NTSB Reports on United Airlines Engine Fire and Evacuation at Houston IAH

This article is based on an official press release and final investigation report from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has officially released its final report detailing the investigation into a February 2025 emergency evacuation involving a United Airlines Airbus A319. The incident, which occurred at George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) in Houston, Texas, involved a suspected right-engine failure and subsequent fire during the aircraft’s takeoff roll.

According to the NTSB’s findings, United Airlines Flight 1382 was accelerating for departure to LaGuardia Airport on February 2, 2025, when the flight crew executed a high-speed rejected takeoff. The swift actions of the crew, combined with passenger awareness, led to a successful emergency evacuation on the runway. Fortunately, the NTSB confirms that no injuries were reported among the 112 individuals on board, which included 107 passengers and five crew members.

We have reviewed the comprehensive data extracted from the aircraft’s Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR). The final report (Occurrence Number: DCA25LA114) sheds light on the critical timeline of the engine failure, the communication breakdown between the cabin and flight deck, and a notable malfunction of an emergency evacuation slide that forced the crew to adapt their evacuation strategy on the fly.

Timeline of the Emergency Evacuation

Crew and Passenger Coordination

The NTSB report provides a precise timeline of the events that unfolded on the morning of February 2. At approximately 8:16 AM local time, the Airbus A319-131 (Registration: N837UA) was accelerating down Runway 15R. The flight crew rejected the takeoff at a ground speed of approximately 115 knots after suspecting a failure of the right-hand V2522 engine.

Data extracted from the Honeywell HFR5-V CVR reveals that the flight deck was initially unaware of the external fire. At 08:15:43, following the aborted takeoff, a flight attendant instructed passengers via the public address system to remain seated. However, just six seconds later, the flight crew’s rejected takeoff checklist was interrupted. A flight attendant contacted the flight deck to report that passengers had observed a fire in the right engine.

By 08:16:20, the flight crew initiated the engine fire checklist. The situation in the cabin, however, was escalating rapidly. At 08:18:06, a forward cabin flight attendant reported light smoke in the rear of the aircraft, noting that passengers in the aft cabin had already begun to self-evacuate. This was confirmed at 08:18:42 when the aft flight attendant reported visible smoke outside the right side of the aircraft.

Equipment Malfunctions and Safety Findings

The Failure of the 2L Evacuation Slide

A significant safety finding highlighted in the NTSB’s final report is the malfunction of primary emergency equipment during the evacuation process. As passengers and crew scrambled to exit the aircraft, the aft flight attendant attempted to deploy the evacuation slide at the aft-left door (designated as 2L).

According to the NTSB investigation, the emergency slide at the 2L door was found to be “damaged,” forcing the crew to redirect passengers.

Because the 2L slide was unusable, the flight crew had to quickly pivot and funnel the evacuating passengers to the aft-right door (2R). Despite this severe bottleneck in the evacuation route, the NTSB reports that all 112 occupants successfully exited the aircraft via the functioning slides and were safely bused to the terminal.

Instrument Indication Discrepancies

Another crucial takeaway from the NTSB investigation is the lack of immediate instrument feedback provided to the pilots. The report notes that the flight crew initially stated they did not have engine fire indications on their flight deck instruments. This discrepancy underscores the vital role that cabin crew and passenger observations played in alerting the pilots to the severity of the engine fire, ultimately prompting the execution of the engine fire checklist.

AirPro News analysis

The findings from United Airlines Flight 1382 arrive during a period of heightened public and regulatory scrutiny regarding commercial aviation safety. The early months of 2025 have been marked by several high-profile incidents, including a tragic mid-air collision in Washington D.C. in January. While the Houston incident resulted in zero injuries, it highlights ongoing industry challenges regarding aging aircraft infrastructure.

The aircraft involved in this incident was manufactured in 2001, making it 24 years old at the time of the evacuation. The NTSB has historically maintained a strict focus on the reliability of evacuation slides. The failure of the 2L slide on this aging Airbus A319 may prompt the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to issue further Airworthiness Directives (ADs) concerning the inspection and maintenance lifecycles of emergency slides on older airframes. Furthermore, this event keeps United Airlines’ operational safety at IAH in the spotlight, following a previous runway excursion involving United Flight 2477 at the same hub in March 2024.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

• What caused the evacuation of United Airlines Flight 1382? The evacuation was triggered by a suspected failure and subsequent fire in the aircraft’s right-hand engine (V2522) during the takeoff roll at George Bush Intercontinental Airport.
• Were there any injuries reported? No. According to the NTSB final report, all 107 passengers and 5 crew members evacuated safely with no reported injuries.
• Did all emergency equipment function properly? No. The NTSB investigation revealed that the emergency evacuation slide at the aft-left door (2L) was damaged and failed to function, requiring the crew to redirect passengers to the aft-right door (2R).
• Did the pilots know the engine was on fire immediately? The NTSB report indicates that the flight crew did not initially have engine fire indications on their instruments; they were alerted to the fire by a flight attendant who relayed passenger observations.

Sources

• National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Final Report: Occurrence Number DCA25LA114