Regulations & Safety
NTSB Findings on United Airlines 737 MAX March 2024 Runway Excursion
NTSB investigation details runway condition misperception in United Airlines 737 MAX runway excursion at Houston IAH in March 2024.
This article is based on official investigative data and documents released by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding the March 2024 United Airlines Flight 2477 incident.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has opened the public docket for its ongoing investigation into the March 8, 2024, runway excursion involving United Airlines Flight 2477. The Boeing 737-8 MAX, registered as N27290, veered off the runway after landing at George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) in Houston, Texas, resulting in the collapse of its left main landing gear.
Newly released documents highlight a significant discrepancy between the flight crew’s perception of the landing environment and the actual runway conditions. According to the investigative reports, the Captain believed the runway was dry and braking action was “Good,” while data indicates the surface was wet and slippery. This misperception appears to have influenced critical operational decisions, including the selection of a low autobrake setting.
While the investigation is ongoing and a final probable cause has not yet been determined, the factual reports provide a detailed look into the human factors and external pressures present in the cockpit during the incident.
The central finding in the newly released documents is the conflict regarding runway condition codes, which are essential for determining landing performance and braking requirements. The NTSB docket reveals that the Captain, who was the Pilot Flying, recalled seeing condition codes of 5/5/5 for Runway 27 on the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS).
In aviation standards, a code of 5 corresponds to “Good” braking action, typically associated with a wet surface that is not slippery. However, investigators found that the actual ATIS broadcast at the time of the incident reported codes of 3/3/3. A code of 3 indicates “Medium” braking action, warning pilots that the runway is slippery when wet.
This disconnect extended to visual perception. The First Officer, serving as the Pilot Monitoring, correctly identified the runway as “wet.” In contrast, the Captain maintained the assessment that the runway appeared “dry,” a belief that directly impacted the braking strategy employed during the landing roll.
Based on the perception of favorable conditions, the flight crew made decisions that reduced the aircraft’s deceleration rate. NTSB data indicates that the Captain selected “Autobrake 1,” the lowest available setting. United Airlines standard operating procedures generally recommend higher autobrake settings (such as MAX) when runway conditions are slippery or uncertain. The docket further reveals that manual braking was not applied until the aircraft was approximately 6,000 feet down the runway. The crew attempted to exit the runway onto Taxiway SC, a high-speed exit, while traveling at approximately 39 knots. Investigators noted that this speed was excessive for the wet surface conditions present at the time.
As the aircraft attempted the right turn, the tires lost traction. The 737 MAX skidded off the paved surface into the grass, where the left main landing gear struck a concrete electrical junction box. The impact caused the gear to separate, and the aircraft came to rest on its left wing and engine nacelle. Fortunately, no injuries were reported among the 160 passengers and 6 crew members.
The investigation also sheds light on external factors that may have contributed to the crew’s decision-making. Transcripts included in the docket show that Houston Tower instructed the crew to “keep your speed up” during the approach to accommodate a tight arrival sequence.
Investigators suggested that this instruction might have created a “sense of urgency” in the cockpit to clear the runway quickly. The Captain reportedly requested to roll to the end of the runway to shorten the taxi time to the gate, a maneuver he stated he had performed “hundreds of times” in his career. The Captain is a veteran pilot with over 15,000 flight hours, including more than 9,600 hours on the Boeing 737, and had completed landing performance training just one month prior to the accident.
The release of these factual reports underscores a recurring theme in runway excursions: the danger of confirmation bias. When a pilot expects a “dry” runway based on prior experience or a misread report, they may subconsciously filter out contradictory visual cues, such as the “wet” appearance noted by the First Officer.
Furthermore, the “keep your speed up” instruction from Air Traffic Control highlights the subtle but powerful pressure placed on crews at high-volume hubs like Houston. While safety is always the priority, the operational drive to maximize runway throughput can inadvertently encourage crews to push the boundaries of stable deceleration, particularly when environmental conditions are worse than anticipated.
The opening of the public docket marks a significant phase in the NTSB’s process, allowing industry experts and the public to review the factual basis of the investigation. The docket includes operational factors reports, human performance studies, and transcripts from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR).
The NTSB has not yet issued a final report. The board will continue to analyze the gathered data to determine the official probable cause of the accident and may issue safety recommendations to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Sources:
NTSB Docket Reveals Critical Disconnect in United Airlines 737 MAX Runway Excursion
Conflicting Assessments of Runway Conditions
Braking Decisions and High-Speed Exit
External Pressures and ATC Instructions
AirPro News Analysis
Next Steps in the Investigation
Photo Credit: NTSB
Regulations & Safety
SAS A320neo Wrong Taxiway Takeoff Incident at Brussels Airport
A SAS Airbus A320neo nearly took off from a taxiway at Brussels Airport, aborted at 127 knots with no injuries. Preliminary AAIU report details contributing factors.
This article is based on an official preliminary report from the Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU).
On March 6, 2026, the Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) released a preliminary report detailing a severe aviation incident that occurred at Brussels Airport (BRU). According to the official AAIU documentation, on the evening of February 5, 2026, a Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) Airbus A320neo mistakenly attempted to take off from a parallel taxiway instead of its assigned runway. The aircraft reached a high speed before the flight crew realized the error and executed an emergency rejected takeoff (RTO).
The AAIU has officially classified the event as a “Serious Incident” under ICAO Annex 13 due to the high probability of an accident. The aircraft, operating as Flight SK2590 to Copenhagen with 165 passengers and crew on board, narrowly avoided a catastrophic collision with temporary fences and nearby aviation fuel storage tanks. Fortunately, no injuries were reported, and passengers were safely transported back to the terminal.
We have reviewed the preliminary findings, which highlight a complex “Swiss cheese” alignment of environmental, technical, and human factors. The report emphasizes that multiple overlapping issues contributed to the crew’s loss of situational awareness, rather than a single point of failure.
According to the AAIU timeline, the incident unfolded between 21:00 and 21:04 local time. The flight crew was cleared to take off from Runway 07R via an intersection designated as C6, rather than utilizing the full length of the runway. Operating in total darkness, the crew mistook taxiway “Outer 10” for intersection C6 and subsequently aligned the Airbus A320neo with Taxiway E1, which runs parallel to the active runway.
The preliminary report states that the crew initiated the takeoff roll down the taxiway, accelerating rapidly. The aircraft reached an Indicated Airspeed (IAS) of 127 knots (approximately 146 mph). The AAIU notes that the critical “V1” speed, the velocity beyond which a takeoff can no longer be safely aborted, was calculated at 132 knots for this specific flight, placing the aircraft just 5 knots away from the point of no return.
As the aircraft accelerated down Taxiway E1, the First Officer noticed that the forward visual perspective appeared unusually narrow and that the Captain was not responding to standard operating procedure callouts. Realizing the aircraft was not on the runway, the First Officer intervened.
“Stop, stop, stop, stop.”
, First Officer, SAS Flight SK2590, as recorded in the AAIU preliminary report.
At 21:04:09, the Captain immediately aborted the takeoff by applying full reverse thrust and maximum braking. The AAIU report details that at the moment the abort was initiated, the aircraft had only about 520 meters (1,705 feet) of taxiway remaining before it would have collided with temporary fences. While still moving at roughly 40 knots, the First Officer instructed a right turn to avoid the approaching barriers. The aircraft came to a complete halt in just 14 seconds, stopping near the intersection of taxiways V1 and C1, mere meters from the runway guard lights and the airport’s fuel storage farm.
The AAIU preliminary report does not assign blame but rather identifies several contributing factors. Environmental conditions played a significant role; the incident occurred after civil twilight in total darkness. Furthermore, the runway and taxiway surfaces were wet, which the AAIU notes caused glare and made painted ground markings highly difficult to read.
Infrastructure and procedural elements also compounded the risk. The specific intersection is officially designated as a “hot spot”, an area with a known history or high risk of runway incursions. The AAIU report highlights that the illumination for a crucial intersection sign was inoperable at the time. Additionally, the red stop bar lights at the taxiway/runway intersection extinguished before the crew arrived at the holding point, depriving the pilots of a critical visual reference.
According to the investigation, the SAS Airbus A320neo was not equipped with optional safety software such as the Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS), Airbus Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS), or Take-Off Surveillance 2 (TOS2). While aviation regulators do not currently mandate these systems, their absence is noted in the report as they are designed to provide auditory and visual alerts if a takeoff is attempted from a taxiway.
From an Air Traffic Control (ATC) perspective, the AAIU notes that the control tower supervisor had combined the ground and air frequencies. A single air traffic controller was managing both frequencies and dividing their attention among seven different aircraft. Following the report’s release, Belgium’s ATC agency, Skeyes, publicly stated that this staffing arrangement strictly adhered to existing safety guidelines for that time of night and emphasized their full cooperation with the investigation under a “Just Culture” framework.
We note that this incident serves as a textbook example of the critical importance of modern Crew Resource Management (CRM). Historically, steep cockpit hierarchies often prevented junior First Officers from correcting senior Captains, sometimes with fatal results. In this instance, the First Officer’s immediate, assertive command directly prevented a disaster, demonstrating that modern CRM training is functioning exactly as intended.
Furthermore, the absence of systems like RAAS or TOS2 on the incident aircraft highlights an ongoing industry debate. While airlines are legally compliant without these systems, wrong-surface events remain a persistent threat in commercial aviation. As the AAIU continues its investigation, we anticipate that the final report may include safety recommendations urging broader adoption of these technological safety nets, especially for operations at complex airports during low-visibility conditions.
Were there any injuries on SAS Flight SK2590? How fast was the aircraft traveling before the abort? When will the final investigation report be released? Sources:
SAS A320neo Narrowly Avoids Disaster in High-Speed Taxiway Takeoff Incident at Brussels Airport
The Sequence of Events: A High-Speed Near-Miss
Misalignment and Acceleration
The Critical Abort and Evasive Action
Contributing Factors Identified by Investigators
Environmental and Infrastructure Challenges
Equipment and Air Traffic Control Context
AirPro News analysis
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
No. According to the AAIU report, all 165 passengers and crew members were unharmed and safely transported back to the terminal via bus. The aircraft sustained only minor tire and landing gear damage due to high-speed braking.
The AAIU confirmed the aircraft reached 127 knots Indicated Airspeed (IAS) on the taxiway. The V1 speed (the speed at which takeoff must continue) was 132 knots.
The current AAIU report is strictly preliminary. A final report, which will include binding safety recommendations, is expected to be published in approximately one year, likely in early 2027.
Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) Preliminary Report: AAIU-2026-02-05-01
Photo Credit: Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit
Regulations & Safety
South Korea Audit Finds Cost-Cutting in Jeju Air Flight 2216 Crash
South Korea’s audit reveals regulatory failures and falsified documents linked to the non-frangible embankment that worsened the 2024 Jeju Air Flight 2216 crash.
This article summarizes reporting by Yahoo News, Reuters and official findings from the South Korean Board of Audit and Inspection.
On March 10, 2026, South Korea’s Board of Audit and Inspection published a comprehensive report that fundamentally shifts the narrative surrounding the tragic December 2024 crash of Jeju Air Flight 2216. According to reporting by Yahoo News and the state auditor’s findings, severe regulatory negligence and cost-cutting measures by the transport ministry were decisive factors in the disaster’s high death toll. The crash at Muan International Airport claimed 179 lives, making it the deadliest aviation disaster in South Korean history.
While initial investigations heavily scrutinized the flight crew’s response to a bird strike, the newly released 300-page audit reveals that the Boeing 737-800 collided with a rigid concrete embankment that violated international safety standards. Government simulations now indicate the crash would likely have been survivable had the airport’s infrastructure complied with legally required frangibility guidelines.
The state auditor’s report details systemic failures spanning more than two decades. According to the findings, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport constructed a 2.4-meter (7.9-foot) rigid concrete embankment at the end of the Muan runway to house a localizer antenna. The audit concluded this structure was built specifically to avoid the financial costs associated with leveling the surrounding sloping terrain.
Under international aviation standards, structures within runway end safety areas must be designed to break apart easily upon impact, a standard known as frangibility. The rigid concrete wall at Muan directly violated these international guidelines. Furthermore, the audit revealed that for up to 22 years, officials falsified documents. Between 2008 and 2024, the transport ministry certified operating permits and approved inspections that erroneously claimed the structure was made of breakable materials.
The auditor also identified widespread infrastructure issues beyond Muan, noting 14 non-compliant localizer installations across eight South Korean Airports, including major hubs like Gimhae and Jeju.
Jeju Air Flight 2216 was traveling from Bangkok, Thailand, to Muan on December 29, 2024, when it suffered a bird strike during its approach, severely damaging the right engine. Preliminary investigations cited in the reports suggest the flight crew mistakenly shut down the operational left engine instead of the damaged one.
The pilots subsequently attempted an emergency belly landing without deployed landing gear. Data disclosed by the Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board in January 2026 showed the aircraft was traveling at approximately 374 km/h (232 mph) during the belly landing. It slid down the runway and struck the concrete embankment at 232 km/h. Investigators estimated that passengers experienced extreme forces between 40 and 60 times the force of gravity upon impact, after which the aircraft erupted into flames. Only two flight attendants, seated in the detached rear section, survived. A government-commissioned computer simulation provided a stark contrast to the tragic reality. The simulation revealed that if the aircraft had landed on flat ground without the concrete obstacle, it would have skidded for approximately 630 meters and safely come to a stop.
“The government has pledged to take strict follow-up measures, including removing the concrete embankment at Muan,”
according to the summarized reports, which noted that a frangible structure would have caused significantly less damage and likely allowed passengers to survive the initial impact.
In response to the audit, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport stated it humbly accepted the findings and committed to rectifying similar non-compliant structures nationwide. The revelations follow a December 2025 parliamentary vote that launched an independent 18-member inquiry into the crash, spurred by victims’ families accusing the government of cover-ups and delays.
Additionally, in October 2025, families of the victims filed lawsuits against Boeing in Seattle and Illinois. The legal filings allege that outdated electrical and hydraulic systems in the Boeing 737-800 interfered with the aircraft’s landing capabilities following the initial bird strike.
At AirPro News, we observe that the South Korean auditor’s report serves as a critical reminder of the Swiss cheese model of Accident causation. While the initial emergency was triggered by a bird strike and compounded by apparent crew error, the ultimate cause of the fatalities was rooted in long-standing bureaucratic negligence. The revelation that safety documents were falsified for over a decade severely damages the credibility of South Korea’s aviation oversight. This disaster will likely prompt international aviation bodies to mandate independent physical inspections of runway end safety areas globally, rather than relying solely on self-reported compliance documents.
What caused the crash of Jeju Air Flight 2216? What is a frangible structure? How many people survived the crash? Sources: Yahoo News and Reuters, South Korean Board of Audit and Inspection, Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board.
The Findings of the State Auditor
Cost-Cutting and Falsified Documents
Anatomy of the Flight 2216 Disaster
From Bird Strike to Catastrophe
Survivability Simulations
Fallout and Legal Actions
Government Response and Boeing Lawsuits
AirPro News analysis
Frequently Asked Questions
The initial emergency was caused by a bird strike that damaged the right engine, followed by the crew mistakenly shutting down the operational left engine. However, the high fatality rate was attributed to the aircraft striking a non-compliant, rigid concrete embankment at the end of the runway during an emergency belly landing.
In aviation, a frangible structure is designed to break, yield, or shatter easily upon impact to minimize damage to an aircraft. International standards require structures in runway end safety areas to be frangible.
Out of 179 people on board, only two flight attendants survived. They were seated at the rear of the plane, which detached upon impact.
Photo Credit: AP photo
Regulations & Safety
IATA 2025 Safety Report Shows Decline in Global Aviation Accident Rate
IATA’s 2025 report reveals a lower global accident rate at 1.32 per million flights with increased flights and a slight rise in fatalities.
This article is based on an official press release from The International Air Transport Association (IATA).
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has released its 2025 Annual Safety Report, demonstrating a solid year of safety performance across the global Airlines industry. The comprehensive data reveals a declining overall accident rate, even as the total number of commercial flights increased year-over-year.
According to the official press release, the global all-accident rate dropped to 1.32 per million flights in 2025, an improvement from the 1.42 rate recorded in 2024. Despite this positive trend in overall incidents, the industry experienced a slight uptick in fatal accidents and total onboard fatalities, underscoring the continuous need for rigorous Safety standards and global collaboration.
Industry leaders emphasize that aviation remains the safest form of long-distance travel. Long-term trends highlighted in the report show significant improvements in fatal accident rates over the past decade, reinforcing the effectiveness of modern safety management systems and operational audits.
In 2025, airlines operated approximately 38.7 million flights worldwide, an increase from the 37.9 million flights recorded in 2024. Within this expanded operational activity, the global fleet recorded 51 total accidents. This represents a decline from the 54 accidents reported the previous year, though it remains slightly above the 2021–2025 five-year average of 44 accidents.
The all-accident rate of 1.32 per million flights translates to exactly one accident for every 759,646 flights. While this marks a clear year-over-year improvement, IATA notes that the rate is marginally higher than the five-year average of 1.27 accidents per million flights. The data reflects a long-term decline in aviation incidents that has characterized the commercial airline industry over the past decade.
Despite the improvement in the overall accident rate, the number of fatal accidents increased slightly in 2025. The report recorded eight fatal accidents, compared to seven in 2024 and a five-year average of six. Total onboard fatalities rose to 394, which is higher than the 244 fatalities reported in 2024 and the five-year average of 198.
This increase in fatalities drove the fatality risk metric to 0.17 per million flights, up from 0.06 in 2024. However, IATA Director General Willie Walsh emphasized the broader context of these figures in the organization’s press release. “Flying is the safest form of long-distance travel. Accidents are extremely rare and each one reminds us to be even more focused on continuous improvement through global standards and collaboration guided by safety data,” Walsh stated in the release.
Walsh further noted that a decade ago (2012–2016), the industry experienced one fatal accident for every 3.5 million flights. Today, that rolling average has improved to one fatal accident for every 5.6 million flights.
The most frequent types of accidents in 2025 included tail strikes, landing gear events, runway excursions, and ground damage. Notably, Airports facilities contributed to 16 percent of all accidents, prompting IATA to call for stricter adherence to global standards for runway safety areas and hazard mitigation.
In a significant safety milestone, there were zero loss of control in-flight (LOC-I) accidents in 2025. This marks only the second time the industry has achieved this, the first being the pandemic-impacted year of 2020. LOC-I events have historically been a leading cause of aviation fatalities.
Safety performance varied significantly by region of carrier registration. In Africa, the all-accident rate improved dramatically to 7.86 per million sectors, down from 12.13 in 2024, though the region still recorded the highest overall rate. The Asia-Pacific region saw its accident rate improve to 0.91, better than its five-year average. Meanwhile, Europe recorded 11 accidents, improving its rate to 1.30 with zero fatality risk for the year. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) experienced an increase in its accident rate to 2.74, driven by four accidents involving turboprop aircraft.
We believe the 2025 IATA safety data reveals a complex picture for the aviation sector. While the frequency of accidents is decreasing, a testament to robust operational procedures and advanced aircraft technology, the severity of the few accidents that do occur has driven up the fatality count. The complete elimination of Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I) incidents is a monumental achievement that reflects improved pilot training and flight envelope protection systems. However, we note that the 16 percent of accidents linked to airport facilities suggests that ground infrastructure, runway maintenance, and ground handling protocols require renewed focus and investment from global aviation authorities.
What was the global all-accident rate for commercial aviation in 2025? How many commercial flights operated in 2025? Were there any Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I) accidents in 2025?
Global Accident Rates and Flight Data
Fatalities and Major Safety Trends
Regional Performance and Common Incident Types
Common Accident Categories
Regional Highlights
AirPro News analysis
Frequently Asked Questions
According to IATA, the all-accident rate in 2025 was 1.32 per million flights, which equates to one accident per 759,646 flights.
Airlines operated approximately 38.7 million flights worldwide in 2025, an increase from 37.9 million in 2024.
No. The industry recorded zero LOC-I accidents in 2025, marking only the second time this has been achieved.Sources
Photo Credit: IATA
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