Merlin has reached a critical regulatory threshold in its pursuit of certified autonomous flight, securing Stage of Involvement 3 (SOI 3) approval from the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand for its core flight control and communication systems.

Announced in a press release on August 6, 2026, the milestone confirms that the software underpinning the Merlin Pilot platform has been verified against regulatory standards. The approval advances the company’s Part 23 certification program and was coordinated with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.

Advancing the Merlin Pilot certification program

The SOI 3 certification specifically covers two primary components of the Merlin Pilot architecture: the Flight Control Computer (FCC) and the Automated Communication System (ACS). The ACS is designed to interpret spoken air traffic control instructions and convert them into actionable commands, such as heading, altitude, and airspeed adjustments, which are then executed by the FCC.

In addition to the SOI 3 milestone, Merlin concluded an issue paper with the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAANZ) establishing the certification approach for the artificial intelligence and machine learning natural language processing capabilities used in the system.

Merlin Chief Technology Officer Tim Burns stated that the achievement establishes a foundation for certifying the company’s flight autonomy and artificial intelligence capabilities.

“This milestone underscores Merlin’s approach of building trusted autonomy in partnership with regulators. This is significant as we’re not building experimental AI, but rather aviation-grade autonomy that performs full phase autonomy from takeoff to touchdown,” Burns said.

Commercial targets and military integration

The regulatory progress aligns with Merlin’s stated timeline to introduce autonomous flight into commercial revenue service. The company operates a flight test and development center in Kerikeri, New Zealand, where it has conducted hundreds of autonomous test flights.

Merlin Founder and CEO Matt George previously outlined the company’s operational targets, noting that no traditionally crewed, fixed-wing aircraft has flown autonomously in commercial revenue service. George stated the goal is to achieve this milestone in New Zealand by 2027.

Alongside its civil aviation efforts, Merlin is developing autonomous capabilities for military applications. The company holds an Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity contract with the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) with a ceiling value exceeding $100 million. This program focuses on integrating the Merlin Pilot into the Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules, a project that completed its Preliminary Design Review in March 2026.

The company has also expanded its focus to larger commercial platforms. On July 23, 2026, Merlin signed an agreement with Israel Aerospace Industries to develop autonomy for Part 25 commercial cargo aircraft. This followed a July 17, 2026, demonstration at EAA AirVenture Oshkosh, where the company completed an autonomous landing using a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan.

AirPro News analysis

We view the completion of SOI 3 as a major de-risking event for Merlin’s certification program. In aviation software certification, Stage of Involvement 3 is the phase where regulatory authorities verify that the software code actually satisfies the design requirements and that the testing procedures are robust. Passing this stage indicates that Merlin’s engineering processes for novel artificial intelligence and machine learning applications are meeting the strict safety standards required by CAANZ and the FAA.

By pursuing concurrent development paths across Part 23 utility aircraft, Part 25 large cargo aircraft, and military transport platforms, Merlin is diversifying its integration risk. The successful conclusion of the issue paper regarding natural language processing is particularly notable, as certifying non-deterministic AI systems for critical flight operations remains one of the most significant regulatory hurdles in the advanced air mobility and autonomous aviation sectors.

Sources: Merlin, Inc.

This is original reporting and analysis by AirPro News.

The United States Congress is evaluating whether to streamline Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification requirements for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) aircraft to prevent regulatory gridlock, according to a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report published on June 12, 2026.

The CRS report outlines the complexities of certifying electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, which are designed to transport small payloads and a few passengers over distances of 10 to 150 miles. Lawmakers are attempting to balance the need to foster aerospace innovation with the stringent safety oversight implemented following the Boeing 737 MAX crashes in 2018 and 2019.

Certification timelines and regulatory hurdles

Current FAA rules grant a five-year validity period for transport category aircraft type certification applications. Normal, utility, aerobatic, and commuter categories receive a three-year window.

The CRS notes that certifying a new aircraft type typically takes between five and nine years. This timeline frequently forces developers to seek extensions to their initial applications to keep their certification programs active.

Noise limits for AAM applicants remain undefined by the FAA. The CRS report indicates that maximum noise levels and measurement conditions will differ from those established for commercial drones because of the larger size and weight of AAM vehicles. Separately, the FAA has not approved any AAM designs developed in China for use beyond experimental testing and limited flight demonstrations in the United States.

Legislative efforts to streamline approvals

Congressional scrutiny of commercial aircraft certification increased significantly after the Boeing 737 MAX accidents, culminating in the December 2020 passage of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act. The CRS report notes that Congress might consider relaxing requirements that industry views as impediments, potentially through alternative means of compliance that offer “equivalent levels of safety to more traditional or established certification regulations.”

To address the specific needs of the nascent AAM industry, a bipartisan group of senators introduced the Aviation Innovation and Global Competitiveness Act (S. 3885) on February 12, 2026. The Senate Commerce Committee advanced the bill by voice vote on July 22, 2026.

If enacted, the legislation would require the FAA to publish a certification plan for AAM operations within 180 days. The agency would also be mandated to establish nonbinding expected time ranges for major certification milestones within 270 days. Concurrently, the FAA is operating the eVTOL Integration Pilot Program (eIPP) to evaluate emerging technologies in real-world environments.

AirPro News analysis

We view the tension between rapid innovation and rigorous safety oversight as the defining challenge for the AAM sector over the next decade. The CRS report highlights a fundamental mismatch between the statutory three-to-five-year certification windows and the reality of a five-to-nine-year development cycle for novel aerospace technologies.

Congress appears willing to explore alternative means of compliance for eVTOL manufacturers, provided those alternatives offer equivalent levels of safety to traditional standards. However, the political memory of the Boeing 737 MAX groundings ensures that any legislative mandate to accelerate FAA timelines will face strict scrutiny regarding passenger safety and system redundancy.

Sources: Congressional Research Service

This is a developing story. Information may change as official details are released.

This article summarizes reporting by Reuters, The Wall Street Journal, Forbes, The Guardian, and CNN.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is investigating a loss of standard separation incident that occurred on August 4, 2026, involving Marine One and an Envoy Air commercial flight in the airspace near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). The safety occurrence took place when air traffic controllers did not halt commercial departures at the airport during the presidential helicopter’s takeoff from the White House Ellipse.

The incident highlights ongoing airspace management challenges around the capital. The specific ground-stop protocol that was apparently bypassed had been implemented following a fatal mid-air collision in the same airspace in January 2025.

Timeline of the separation loss

According to air traffic control audio reported by CNN, the pilot of Marine One radioed the DCA tower at 18:31 UTC (14:31 EDT) with a departure warning. The pilot stated, “Tower, do you copy. Marine One, three minutes to lift.” The transmission was reportedly not acknowledged by the controller.

Marine One departed the Ellipse at 18:33 UTC (14:33 EDT) en route to Joint Base Andrews. One minute later, at 18:34 UTC (14:34 EDT), Envoy Air Flight 3742 departed DCA bound for Pensacola, Florida. Envoy Air is a wholly owned subsidiary of American Airlines Group Inc., and the flight was operated using an Embraer E170.

The simultaneous movements resulted in a loss of standard separation. The FAA requires a minimum separation of 1.5 nautical miles horizontally and 500 feet vertically for aircraft operating in the airspace immediately surrounding the airport.

An FAA spokesperson confirmed the investigation to Reuters, noting that while standard separation was lost, the event did not appear to be a “dangerous close call” and the two aircraft were not converging.

Airspace protocols and the 2025 collision

The airspace surrounding Washington, D.C., operates under strict security and safety regulations. Following a January 2025 mid-air collision between a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter and an American Airlines passenger jet that resulted in 67 fatalities, the FAA enacted heavy restrictions on mixed air traffic in the area.

A key component of these revised safety protocols requires air traffic controllers to temporarily halt all commercial flights at DCA when Marine One takes off from the White House area. The August 4 incident occurred because this specific ground-stop procedure was not executed.

AirPro News analysis

We view this incident as a critical test of the FAA’s procedural safeguards in one of the most complex airspace environments in the United States. The failure to execute a mandatory ground stop, despite a direct radio warning from the Marine One crew, raises questions regarding controller workload management and inter-facility communication.

While the FAA has stated the aircraft were not on converging flight paths, the breakdown of a protocol designed specifically to prevent a repeat of the 2025 disaster will likely draw intense scrutiny from lawmakers and independent safety investigators. The focus will now shift to understanding why the DCA tower did not acknowledge the presidential helicopter’s departure notification and why the commercial clearance was not canceled.

Sources: Reuters