance before approvals are granted.

Certification and Production Status Updates

Despite the stern words regarding responsibility, progress is being made on the technical front. Industry information indicates that Boeing executives are still expecting to finalize certification for both jets within the current calendar year.

Flight Testing Milestones

According to recent data compiled in industry research reports, the MAX 10 has advanced into a critical stage known as Type Inspection Authorization (TIA). This phase marks the entry of FAA pilots and engineers into the flight test program to verify systems directly. Meanwhile, the MAX 7 remains uncertified, pending the resolution of documentation and design reviews that overlap with the MAX 10 requirements.

Production Rate Increases

Beyond certification, Boeing is slowly ramping up its industrial output. Following the strict production cap imposed after the January 2024 Alaska Airlines incident, the FAA allowed Boeing to increase its monthly output. As of October 2025, the cap was raised to 42 jets per month.

Additionally, reporting by aviation intelligence outlet Leeham News indicates that Boeing is preparing to activate a new assembly line, dubbed the “North Line”, at its facility in Everett, Washington. While this line is eventually intended to support the high-demand MAX 10, it is expected to go live in mid-2026 building certified MAX 8 and MAX 9 models. This strategy aims to stabilize operations and train workforce teams before the MAX 10 enters full-rate production.

AirPro News Analysis

The Stakes of the 2026 Timeline

Administrator Bedford’s comments highlight a critical shift in the FAA-Boeing dynamic. By publicly stating that the FAA is not the “roadblock,” the agency is effectively insulating itself from blame should further delays occur. This places immense pressure on Boeing’s engineering teams to deliver flawless documentation.

For Boeing, the stakes of a 2026 certification are incredibly high. The MAX 10 is the company’s only direct competitor to the Airbus A321neo, which currently dominates the large narrowbody market. With a backlog of over 1,200 orders for the MAX 10 alone, further slips in the timeline could force major customers like United Airlines and Delta to reconsider their fleet strategies. The activation of the Everett North Line suggests Boeing is confident enough to invest in capacity, but that investment will only pay off if the FAA is satisfied with the safety data.

Frequently Asked Questions

When will the Boeing 737 MAX 10 be certified?
Boeing executives and industry forecasts currently target certification within 2026. The aircraft recently entered the Type Inspection Authorization (TIA) phase, a critical step toward final approval.

What is the “North Line”?
The North Line is a new 737 assembly line located in Everett, Washington. It is expected to activate in mid-2026 to help Boeing meet its production targets, initially building MAX 8 and 9 aircraft before transitioning to the MAX 10.

Why was the MAX 7 and 10 certification delayed?
Delays were caused by a combination of factors, including a redesign of the engine anti-ice system to prevent potential overheating, and a stricter FAA certification process implemented after the 2024 door-plug blowout incident.

Sources

• Reuters
• Leeham News

This article summarizes reporting by ABC7 NY and Eyewitness News.

Delta Flight Returns to Gate at LaGuardia After De-icing Fluid Leaks into Cabin

A Delta Air Lines flight departing from LaGuardia Airport (LGA) was forced to return to the gate on Sunday, January 18, 2026, following an unusual maintenance issue where de-icing fluid entered the aircraft cabin. According to reporting by ABC7 NY, the leak resulted in a passenger being soaked by the fluid shortly after the plane completed its de-icing procedure.

The incident occurred aboard Delta Flight 1307, an Airbus A220-100 service bound for Jacksonville International Airport (JAX). While the airline has confirmed that the fluid involved was non-hazardous and no injuries were reported, the event necessitated an aircraft swap and a delay of approximately three hours for the passengers on board.

Incident Details and Pilot Communication

Flight data indicates the aircraft pushed back from the gate during winter weather conditions, with temperatures hovering near freezing. The crew proceeded to the “Echo” de-icing pad at LaGuardia, where ground crews applied Type I de-icing fluid, a heated mixture of water and propylene glycol, to remove ice and snow from the wings and fuselage.

According to audio recordings from LiveATC.net, the situation developed as the aircraft began to taxi for takeoff. The pilot contacted air traffic control to request an immediate return to the terminal.

Hey Ground, Delta 1307 coming out of the Echo deice pad. We need to head back to the gate. We had a bunch of deicing fluid leak inside of the aircraft and soak a passenger.

Pilot of Delta Flight 1307 (via LiveATC.net)

When controllers asked if the passenger required medical attention, the pilot reportedly responded that the passenger likely just needed “a new pair of pants.”

Airline Response and Safety Context

Upon returning to the gate, the affected passenger was provided with a change of clothes and rebooked. Delta Air Lines issued a statement confirming the details of the event, emphasizing that safety remains their priority. The airline noted that the substance was Type I de-icing fluid, which is classified as non-hazardous to humans in limited exposure, though it can cause minor skin irritation.

Maintenance crews removed the original aircraft from service to inspect the source of the leak. Industry standards suggest that while cabin pressurization seals the aircraft in the air, seals around emergency exits and doors are less compressed while on the ground. High-pressure spray directed at these seams can occasionally result in “overspray” entering the fuselage.

AirPro News Analysis

The rarity of liquid ingress: While “fume events”, where odors from engine bleed air enter the cabin, are a known issue in aviation, a physical liquid leak resulting in a drenched passenger is statistically rare. Modern aircraft like the Airbus A220 are designed with tight tolerances, but the high-pressure application of de-icing fluid (often sprayed at 140–180°F) can exploit minor gaps in door seals or emergency exits if the spray angle is incorrect.

We note that this incident appears to be a localized seal failure or ground crew procedural error rather than a systemic flaw with the aircraft type. The swift return to the gate reflects standard Safety protocols, ensuring that the integrity of the cabin was verified before any attempt at flight.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is de-icing fluid made of?

The fluid used in this incident (Type I) is primarily a mixture of propylene glycol and hot water. It is often dyed orange to make it visible to ground crews. It is designed to melt ice and snow off critical flight surfaces to ensure the aircraft can generate lift.

Is de-icing fluid toxic?

Propylene glycol is generally recognized as safe (GRAS) by the FDA for use in food and cosmetics. However, in industrial quantities, mist inhalation can cause respiratory irritation. In this specific case, Delta confirmed the fluid was non-hazardous to the passenger.

How long was the flight delayed?

Flight data shows the actual departure occurred at approximately 5:22 PM EST, resulting in a delay of roughly three hours from the scheduled 2:10 PM EST departure time.

Sources: ABC7 NY, LiveATC.net, FlightAware

This article is based on the official preliminary report released by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding the January 2, 2026, accident in Superior, Arizona.

NTSB Preliminary Report: Slackline Collision Cited in Fatal Arizona Helicopters Crash

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has released its preliminary report regarding the fatal crash of an MD Helicopters MD369FF near Superior, Arizona, on January 2, 2026. The investigation confirms that the aircraft collided with a recreational slackline suspended across Telegraph Canyon, resulting in the deaths of the pilot and three passengers. The report highlights critical issues regarding the visibility of the obstacle and the effectiveness of the Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) system.

According to the NTSB’s findings, the accident occurred at approximately 11:00 AM local time. The helicopter, registered as N3502P, was conducting a private sightseeing flight when it struck the line, causing a catastrophic separation of the main rotor system. The fuselage subsequently fell to the canyon floor. The crash claimed the lives of pilot David McCarty, 59, and three passengers: Rachel McCarty, 23; Faith McCarty, 21; and Katelyn Heideman, 21.

Investigation Findings: The Obstacle and Visibility

The preliminary report identifies the primary hazard as a recreational highline, specifically a slackline used for balancing, strung between the canyon walls. The NTSB investigation revealed that the line spanned approximately one kilometer (0.6 miles) and was suspended roughly 600 feet above the ground. While the slackline was reportedly flagged and lighted, investigators noted significant discrepancies regarding its actual visibility to pilots.

Witnesses and first responders indicated that the line was extremely difficult to detect against the terrain. The report notes that a rescue helicopter operating in the area after the crash nearly collided with the same line, underscoring the difficulty of seeing the webbing even when crews are alert to hazards. Reports suggest the flagging may have been limited to one end of the span, and the lighting was either inactive or insufficient for daytime conditions.

The NOTAM System Disconnect

A central focus of the ongoing investigation is the dissemination of safety information through the NOTAM system. The NTSB confirmed that a Notice to Air Missions had been filed regarding the slackline. However, the warning was geographically attached to the Superior Municipal Airport (E81).

The accident flight departed from Pegasus Airpark (5AZ3) in Queen Creek, Arizona. Because standard pre-flight briefings are typically generated based on the departure point and specific route, the warning listed under the nearby Superior airport code likely did not appear in the pilot’s briefing package. Consequently, despite the hazard being “officially” logged in the system, the pilot was likely unaware of the wire’s existence before entering the canyon.

AirPro News Analysis

The tragedy in Superior has reignited urgent discussions within the aviation safety community regarding the modernization of the NOTAM system. Current protocols often rely on airport-specific filings that can bury critical en-route hazards if a pilot does not specifically query a nearby, non-departure aerodrome.

We observe that this incident parallels long-standing criticisms that the NOTAM system is antiquated. Safety advocates argue that hazards such as highlines spanning navigable canyons should be presented as geo-fenced obstacles on moving maps rather than text-based warnings hidden under specific airport identifiers. The fact that a rescue helicopter also experienced a near-miss suggests that the current method of marking and notifying pilots of temporary recreational obstacles is insufficient for low-level operations.

Context and Next Steps

The pilot, David McCarty, was the owner of Columbia Basin Helicopters and was described as a highly experienced commercial pilot specializing in utility operations, including firefighting and agricultural work. The flight was a personal sightseeing trip taken on the morning of his scheduled wedding.

The NTSB has stated that the investigation is ongoing. A final report, which will determine the probable cause of the accident and potentially issue safety recommendations, is expected to take between 12 and 24 months to complete. Future investigative work will likely focus on spectral analysis of the webbing to determine its visibility, compliance with marking regulations, and potential software improvements for pilot briefings.

Sources:

• NTSB Preliminary Report (PDF)